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Sammendrag: 
 
Karakterutvikling henger nøye sammen med vår sansning og emosjonelle drag mot de 
ønskeobjektene som motiverer oss til handling, i følge Aristoteles i den Nikomakiske Etikk. 
Problemet som oppstår når vi leser Etikken, til tross for å bli møtt med en stor variasjon av 
psykologiske mekanismer, er at vi mangler støtteteorier som gjør det mulig å forstå hvordan 
mekanismene henger sammen. Mitt mål med denne oppgaven er å få på plass slike 
støtteteorier med utgangspunkt i den tekstlige kilden. For å få støtteteoriene til å fungere tar 
jeg i bruk flere filosofiske virkemidler og har konstruerer et tankeeksperiment om en tenkt 
karakter under utvikling av ønskeapparater.  
 
Denne oppgaven undersøker hvorvidt vi, i den Nikomakiske Etikk, finner overganger og 
metodikk for å utvikle våre evner til å ønske godt, til å søke de ønskeobjektene som er gode. 
For å forklare hvordan Aristoteles argumenterer for nødvendigheten av 
motivasjonsutvikling gir jeg et overblikk over det som kan kalles en aristotelisk psykologi. 
Jeg ser på hvilke komponenter sjelen har i Aristoteles sin begrepsbruk, men spesielt, hvordan 
de virker sammen. Ved å beskrive henholdsvis en emosjonell utvikling, intellektuell utvikling 
og sosial utvikling redegjør jeg for faktorene som spiller inn på våre evner til å ønske "godt".  
 
Under behandlingen av Aristoteles‟ ”motivasjonsteori” oppdaget jeg hvordan følelser og 
tanker påvirker hverandre, at intellektet er en ”sanser” i seg selv og at våre ”ønskeevner” 
betinger sosial anerkjennelse. 
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1 Introduction 
When we seek to explain why a person does some action we will often get the answer that the 
action is what the person desired or was motivated to do. The term „motivation‟, however, 
seems to have to cope with several distinct and separate references, like the value the person 
wishes by acting, the emotional „drive‟ that causes the action and even the process that leads 
up to us „becoming motivated‟ in the first place. However, when we use this term to make 
sense of the connection between our inner wants and desires and the satisfaction of these by 
our actions, we rely on the assumption that we understand these connections. Yet even at a 
glimpse, it is apparent that our „desiring‟, „motivational‟ faculties are of a vast complexity, 
triggering even the deepest metaphysical questions concerning action, change and perception. 
The aim of this paper is to make clearer the underlying mechanisms of our „desiring 
faculties‟ by studying one who does not shy away from metaphysical questions concerning 
desire in his theories, but if anything, is the source of them. Aristotle‟s work the 
Nicomachean Ethics (NE for short) presents his views on what it is for the life of the 
human being to be complete and lacking in nothing. The NE consists of a group of lectures 
intended for an academic Greek audience and incorporates his views on both the theoretical 
and practical implications of specifically human psychology and activity. Aristotle does not 
stop with a description of action as a description of whatever causes a person to act. Instead 
he is concerned with our development of desiring faculties in relation to what we deem 
good: i.e. a relation between what is in fact fine and good and a good‟s truthful 
representations in our desires. That is, in Aristotle‟s project, he draws a remarkably detailed 
and comprehensive picture of the human soul, including the diverse needs and wants that 
move us into action. Throughout the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle presents his view that 
what humans want in life, the object that all our „motivations‟ ultimately point to, which 
enables us as members of our species to be happy in a way only a member of our species 
can, is the Summum Bonum, or the Final Good, being happiness for man. The Nicomachean 
Ethics is a study of what this Final Good, our happiness, consists of, and includes not only 
some description of the objects of our desires (what motivates us) but also relies on a 
detailed look at what „motivation‟ is, drawing a connection between the way we are 
motivated and what motivates us – stating that the one has a causal influence on the other 
and that this influence is something that can be subject to a motivational process in and of 
itself - what we want and the way we want stands equally in relation to the good as the 
desires themselves. 
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We can organise the above-mentioned “complexity” of the term „motivation‟ by 
assuming that good-inducing actions can be explained by features of our desiring faculties. 
Aristotle lists readily which features our psychology and intellect consist of. The difficulty 
resides in understanding how these features contribute to a systematic understanding of 
human desires in action. 
In modern philosophy theorists have come far in explaining our actions, including 
the process in which we gain a positive attitude towards some object of desire, qua desiring 
what we believe to be desirable. We thus desire what we believe to be good, for us, the one 
who desires. So this positive attitude, „pro-attitude‟ we often say in modern philosophy1, is 
an individual‟s positive attitude towards an object he or she deems good. The enquiry often 
stops, however, at individual‟s motivation or intention, to ϕ (or act in the particular way 
acted), thus gaining some explanation on the reasons founded by said individual. Still, we 
do use the term „good‟ to signify the persons object of desire as a cause of action. Yet we 
do not ask questions concerning what good is, or how good the object is to this person, how 
it became good, or give an account of what the good is thought to be in general, leaving 
this up to the „intending‟ faculties of reasoning and desiderative capabilities of the 
individual. There seems none the less to be a consistent and lengthy history behind the 
development of, not only our desires, but our desiring faculties, including non-
individualistic concerns for what we find to be good in cooperation with others. Our „pro-
attitudes‟ seem also to have a strong emotional slant to them; we often feel strongly about 
what we believe to be good, or desire something strongly, describing „desire‟ as an 
emotion.  It also seems evident from our practice that conflicting desires are included in the 
arsenal of whatever moves us, like a conscious decision to pay the tram-fair and not catch a 
free ride versus a desire to spend the money on a nice cup of coffee instead. Yet we manage 
to resolve such conflicts within us, not always because the strongest desire „wins‟ but 
because we judge an end to be of greater value. It seems, also, that we are sensitive to the 
“pushes” and “pulls” that are involved in the actions of others, as well as ourselves, like 
when someone is being motivated from pleasure instead of pain, or whether we are treated 
well or badly. All these variations go into accounts of what makes an object of desire good. 
In contrast to modern theory, it appears Aristotle‟s concepts on human desiring attempt to 
include all the above lines of questioning. Indeed, Aristotle‟s project is inclusive of both 
                                                 
 
1
 Davidson, Donald. Essays on actions and Events. 2
nd
 edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 1991. Pg 86-87. 
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what makes the object of desire good in addition to an intricate theory of psychological and 
physiological change, all the while being mindful that it is the human animal under 
development that is the desiring agent.  
The list of concepts that go into Aristotle‟s theory of desire is indeed long. The 
problem, however, is not to list them. The problem is to understand how they are 
connected, in a systematic way, to explain action and development of human desires. The 
main contribution of this paper is therefore to select concepts crucial to Aristotle‟s theory 
of desire and provide explanations, consistent with Aristotle‟s textual basis, of how they 
function together in practice. 
While we can get some inkling of what many of Aristotle‟s concepts mean, we must 
be aware that where we would have to construct functioning theatrical scaffolding around 
Greek terms, a native of ancient Greece would have had an innate understanding of the 
terms that we find intricate and eluding. As mentioned in the beginning, in today‟s 
language we tend to use the term “motivation” in such a broad and case-sensitive manner 
that it is easy for the proverbial thin red line to get all tied up in a knot. But when these 
same topics are presented in classical theory they are well organised in a richer grammar 
and modal vocabulary that is ancient Greek, in a manner that lets us see more specific 
semantic uses of the same ideas. My knowledge of the ancient Greek language is limited 
and I will have to rely on trusted translational works and when necessary, compare 
conflicting translations. I will, however, present ideas on classical notions present in 
Aristotle‟s work, and attempt to organise some of these terms in a way that makes sense in 
current language. 
This, then, is the aim of the thesis: in order to sort out and understand how 
Aristotle‟s concepts on desire influence each other, we must design supporting theories that 
cohere to the concepts we find within the NE.  
1.1 The Case of “Hannah”: Someone Undergoing Early Development 
In order to create such scaffolding around Aristotle‟s concepts concerning desire, we will 
have to dig deep into the philosophical goody bag. Since he is altogether mindful of 
describing our desires in development and action, we will need to make a thought-experiment 
in order to see how his concepts work in practice. I have therefore constructed the case of 
“Hannah”: 
Hannah is born a healthy, bouncing baby girl who is not yet accustomed to 
choices or production in her actions. In this stage of Hannah‟s life we can 
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imagine that the pleasures and pains mentioned above are of great 
importance to her. Though not yet pre-empting that some pleasures are 
attached to specific objects, she nevertheless feels pleasure from some states 
and pain from others. Once Hannah learns some productive capacities, like 
muscle control and some higher order cognitive functions, she starts to see 
how, through her own actions she can be the cause of her own pleasures and 
pains. Her own actions involve social interaction with other people and after 
a while she starts to see how some of her production is connected with many 
others‟ production that can hinder her or be conducive to what she finds 
pleasing. But she still has very rudimentary pleasures and pains, mainly 
connected to her most basic needs. Then Hannah starts going to school and 
starts interacting with her peers. A new type of pleasure and a new type of 
pain emerges. All of a sudden what she finds rudimentarily advantageous 
and what she finds socially advantageous gives her different types of 
pleasure. The pleasure from, say, playing a complex game with her friends 
gives her a more heightened feeling than, say, eating her lunch. Her 
advantageous interaction with others gives off a new class of emotion. 
Hannah becomes interested in sports. She notices that she has some talent in 
track and field. She starts to experience that though running in itself can be 
tiring and sometimes painful, that there is something about the feedback she 
gets from her classmates and her teachers that give her a type of pleasure 
that makes it more than worthwhile. In fact, perhaps it is precisely because 
the sport can be fatiguing that others applaud her for doing her laps and 
sticking to the training, knowing that it is more difficult than simply running 
around the schoolyard. Hannah and her school team are competing at a track 
meet with many other schools in her district. She is running both 
individually and in a relay with her school team. However she finds out that 
the competitions are too close together and if she goes all out in the relay 
she will not be able to win her individual competition. The thought of not 
winning her own race really pains Hannah. In spite of this she goes all out in 
the relay. The team wins and she loses her own race but she is surprised in 
experiencing the relatively new positive feeling of making a good choice. 
She gained respect from her peers but the pleasure she feels has more to do 
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with her deliberation, conclusion and execution of the action being good in 
itself.  
We will follow Hannah in this thought-experiment in order to illustrate and utilise key 
concepts of development as presented to us in the Nicomachean Ethics. The phenomenon this 
essay is trying to explain is a person‟s “firm disposition” to do ethically good acts all the 
while this person is motivated to become thusly disposed. 
In order to approach Aristotle‟s psychological concepts in a conceivable order, I 
have separated his theory on desire into three main contexts: Emotional development, 
intellectual development and social development.  
In chapter 2, on emotional development, we will examine Aristotle‟s theories 
concerning our growing capacities, that we initially share with all living things, such as 
capacities for growth, nutrition and reproduction, and go on to animal capabilities for 
movement, perception and memory, thereby action in relation to our wants and desires, to 
cognitive dispositions over each of these emotional capacities.  
In chapter 3, we will look more closely into intellectual development, what our 
intellectual part consists of and what its job is thought to be in relation to wants and desires. 
We will look into what it is to have and intellectual development in relation to gaining the 
goods we want.  
Last, in chapter 4, we will look into social development, while focussing more 
specifically on descriptions of the needs and desires that bring about change in respect to 
these. Aristotle has as an intrinsic idea in his theory that we need each other in order to 
learn and realise what our wants and desires are, how we make goods, for ourselves and in 
life.  
While I separate three “routes” of development into emotional, intellectual and 
social development, which will lend structure to Hanna‟s story, we need to keep in mind 
that each parameter shares in the enablement of the other, meaning that getting a clear 
picture involves us in the end being able to consider them in relation to each other. I will 
draw these connections in chapter 5.  
1.2 A Schema of Motivation 
The investigation of motivation I present must take the „scenic route‟ in order to capsulate 
what motivation in the NE is per se, since Aristotle utilises a vast number of, for us, foreign 
terms and concepts. These terms will have to be explained in stride as the examination 
develops. At the same time “motivation” will touch upon a vast variety of subjects in the NE 
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that together build up Aristotle‟s concepts on ends and desire, seen as an integral theory, but 
where the concepts in the NE lack organisation as a theoretical whole. As each concept is 
explained I will in the next instance present a simplified overview of the concept, thereby 
preparing the reader to be better equipped to utilise the concept when arriving at the next. It 
will be fitting, however to start off with a general outline of concepts integrated into 
Aristotle‟s theory on human desire. 
1.2.1 On Ends (I) 
An essential step in understanding any concept of motivation will be understanding what 
actions are done for, or the end of the desired act.  
We start the hands-on investigation of the NE by looking at its first sentence of 
Aristotle‟s opening remarks in book I of the NE: 
“Every sort of expert knowledge and every inquiry, and similarly every action and 
undertaking seek some good” (1094a1-2), and “… in all activities the ends of the 
controlling ones [i.e. products, ibid.] are more desirable than the ones under them [i.e. 
action, ibid.]…” (1094a15).  
The use of the terms „seeking‟ (1094a1) and later „desirable‟ (1094a15) in his 
opening remarks have an important connection, where the seeking of activities can take 
identical meaning to desiring or wanting, where the good is a „product‟ (1094a5, 1095a14) 
over and above the actions that produce them (the action-production, praxis-poiesis 
distinction is present throughout the NE). So at least some of the content of the good is 
what makes it wanted in itself, as a product of our actions. It is tempting to draw the further 
conclusion that the quality that makes the good good is its composition and the refinement 
of the work involved in achieving it, i.e. our activity. „Good in itself‟ cannot in this 
interpretation be a different quality than the sum of its parts and the way it is achieved, but 
that does not leave out the possibility that whatever leads up to the product is itself good.  
After all it looks as if fine in the sense here alluded to, plays a rather marginal role 
in what moves us in our day-to-day lives. And how can one way of life seem fine when 
what appears to be fine differs from person to person? In order to address these questions 
we should look to how Aristotle forms his argument. The first book of the NE starts out by 
suggesting that all expert knowledge, enquiry, action and undertakings, is done for the sake 
of „a good‟. Does this sentence mean anything less tautological than that all actions are 
done for some reason? Well yes. What Aristotle is looking to here is to frame the question 
  
 
9 
“what does it mean to do something, anything at all?” by way of asking “why are actions 
done?”, where the most obvious answer is, because the action is good for the one who acts. 
That is, Aristotle frames the ontological status of actions by postulating that if an action 
fails to meet the criterion of being 1) for the sake of 2) some good 3) for the one who acts, 
then the action would not be an action. It would be something else. So what initially seems 
to be a tautology ends up listing quite a demanding set of relational criteria that must be 
met in order to call something know-how, an enquiry, an undertaking or an action. In order 
for an action at all to exist, there must be some access to information about who and what 
the one who acts is, what it is that is that would be good for this agent and how, what, when 
and in which way the agent should act in order for the good to be brought about, in order 
for an action to be called an action.  
 So expert knowledge and the methods required to attain it can be read as 
concerning actions and undertakings leading to the specific good we are after, or the 
(human) good (1094a1-3). Let us assume that the good at this point is simply the reason(s) 
for why things are done, or the ends of the activities. Aristotle further (1094a3) postulates 
that what he calls the good is what all things seek
2
. This might not look very controversial, 
but it is suggesting that, if we ask the question “what is the human good?” then we are 
simultaneously stipulating that the human good is for some more or less specific purpose. 
Might we therefore anticipate that the project will try to describe some sort of content for 
this process, the aim itself and a methodology concerning how to achieve knowledge of 
ends, in addition to an attempt to define this purpose? These are very ambitious goals, but 
let us assume this for the time being. The project also appears to make plausible the 
statement that there is a universal goal for all actions and it is either some good or „the 
good‟ („what all things seek‟). The later introduces to us that what is being said is similar to 
what we think of as a project dealing with ethics; that is, that we are trying to say 
something general concerning what many individuals really want with their lives and not 
only ourselves as readers or interpreters of a text. Another notable aspect here is the 
connotation of „the good‟. Note that the good in this sense is not relative to the vast 
variation contained in demarking „all things‟, but one good for all. The good demarks not 
                                                 
 
2
 Though there is a possible fallacy in the transition from „all actions seek some good‟ to „the good is what all 
things seek‟, I will suggest that these are beginning propositions only. One of the goals Aristotle has in mind is 
to dissolve this fallacy. 
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only desirability (we desire what is of highest worth), but also it demarks quality, what is 
truly fine or Kolos.  
We are in this sense devoted to the highest goods in a hierarchy. It would be a 
logical assumption to surmise that if these goods that are to kolon (fine) are superior, they 
would also be rare. One would also assume that if this is so, they would be highly sought 
after and fought over. This is what Aristotle himself surmises (1168b15). Under Aristotle‟s 
theory this is not the case, however. Aristotle admits that the highest goods are rare (indeed 
the objects that are kolos are so rare they should be loved; 1158a27-34, 1156b25), yet they 
are not those that anyone would desire, as most desire goods concerning personal wealth, 
pleasure and honour (1095a23). He then continues to imagine three types of lives that take 
each end as a serious basis for well-living by that that end, and compares them in terms of 
which lifestyle best deserves the heading of being a „happy‟ life: The life of consumption, 
the political life or the life of reflection (1095b17-20). Each of these versions fall short of 
what can be described as kolos, or that which comprises human happiness or flourishing.  
The question then is what might define the final good for man? There are three 
concepts that contribute to the good being good (objectively, under Aristotle‟s theory), 
comprising what I call a compositional theory of the good. First there is an object‟s Final 
cause (I will get back to a description of Aristotle‟s four causes, material cause, formal 
cause, efficient cause and final cause, in chapter two). An example of final cause that 
Aristotle uses is the final product of a sculptor‟s idea of the shape of a statue. The concept 
defines the final step that makes the statue an actual statue. The final cause defines what 
preliminarily will lead up to it. Second we have an object‟s ergon or function. An ergon 
defines whether something (or indeed someone) is functioning as the thing it is. An ergon 
is also determined by its finality in a process: what the thing could be if it functions well. 
Whether or not something functions well or not means whether it functions in activity as it 
should. The concept is interesting due to Aristotle‟s utilising it in defining biological 
function, of, say, a species. If we take a species, say a canine, we can observe the canine 
activity to get an idea of the canine ergon. We can in a sense use the species‟ noun as a 
verb, and ask “is this dog dogging well?” when we observe its activity according to its 
environment. Third, we have a good‟s controlling principle or archē. The controlling 
principle of what makes a good good, is the final good. Since goods i) tautologically are 
defined in terms of value, ii) since value is defined relatively as less or more in relation to 
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what it is of value for, iii) since goods then stand in a hierarchy, then iv) the goods that 
stand over and above the goods that lead up to it will be archē over these goods.  
A desire (orexis) will stand in a relation to the mentioned facets of what comprises a 
good. Yet orexis is a push or pull from within us. Whether we desire something or not can 
be described as whether or not we notice what that good is for - for us - by our faculties of 
sensation and emotion. An orexis will sense or be affected by the features of the good that 
make it desirable, depending on well functioning good-sensing faculties. But desires 
themselves will also stand in a relation to the objects that cause them, the idea being that it 
is the object, or external good, that is the cause of affective desire when coming within 
reach of the sensation of the desiring animal. Thus external goods can also be categorised 
under final causes, functions and controlling principles themselves. To give an example the 
final cause is our „object of desire‟, say an apple. The controlling principle over our hunger 
for the apple is our desire for health, and in continuation, life. The function of eating the 
apple is also life, but more important it is human living. That is, we eat the apple in the way 
humans do, for the reasons of humans, in order to do human activities.  
“What Hannah is”. What does that mean? The idea that what Hannah wants, what 
drives Hannah to do the actions she sets about doing, is the same as what Hannah “is” 
unveils a teleological thinking about the origins of Hannah‟s desires. In sum, this means 
that in all of us there is the potential to reach a certain end that is uniquely embodied by 
who and what we are, our Telos. The acorn is a potential tree, a puppy a potential dog, the 
young Alexander a potential conqueror of Babylon and India. So on the one side of a 
teleological development we have potential, but on the other we have the functions of that 
potential, what the particular potentialities are for, the end of that potential or what 
Aristotle calls the form of that potential. A particular entity‟s “forness” is described in 
Aristotle‟s Physics as a causal connection between what the subject is for and the end goal 
of the “forness” brought about by the subjects form. And these actualisations of Hannah‟s 
inner workings will be what her emotional composition or emotional (and intellectual, and 
social) form is for.  
It is explicated plainly (1094a5) that there is a difference between ends discerned by 
whether they are activities or products of these activities. What Aristotle calls „products‟ 
(ergon) are over and above the activities that produce them. At this point there is no reason 
to infer that „over and above‟ has any deeper meaning besides simply „resulting from 
them‟. Thus, it doesn‟t simply imply that activities are prior to the products they produce, 
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but suggests that there is some sort of hierarchy. If there is a hierarchy of goods, the criteria 
for their placement must of course be one of more or less good (i.e. value). It is at this time 
unclear whether there is any definition of good outside of whatever leads up to it. What can 
be a little confusing is how the two different types of ends, products of activities and 
activities themselves, relate to each other in such a hierarchy. Here the concept of 
organising principles, or rather „ends‟ in the tautological sense meaning purpose, enters the 
scene. In this case a purpose in one direction, let‟s say from shipbuilding to ship, the ship 
being what is good in this case. Under this interpretation the good gives meaning to the 
actions, pointing out specific actions that are for the sake of it. The hierarchy metaphor is 
strengthened in the description of desire (boulesthai) in 1094a15, where desirability or the 
strength of „wishing‟ is claimed to be proportional to the placement of the activity or end 
(an uncontested assumption at this point is whether „wantedness‟ automatically follows 
judgments of what is more fine). Whichever good is higher up will be correspondingly 
more desirable and a better goal for the knowledge and activities under it.  
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2 Emotional Development 
Aristotle‟s taxonomy of emotions and psychological components in human action can be 
fruitfully considered a continuation of several centuries of advanced philosophical reflection 
on the subject of the human soul. It comes as no surprise then that students of philosophy 
continuously strive to climb abreast of its level of subtlety. I will in this section discuss the 
markings of test subject Hannah‟s different stages, mainly her first stage. Many of the basic 
psychological components that we want to explain are already present at this point, though not 
“complete” in Aristotelian terms. While going through these explanations, however, we 
should try to keep in mind the pretext that emotional development in Aristotle‟s theory is 
tightly and essentially interwoven with both social and intellectual development in a complete 
life, as we will see in both present and following chapters. 
By observing some of the emotional starting points in Hannah‟s first developmental 
stages, the idea is that we will be able to align what we “observe” with certain Aristotelian 
concepts having to do with emotional development: These include, but are not limited to, 
pleasures, pains, affections, emotions, capacities and dispositions. We will look more 
specifically for arguments supporting the concepts of affections, capacities and dispositions 
along with pleasure and pain. In chapter 4, ”Social development”, we will be interested in 
how Hannah and the people around her can be sensitive to her “natural tendencies” in 
relation to others. Presently, however, we will be primarily interested in how such changes 
are made possible by Hanna‟s “natural tendencies” at different stages and how her 
emotions come into play in these tendencies.  
And just to outline the thought, a determinate of whether or not Hannah and the 
people in her life will be able to facilitate and live out some of their best properties given 
their “natural tendencies” will be what type of habituation they get and how they affiliate 
themselves to it (the goal of habituation, according to Aristotle, being to enable a person to 
consecutively do the right actions that bring about the right outcome at the right times for 
the right reasons, as “the good person” does, that will bring about the summum bonum, or 
„final good‟, being happiness for man). So ethical development implies that Hannah‟s 
“natural tendencies” to notice through certain feelings, and react to, certain happenings 
must change over time if they do not initially enable her to react aptly to the circumstance, 
or her desired outcome, free of inner and outward conflict. And pressing this idea forward, 
we should get the result that not only can our emotional make-up change, we can change it 
via several capacities that lay within our power: It can change by deliberation and decision, 
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by practice, by imagination, by acceptance of the potential value of change, by expanding 
or retracting our range of possible or permissible actions, by imagining and reflection on 
what the goal is, and by finding out which steps are needed and then executing them, to 
name but few means within our grasp. How our non-rational side is changeable, on the 
other hand, is another matter. That is to say, in order to draw the aforementioned 
connection between development that embodies a sustainable happy life and Hannah‟s 
motivational apparatus, we need at some point to explain how her emotional-motivational 
make-up can be brought in under the heading of self-change through a cognitive influence 
on her emotions, where the motivation for change lies within Hannah‟s grasp, being a part 
of what Hannah is.  
The idea that what causes our emotions can change over time, both practically and 
in terms of value, aligns itself quite well with our observations in Hannah, though we as of 
yet have no clear idea as to how and in what way emotions can transform over time. We 
observe that Hannah experiences pleasures and pains on a rudimentary level as an infant 
while gaining early on the ability to cause or have a say in things that bring about her 
pleasure or pain. She experiences that the pleasures brought about by some of her greater 
abilities are of greater importance to her the more she is able to master them, like when she 
interacts with her classmates and when she starts competing in track and field. She is able 
to assess great value to pleasures derived from her own activity, when playing or running, 
for its own sake, even though acquiring these values means doing something she previously 
would find too strenuous or taxing to be pleasurable or too exasperating or painful to 
execute. Emotions tied to her relations with her classmates and peers also undergo 
transformation, from being vehicles of basic needs and desires to being partners in, and 
teachers of, what she ends up valuing because they are socially facilitated, like imagining 
plausible or implausible worlds, daring to do together with others what she would not dare 
do alone, confiding and caring.  
The end goal for Hannah‟s potentials, or the summum bonum as we say, will then be 
the end goal that fulfils the potentials or telos in Hannah most precisely, to the greatest 
degree by way of embodying greatest value. Somewhat controversial to modern eyes is that 
these potentially actualised values are not necessarily relative to Hannah the individual, but 
can also be objectively of greatest value to her given that she is not sufficiently defined 
only as an individual. Not even defining her as a loved one and as a member of a 
social/legal grouping will suffice in Aristotle‟s view. She is also a genus of animal with a 
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certain biological make-up shared by all members of her species. So the traits of our 
common species will in part determine Hannah‟s telos that she by definition shares with the 
rest of her species along with many others species of both plants and animals. The traits 
cognition and intellect, two of the most prominent traits of our species, play an enormous 
role in opening up possible summum bonum and will not only be utilised to give direction 
to our telos but will also by definition be incorporated in the end goal itself.  I will pick up 
again some of the technical content of teleological thinking in sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 
2.2.3. 
2.1 An Introduction to Aristotle‟s Concept of the Bipartite Soul 
It would be helpful to get a clearer idea as to what Aristotle‟s framework for 
psychology is and a preliminary taxonomy of the soul as focussed upon and developed by the 
time Aristotle wrote the Nicomachean Ethics in Plato‟s academy. In his early investigations, 
in the Republic, Plato famously divides the soul into three distinct parts, which we will soon 
begin to look at. As we shall see, Aristotle will be fully aware of the arguments for this 
tripartite psychological distinction. But instead of following Plato‟s organising of these 
psychological elements into three distinct and separate parts of the soul, Aristotle, while 
heeding Plato‟s three origins of desires, instead organises these distinctions into two headings 
for conceptually different distinct parts of the human soul: A part of our soul that has to do 
with reflection, reason and various cognitive activity that fall under the heading of calculation 
(logismos) and the part that is incapable of such reasoning faculties that can instead be 
“informed by” or “listen to” reason. In this discussion I will closely follow W.W. 
Fortenbaugh‟s (Duckworth 2008, 2. Ed) analysis of this development for the sake of briefly 
presenting essential terms and taxonomy of the soul nuanced enough to continue the 
discussion on motivational development. I will not rely on this secondary source exclusively, 
however, but comment on the original texts where necessary. 
Fortenbaugh gives fruitful heed to a contemporary development in the subject of 
human psychology at the time of Plato‟s academy in Athens, by placing Aristotle‟s two-part 
division of the soul (the logical - alogical division) temporally and theoretically ahead of 
Plato‟s three-part analysis in The Republic. As we recall from the Republic Plato famously 
divides the states according to what he regards as a division within man qua man, which have 
each their corresponding desires (580d7-581b10):  
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Enthymia or epithumia: The appetitive part of the soul, concerned with nutrition, 
growth, and gain. Epithymia corresponds to the desires of hunger, thirst, sexual appetite, and 
the desire for money and material gain over others. 
Thymos: The self-other-oriented part of the soul concerned with the human “spirit” or 
“temper”, manifest in emotions like anger at being slighted, shame, low or high self-worth. It 
is from Thymos that the desires for honour and greatness, high self-worth, self-protection and 
self-love, honesty or self-truth have their origin. This part is necessitated by social interaction. 
 Logos: A part that enables the capability of reasoning, reflecting, planning, 
calculating and deciding, which concerns itself with the desire and love for knowledge and 
universal truths. It also involves in us a wish to “follow calculation” (604d5-6), meaning a 
desire to make the steps a requirement in solving puzzles along with an open interest in 
resulting conclusions. As enthymia, thymos and logos are bound to disharmony and inner 
conflict, logos is the origin of the desires that nudge our soul in a certain direction by a 
leading impulse (604b3-4). 
Aristotle recognises these three centres for variation of desire in his ethics, and ads a 
fourth, though in his ethics these centres are most often explained in relation to their objects 
of desire in a broader sense than in early Plato. Epithumia is a non-rational drive for objects 
that “seem to be pleasurable” (NE 1111a31-32). Thymos is a non-rational desire that has as its 
main object of desire that which seems to be good (1149a15). Logos represents both a 
supposition for an object of desire to be in truth good and desirable, and also represents 
desires for different types of knowledge (i.e. practical, technical, theoretical etc.). A fourth 
centre for desire is added to the above list by Aristotle: Boulesis is a (deliberated) rational 
desire and is often translated as „wish‟. Boulesis has as its object to combine knowledge and 
what is rationally known to be good, a rational desire for an end (1111b26).  
We see that for Plato all of the above psychological categories are strong emotional 
movers and potential sources of a vast variety of actions, and as mentioned he in fact uses 
these psychological distinctions as a model for his tripartite republic divided into a mercantile 
class representing enthymia, a soldier class representing thymos and the philosopher kings 
representing logos. Indeed Aristotle includes Plato‟s distinctions in his psychological analysis 
and even makes a similar move, of explaining mans inner workings by exemplifying three 
types of lives in his arguments on three specific endoxa (qualified and rational common 
opinions) on what a life of happiness is thought to be: A life of consumption (from 
  
 
17 
enthymiatic desires), a life of honour or the political life (from thymiotic desires), and the life 
of contemplation or the intellectual (from desires stemming from logos) in book I.5 of the NE.  
Under Fortenbaugh‟s interpretation, the emotions and desires of enthymia and thymos 
in Plato‟s tripartite theory do not partake in the cognitive activities of the logismos, the 
reasoning capacity, and do not have cognitive content themselves. The emotion fear is distinct 
and separate from thoughts about a fearful situation because fear involves desires from the 
subcategory of thymos, or enthymia, while thoughts about the situation will engage desires 
like wanting to know what will happen or a desire for a truthful result which will have their 
origin in logos. This separation proves problematic, however, when faced with mixed 
examples. For instance, we have both cognitive prepositions that have emotional causes, like 
deliberation over an unjust act that have emotional causes under other distinctions, like the 
emotion shame, or emotions like fear that have a cognitive cause, like expectation.  
Fortenbaugh warns us not to make the tempting move of simply bridging the gap 
between early Plato and Aristotle by simply assigning enthymia and thymos to the alogical 
half of the soul and logos to the logical half, thereby bringing Plato‟s theory within 
commensurable reach of Aristotle‟s bipartite psychological theory. Though the case of 
emotions causing cognition, and vice versa, is not controversial for Plato, and though Plato‟s 
Socrates evidently saw an intimate connection between emotions and cognition, we never get 
a clear idea of how the one partakes in the other. Indeed when asked to provide an explanation 
on how emotions interact with thought, Plato relies on metaphor in his answer. When in 
Plato‟s Philebus Protarchus asks Socrates the following question: how it can be that pleasures 
and pains are true or false in the same way that opinions are true or false, in this way evoking 
Plato‟s Socrates‟ reflection over the relation between emotion and thought. Socrates answers 
that pleasures often occur simultaneously, together with false opinion (36c6-d2, 37e10). 
Emotions are thusly described as epiphenomena with no apparent causal link. The best 
Socrates can do here is to observe that one often follows the other (38b9), then having to rely 
on dodgy empiricism, or that opinions have a tendency to “fill up” (I take it he means increase 
the intensity of) pleasures or pains (42a9), which again looks more to be metaphor than 
explanation. 
The two-part division of Aristotle on the other hand, commands the advantage of 
being able to provide an explanation for both elements of a mixed emotional/cognitive 
response. Under this analysis Aristotle argues against Plato‟s view that logos, thymos and 
enthymia are separate qualities that do not partake in each other‟s activities. Instead, the 
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alogical half in Aristotle‟s theory “is above all the seat of psychic phenomena open to reason” 
(Fortenbaugh, 75, p. 35). 
The account clarifies how Aristotle is able to make a connection between the logical 
and alogical halves of the soul by way of his theory of demonstrative science: Much of the 
distinction between Plato and Aristotle, according to Fortenbaugh (p. 11-12), hinges on their 
definitions of “following, together with” or meta. In Plato‟s Philebus (37 e10) Socrates tells 
Protarchus that pleasures often occurs meta, or together “with”, false opinion, whereby 
Protarchus rightly points out a distinction between simultaneous occurrence and causal effect 
will be arbitrary at best. While in Aristotle‟s Topics the definition of meta is given an entirely 
different meaning. In the Topics (156a32-33) meta is defined as causation, following 
scientific principles that Aristotle lays down in his Posterior Analytics (90a14-15, 31-2, 93a3-
4), called efficient cause or the motive cause. According to this principle, the definition or 
essence of a given phenomenon will necessarily refer to the cause of that phenomenon.  It is 
implicit in the definition of a subject in existence that it has come about, so the definition will 
thusly be sufficient if it states the cause of the „coming into being‟ and demonstrates, why this 
is so. When asking “what is a waterfall” the definition asked for must invoke the cause of the 
phenomenon, that “a waterfall is water in free-fall, by way of gravitational force”, the 
definition says why a waterfall is. Analogously, we can demonstrate what an emotion or 
cognition is by way of stating its causes. If the emotion anger for instance, is demonstratively 
caused by the thought of outrage, then the thought “outrage” will necessarily enter into the 
sentence that defines “anger” in this instance: “His anger is, or exists, because we treated him 
unfairly. The thought of this unfairness is causing his anger”. One main advantage to 
attaching demonstrative logic to emotional phenomena is that we are able to see clearly how 
and why cognitive phenomena interacts with emotional phenomena and vice versa, relieving 
the need to rely on metaphor or epiphenomena when considering the links between cognition 
and emotions. Emotions are causally open to reason and reason is open to change by emotion. 
We are also able to give explanations for the phenomena and state reasons subject to rational 
demonstration. 
The principle of efficient cause helps us clarify Aristotle‟s view on what separates 
emotions and other sensations and affections. All emotions have thought as a part of their 
efficient cause. This means that any sensation or feeling that does not have thought as at least 
part of their efficient cause does not qualify for the term “emotion”. This is not to say that 
thought has to be a part of a direct causal explanation of all emotions. It can be the thought of 
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what the emotion is for, its function or goal which can be “formulated” as a thought, like the 
thought of a safe haven to the emotion fear. This distinction should become clearer in the 
upcoming discussion on affections. 
Emotions on their part are organised into practical and non-practical emotions. The 
main difference between them is that the practical ones are obviously goal oriented while the 
others are not (p.79-80). The interesting facet of this distinction is the use it has for aligning 
different emotions into the logical/alogical halves of the soul. Confusingly, we can construct 
examples that evaluate an emotion as practical here and non-practical there, but when we 
regard an emotion‟s practicality under the qualification of logical or desirable goals then we 
are also given a tool that can rightly sort emotions along the logical/alogical parts of the soul. 
Another important Aristotelian distinction that will prove useful to draw from 
Fortenbaugh‟s analysis is Aristotle‟s distinction between a political/ethical psychology and 
his biological psychology known to us from Aristotle‟s work De Anima. In Aristotle‟s 
biological psychology he makes a distinction quite similar to the logical/alogical distinction, 
namely a distinction between sensation (aisthêsis) and cognition/intelligence (nous). When 
making the later separation Aristotle is widening the field of investigation to include not only 
us humans, but also plants and animals – the vast variety of all living things. Now instead of 
drawing lines between the logical/alogical, he draws lines between nutritive, sensitive and 
cognitive capacities (Fortenbaugh, p. 27) amongst the living creatures, in a hierarchy of baser 
to finer capacities.  
We see this in the NE as well. In book II of the NE pleasure is described as being 
shared by plants and animals, drawing upon De Anima‟s biological psychology: “For pleasure 
both is something shared by the animals, and accompanies all things falling under the heading 
of choice (since in fact what is fine and advantageous seems pleasant)” (NE11034-35). But 
the biological common faculties shared by animals and humans stop with pleasure and pain in 
the Ethics. Interestingly Aristotle figures that both the logical/alogical faculties of man fit 
under the heading of cognitive capacities in nature (1097b33-98a5).  
Aristotle names the appetitive, sensing but also reflective part of the animal 
kingdom, mainly embodied by man, nous. Nous in De Anima (we will also be looking at 
nous in NE VI, in 3.2.1) has the capacity for calculation and thought (DA414b18-19, 
415a7-9) found only in a small part of the animal kingdom, capable of producing 
conclusions of “rightness and wrongness” (DA427b). Fortenbaugh makes a point of 
animals not being able to partake in nous. Since human emotions and moral virtue are 
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subject to nous then an animal‟s affections will not be the same as a human (p. 67). Our 
biological processes and needs are still about the same objects as animals‟, like hunger, 
thirst and sexual desire, and they all have the same physiological efficient causes (see the 
above chapter), which are all necessary biological faculties. When grouped under the 
heading of nous these bodily drives are not subject to “rightness or wrongness” at the level 
of being originated through physiological processes, but from the above we can infer that it 
is when these processes enter in under the faculty of persuasion (p.84) that we can begin to 
talk about “rightness and wrongness”. We can also knowingly reflect upon our biological 
faculties and choose to do actions with the aim of producing the pleasure that comes 
thereof.  
Lastly, let me expound one more essential biological term that plays a central role in 
both the biological and ethical of Aristotle‟s psychology: Orexis, (sometimes translated as 
desire) is a common description of all the above mentioned seats of desire (epithumia, 
thymos, logos and boulesis) in that it describes only what it is that pulls or pushes us into 
action. Orexis is linked to sense perception (as mentioned above, aisthêsis). It is described 
in De Anima as the souls one-way “reaching out” to an object deemed significant by the 
animal (via its imagination or phantasia), preparing the body to “receive” change (Juarrero, 
MIT 2002). Given sensation (aisthêsis), there necessarily exists also imagination 
(phantasia) and appetition (epithumia), and where these exist, desire (orexis) also exists, by 
necessity (DA II.2413b23-25). This mechanism applies to all classes of animal, including 
humans. Such change, say Hannah‟s hunger, must necessarily be brought about by 
something other than that which receives change. Say Hannah notices her uneaten lunch, 
then that lunch is what we call the object of change or the object of desire, which brings 
about the change in Hannah. So in Aristotle‟s view, the object of desire is the first cause of 
the change, so to speak. Since such change and affection can also occur between emotions 
or emotions and though or vice versa, this concept of duality between that which changes 
and that which is being changed will by necessity also exist within our psuchē or soul.  
From the above introduction of Aristotelian terms, concepts and theories, let me 
propose the following taxonomy of the soul: 
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Table 2.1 
For now this diagram will represent my interpretation of the building blocks of 
Aristotle‟s theory of psychology. Though not complete, it duly illustrates the relations of each 
psychological concept and will hopefully help us keep some central distinctions separate from 
each other.  
2.2 Affections, Capacities and Dispositions 
Now that we have a clearer notion of what Aristotle‟s psychological framework 
consists of, our second step will be to get a better idea of what entities emotions consist of and 
how we understand their changing or being changed. Change in our psuchē, oft translated as 
„soul‟ or „mind‟, falls under Aristotle‟s distinction of quality (Categories VIII) in the sense 
that they can contribute or diminish the souls functioning well, in the area of human 
excellence, goodness and badness (Met. V.14 1020b12). A quality of our soul‟s potential for 
change can either be stable, long lasting and difficult to change, i.e. be in a state, or be easily 
changed or changed quickly, i.e. be in a condition. In the following section we will examine 
how both the soul‟s stability and rapid change are thought to work. 
In the NE‟s analysis of the soul, Aristotle makes the reduction that that the things that 
can happen to the soul fall under three generic categories. In the NE II.5 (1105b20) Aristotle 
explains this analysis and describes in a simple sense these three generic parts dealing with 
change and how we react to the world as comprising of i) affections, ii) capacities and iii) 
dispositions. Here is an outline, pending further support, of how we can initially understand 
these terms: 
Affections are the sensations that are usually conjoined with pleasures and pains that 
„happen‟, for lack of a better word, when we are acted upon or behave in a certain way. 
Affections happen to us (the arguments for this statement will be presented shortly in the 
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discussion of affections) and are involuntary. This presents us with a difficulty in 
explaining how something that happens to us in a passive sense plays a role in what we do 
actively when we instantiate actions. And if character development includes how we react 
as affected agents, how can it be said that we are able to change our emotional reactions 
over time when we have no power or choice over emotional content at the level of 
affections.  
Capacities have to do with our individual emotional make-up, which determines 
which specific affections are triggered by specific events, in addition to the degree of 
emotional „intensity‟ that arises together with the affections, and whether these affections 
give rise to pleasures or pains. To take an example, when Hannah runs she presumably gets 
some sort pleasure from the activity, be it from the action itself or perhaps from a belief 
concerning her activity, which is greater than the pain of fatigue from running, where the 
one outweighs the other. She then has the capacity to tolerate pain and fatigue for some 
purpose, and vice versa a capacity for pleasure when running. Capacities can be „about‟ 
physical, psychological and cognitive objects, like fear when faced by pain and formidable 
opponents on the track-field. The affection then of „courage‟ would be described as the 
particular affection relative to how formidable her situation is, while the degree of 
pleasures and pains involved, the degree to which she is affected by her situation, would be 
described as her capacity in this regard. 
Our dispositions overlay both affections and capacities and can be described as 
rooted but not always determinate behaviour. It is said that we are disposed over our 
affections, capacities, pleasures and pains. This entails a human ability to reflect upon how 
we typically act or are. Dispositions are different from affections and capacities in that they 
are subject to an intellect performing choices and decisions. As Aristotle argues (II.5 
1105b30, 1105a8-9), we are neither praised nor censored for having affections or 
capacities, while we can be censored for our dispositions, i.e. dispositions are things we can 
do something about, otherwise we would not be blamed for negative affections, like being 
greedy. In sum, affections happen and capacities we have or are capable of having, while 
dispositions refer to our consecutive actions. The consecutiveness of our dispositions will 
in part be due to how our affective and capacitive makeup functions, while we can reflect 
upon dispositions in both past tense, what we do typically, and hypothetical future tense, 
what we should do.  
All three of these notions deserve to be discussed in turn. 
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2.2.1 Affections 
As I initially stated affections bear the properties of being initial reactions to events as they 
appear to us
3, allowing us the property of “being moved” (II.5. 1106a5). “The reception of 
change” is what Aristotle calls „affections‟ in the Categories (Categories VIII, under the 
heading of “qualities”, together with dispositions, capacities and shape, more on this under the 
discussion on „dispositions‟, and „capacity‟). Though the Categories deal with 
scientific/linguistic principles, the concepts of “reception” and “change” ring true also in 
terms of individuals undergoing a change in gestalt by external events. So what is being 
changed here is Hannah‟s emotional state in respect to some outside influence or event. And 
perhaps it is prudent to ad that, within the Ethics, affections will be causal changes humans 
undergo involuntarily, but are caused by the practice we partake in, including complex social 
relations in addition to thoughts, ideas and attitudes. Let us also understand that what affects 
Hannah and how Hannah is affected will play an important role in Hannah‟s experience by 
way of learning what to pursue or what to avoid. So clarifying some of these observations will 
be the goal in the following explanation.  
Germaine to the analysis is the observation that when we talk about Hanna‟s being 
affected we are in fact talking about her action in the passive verb form of the verb “to act” 
in the ancient Greek text
4
. Let me explain: First, it is plain that the active form of the verb 
“to act” would be action. Let us also call it practice, or praxis as derived from the text. But 
what would the passive form be? Can we even imagine a passive form of “action”? One 
suggestion, as just mentioned, is that we can think of the passive form of the verb “to act” 
as instances or modes of a subject being acted upon. In the Greek text let us call the passive 
verb form a “passion” as it would be awkward for us to say that we are “being passioned” 
which might be closer to the passive verb form we are after („passion‟ comes from 
paschein in greek , derived from pathé often translated loosely as „emotion‟). So this 
affection is something we can understand as an emotion that emerges when something 
happens to us, when we are subjects to some happening. What can be confusing, is that 
                                                 
 
3
 By “appear” I wish to invoke both biological/perceptual and cognitive/ethical “appearance” or phantasia.  
4
I owe this idea to L.A. Kosman (Berkley 1980, A. O. Rorty red. p104), who argues that the events praxis and 
paté happen in a sense simultaneously, being the same event described under different tense. While Kosman 
claim‟s the identification of praxis with pathé creates a paradox, that if it is the same event then by this definition 
we cannot allow the one to be the “unmoved mover” or causally lead to the other. I do not quite see this, on the 
grounds that we can imagine the sequence of events in steps, also causally, involving Aristotle‟s substantial idea 
of both a „before‟ and „after‟ an affecting cause, like his concept of event-evaluation that which follows from his 
concept of being cognizably disposed “over” affections. It follows that the grammatical tense will refer to events 
before, present and after affection. 
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affection here is so closely linked to all following actions, like hitting, being hit and being 
set into motion to hit back, that it is hard to see where an affection ends and an action 
begins. We can at least rely on the fact that affections refer to a causal connection between 
actions and being acted upon. 
In order to make sense of the definition in Categories book VIII, affection, and to 
link the concept of “change of quality” in the Categories with what we can understand as a 
change of affective character state in the Ethics, it can be helpful to exemplify the causal 
chain happening here. What we can say initially is that affections refer to a causal event, be 
it physical, sensory, perceptual or cognitive. Here it might be helpful to divide such events 
into physical precognitive sensing of events, like being affected by the pain of a wound, a 
cognitive event like fearing, relying on an expectation, or a combination of the two, like 
fearing the expectation of a wound. A “reception” of the event by a subject could then be 
called a change in emotional state due to pain and/or cognition of a circumstance. A 
reception of change can be taken to be transitions in emotional state, from unafraid to 
afraid, or another example, from having a neutral view of someone to having grudging ill 
will in view of some event caused by that person, together with (Aristotle says “attended 
by”, meta, here meaning causing5, II.5 1105b23) whatever pleasures and pains follow this 
change.  
The chain of events involving affections seem to evolve within a type of sequence 
prompted by the statement that there is a “reception of change” happening as mentioned 
above. So what we first have is an initial state of pre-reception, usually characterized as a 
state of rest as exemplified by the Greek word pathé or “passive state”. This state will also 
bear importance on the mechanism I will mention under the next discussion on capacity, as 
this state will also imply a “readiness” or “non-readiness” for being changed (the states‟ 
potential readiness for change), so keep this in mind. Next comes the reception-part, pathos 
or “that which happens”: „that which happens to the subject‟. The subject‟s state is altered 
by some event. Third, this change causes an alteration within the subject. The event is 
„received‟ involving a change of the passive state, and notice the grammatical tens of “that 
which happens”…at present - present-tense – meaning that the change in the subject is 
happening simultaneously with the evolving event. The subject‟s apparatus involving the 
subjects “readiness” or “non-readiness” will be involved in how the event is simultaneously 
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 W. W. Fortenbaugh, 1975. 
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received and how it will change. These apparatuses include the subject‟s senses, emotions 
and cognitive abilities. The “readiness” of the subject‟s state will then determine if, how 
and with which apparatuses, the subject will be set in motion, which is the fourth step. We 
assume that the senses are aligned in some systematic way with our emotions (more on this 
while discussing capacities). The change in state will then be almost spontaneous, 
dependant on how “ready” it is. Then we perceive the change to a varying degree, 
dependent upon whether it is pleasurable (invoking a possible judgment that the change is 
good, desirable or of worth, indicating that the chance will be followed by desires to make 
it last, make it happen again or pain, sorrow or regret at its loss), or painful (invoking a 
possible judgment that the change is bad, worthless, or undesirable, prompting desires of 
discontinuation, fear, anger or avoidance and relief when it is gone). If the change is too 
small, it will not be emotionally „perceived‟. As we have seen, many of Aristotle‟s 
explanations of phenomena are based on the assumption that phenomena in nature have a 
purpose, and here, we might add, it looks as if the purpose of our event-reception apparatus 
is to make forthright an evaluation, pleasurable/painful, good/bad, of worth/worthless, to 
inform us both about this particular event and what a desired outcome would be now and in 
similar future circumstances, given the premise that we are in action or being acted upon. 
What happens next? Well we are already on thin ice, as we are trying to say something 
general about a wide variety of event-receptions, followed by either an automated or 
conscious evaluative response from the subject, or a motion or action. So let‟s get back to 
our example. 
If we were to involve the idea of affection to our case, Hannah at a very young age, 
we should get an idea of what role affections play at this stage. However, if we look to the 
preliminary definition stated above, derived from NE II.5, 1105b20-23, the affections stated 
there are the affections that usually only happen in adult activity. These affections correlate 
to specific situations in adult life, instances that produce reactions like anger, fear, grudging 
ill will and several others. This is not how we understand what appears to be affection in, 
say, a toddler
6
 such as one year old Hannah. Never the less, it seems that a toddler is 
capable of showing clear signs of the arousal of pleasure and of being affected (1105a2-5). 
                                                 
 
6
 In short „todler-Hannah‟ is affected in a way that is similar to the appearance of advanced non-human animals, 
whereas the human-specific affections refer to affections causing pleasures and pains retaining to either results 
that are generically good for humans or goods that can be generically good for humans, including affections 
related to social, judicial and intellectual activity. 
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What we lack at present is an observation supporting that a very young person already at 
this early stage displays whatever mechanisms are involved in identifying internal 
emotional change and its causes. 
So imagine one year old Hannah. She can already walk and even run and is well into 
the process of learning to eat on her own. And while she cannot be said to have higher 
cognitive abilities involving such complex functions as speech or the ability to reason, it 
would be wrong to say that she didn‟t feel pleasure or pain, the basic products of affections. 
Now place this toddler in front of a piano for instance. When she depresses a group of keys, 
clavier notes to ring out. These notes cause Hannah to display tell tale signs of exhilaration. 
Hannah starts to laugh and she cannot control her own movements, let alone the pleasure, 
surprise or excitement we can imagine she‟s experiencing. Strange as it may seem, for this 
person of a limited cognitive development, it appears as if she puts two and two together, the 
notes from the piano and her own pleasure, by way of experiencing a systematic connection 
between the two. She gains control of her arms and starts to bang the keyboard with 
accordingly more and more violent strokes. 
But where do Hanna and her feelings of pleasure stand in relation to her being the 
cause of her activity if she is in a sense the subject of her activity? How could these 
emotions then in turn instantiate other emotions that in turn produce actions? Well, say that 
the pleasure that arises from her clunking leads to her hitting the keys even harder with 
greater variety. There seems to be some direction or dynamic between Hannah on the one 
hand being subject to sounds varying in key and strength causing her to feel in certain 
ways, and Hannah on the other hand producing the actions that create more sounds. The 
problem, however, is not only in which sequence the events “passion” and “action” happen, 
but also that the two different events confusingly seem to cause each other.  
So what is happening here? When one year old Hanna is clunking away, her arbitrary 
actions produce sounds that in turn affect her as subject to those sounds, producing in this 
instance the emotion pleasure. This is indicated in her cognitive judgement that she wishes to 
repeat the action, and in the same breath repeat the emotional response. It is odd then that this 
child can do something in an active sense, that in turn is being done to her in a passive sense. 
Though this order of events may seem to be what is going on, it goes against the grain of what 
we intuitively may think happens causally. We may hold the belief that the subject Hannah is 
causing the pleasure in the activity of making notes, and not the other way around, since we 
like to look upon humans as the originators of their own movement. However it looks as if 
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this intuition has to be abandoned in the present case. Even more confusing is what is being 
done to her by the notes seems to cause her to do even more. What is evident is that some 
kind of change is happening here, and that Hannah is receiving this change in her own way. 
Another toddler may start to cry. As it appears, we are able follow the sequence of events 
from random action to triggering a sound, heard by Hannah, surprising her in a pleasant, 
frightening or exiting way, involuntarily to a judgement that a repetition is desired voluntarily.  
Whether affections are able to fall under the heading of being voluntary or not is of 
little importance if affections do no play a role in what we do actively. This is evidently not 
the idea that Aristotle has in mind. As we have seen with the piano, we can through our own 
activity in the world place ourselves in situations that instantiate our actions to bring about 
situations that have a specific affection-production (or avoidance) as its aim. In addition, 
Aristotle also understands that whatever instances we bring about will not have any lasting 
effect on us as affections come and go as whatever causes them comes and goes. Instead, it 
looks as if the chronological parts of action that can tell us something interesting about an 
affection is whatever happens before and after an emotion is set of.  
Let us then look at the idea of someone putting two and two together, meaning 
connecting a certain event with a certain affection-aroused emotion. This idea looks to be 
too advanced for our case, the one-year-old. Indeed the idea of understanding and being 
able to point out which factors affect us emotionally seems here to be necessary in order for 
us to have anything to say about the matter – for a person of more advanced cognitive 
abilities, and even then, not all the time. Now the main arguments for us being able to have 
such a complex understanding of particular event-emotion „causality‟ are the „meta‟-
abilities that Aristotle describe in his treatment of dispositions (I‟ll present a fuller 
overview when presenting the concept of dispositions). At present we need to identify 
which motivation (let‟s call it that since it‟s a toddler hardly has reasons) lead Hannah to 
desire „clarification‟ as to her role in the production of booming noises. The motivation in 
the case of the piano is her desire to make incidental surprise and excitement, last or 
happen again. Surprise and excitement can also drive us to fear and give us a strong urge to 
flee. The difference separating the different responses, for adults, is either ignorance or 
understanding of whether the situation is dangerous or not. Cognition of this level would be 
a remarkable feet for a one-year-old. 
At present, however, it looks as if what is happening, and what discerns tots that run 
away and tots that „stand fast‟ and clunk away are a simple competition of emotions, 
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thereby making cognition of affections a faculty of comparing two or more separate 
affections. This idea leads us to three valuable premises for us having some power over our 
affective states: In order for us to display the ability of separating action from affection it 
seems necessary that we (A) have the capacity to access a memory of previous affections, 
(B), recognise or „know‟ what is causing the affection and associate the cause with (A) so 
as to differentiate which causes lead to which affection, and (C) be in a position to pick out 
the relevant affection and react to its cause.  
The concept of us voluntarily
7
 causing our own involuntary affections is not 
difficult to grasp. Given that Hannah was the initial agent in the stroking of the key, though 
she did not know what would happen, we can say she instantiated the emotional result, and 
discovered what happened. I can just as easily pinch myself to the same effect, and while I 
cannot choose to be affected by pleasure instead of pain when I pinch myself, the point is 
that the action leading up to that point is none the less voluntary. The function of event-
reception would be worthless unless we were able to discover which events by necessity 
produce which emotional responses.  If our senses weren‟t connected to event-receiving 
emotions in a systematic and predictable way we would lead dangerous, miserable lives 
indeed, not feeling pain from being burned here and feeling joy from being slighted there. 
In the future, when Hannah wants to instantiate a pleasure related to her sense of sound she 
might go to the piano and start experimenting with the aim of reproducing that specific 
affect she experienced with her first encounter. She might even wonder as to what precisely 
caused this affect. We do not doubt that she soon will desire to discover her role in finding 
and choosing different keys, which ones make a high pitch and which ones make a low 
one, what happens when they combine together with the whole flora of experiences these 
produce.  
What we can imagine Hannah doing in her first developmental tier is mapping her 
own affective reactions and gaining experience in both the range and predictability of 
emotions that certain events will bring with them. We will return to the social-dependency 
aspect these mechanisms bring with them later. An understanding of this map will have a 
say in what she approaches and avoids and will play a part in future actions as they are 
learned. 
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 Here I mean voluntary in the minimal sense that I am the cause of the action and that it was possible to have 
done otherwise. 
  
 
29 
There are two points to remember: 1. We can establish that there is an emotional 
development through life, that changes are „timed‟ in some way by facilitation and learning 
ability, by nature, yes, but more importantly, within the area of „that which can be changed‟ 
by learning. 2. What happens before and after affection can lie under the heading of that 
which can be changed.  
2.2.2 Capacities  
As with an affection, a capacity (dunamis) is characterised two ways: (1) In the field of ethics 
and character development a capacity is characterised by its range and degree of strength of, 
say, an emotion or ability and how greatly it is affected by a desire (orexis), while in the field 
of metaphysics a capacity is (2) a potential property, condition or state innate in the subject 
which given the right point in development and circumstance will become an actual property, 
condition or state. To put it in its Aristotelian flow-chart it is when the changing or activation 
(kinesis) of a capacity or potential property (dunamis) happens, changing the capacity 
(dunamis) to an exercising power (energeia) becoming an actual property/disposition (hexis), 
illustrated as so:  
Table 2.2
8
 
The characterizations (1) and (2) need clarification. As for (1) the characterisation 
of capacity in the ethics and Categories 8, and to recap, while an affection is something‟s 
reception for change, a capacity has to do with that things “readiness” for change, in the 
sense that the subjects “readiness” will invoke the person‟s ”capacity” to change in a small 
degree, or a large degree, fast or slowly, easily or with difficulty, activating the emotion 
pleasure here or pain there etc. This readiness is regarded as the subject‟s readiness to act 
and says something about that subjects ontological state: 
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 I owe this illustration to Eyjôlfur Kjalar Emilsson. 
Potentiality:    Actuality: 
Dunamis (capacity) 
 
Kinesis (movement/change)  Energeia (functioning/working) 
 
     Hexis (disposition) 
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Another kind of quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or runners or 
healthy or sickly – anything, in sort, which they are called in virtue of a natural capacity or 
incapacity. For it is not because one is in some condition that one is called anything of this 
sort, but because one has a natural capacity for doing something easily or for being 
unaffected... Similarly with the hard and the soft: the hard is so called because it has a 
capacity not to be divided easily, the soft because it has an incapacity for the same thing. 
(Cat. 8, 9a14-27) 
Here we see that a capacity has to do with a subject‟s ability to exercise certain 
functions in practice. As Aristotle mentions, a boxer or runner will have the potential 
ability to run or box, otherwise we would not call them boxers or runners. Another 
connotation of capacity seems to be the capacity to do something well
9
, since you would 
not be called a runner or a boxer if you did not do it well. But even more confusingly, 
Aristotle adds that these potentialities belonging to the subject qua the subject, when they 
are capacities, are there from nature. Are they not there by training or by practice? And 
how can a capacity to maintain health be regarded in the same way as a capability to box or 
run well? Is the one not a product of training and the other one not? Instead of thinking of 
these capabilities as a mixed bunch of what is hypothetical and what is imminent, it seems 
that Aristotle is suggesting that these imminent potential exercises exist “in virtue of” or 
because of the capacity. So it looks like these „exercisings‟ do not say very much about the 
capacities themselves or the natural capacities. That is, the „exercisings‟ are not necessary 
for the capacity to exist; however, it does appear as if the capacities are necessary in order 
for the „exercisings‟ to exist. Are the capacities enough to explain the exercising? It does 
not appear so. Health and being a boxer are not necessary outcomes for someone who is 
capable of being good at boxing or of being healthy. Such a person could just as easily find 
interests in other activities or have an accident so as to cease being a boxer or being 
healthy. So “in virtue of” means that capacities are necessary, though not sufficient, for a 
specific activity to exist.  
“Natural” seems here to invoke more of what the capacities themselves are for and 
capacities in the first (1) state mentioned above, meaning what we are by nature equipped 
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 In the Metaphysics V 1019a23-25, this notion of dumanis as the capacity to do something well is second of 
three notions of dunamis, the first being dunamis as a source of change in another thing, like the verb building is 
the dunamis of what is being built. The third notion is quite the opposite of the affective states we have been 
examining so far: not capacity as a condition but capacity as a state, not easily changeable, enduring. Thus we 
see that capacity, in that it denotes both rapid change and resistance to change, can be linked both to affections 
and dispositions. 
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with, including our individual emotional taxonomies. In addition “nature” seems to refer to 
whether these potentials enabled by our emotional-physical makeup function well or not in 
regard to what they are for qua what they can do. Take Hannah‟s running. She undoubtedly 
has what we also call today a great “natural” capacity for running. We can easily imagine 
that Hannah has had this capacity her whole life, “readying” it through all sorts of 
development, like play and games. However, performing this capacity as an exercise of her 
capabilities is in a sense the status quo of her abilities: In addition to a well performing 
cardiovascular system, partially because of it, she has the ability to tolerate pains more 
easily; knowing more about her limits and the rewards of pushing them, maybe even the 
potential courage she showed in front of the piano is a part of the stock of capacities 
Hannah commands as a runner that enables her to run with running being a purpose and 
end in itself. Her capacities say something about who Hannah is now by way of what she is 
ready to do. Also when she is not running she is capable of it. Also when she was younger 
she was potentially capable of being a runner. She is easily moved by her desire to “work 
well” when she is running and the pains of running don‟t affect her enough to hinder her 
functioning to her contentment as a runner, i.e. her capacities survive rapid changes of 
affection that do not contribute to her running. All these things add up to Hannah‟s 
capacity, or dunamis, power, to run.  
Let us look at the second characterisation of capacity. What we first have is an 
initial condition or state of pre-reception, usually characterized as a state of rest as 
exemplified by the Greek word pathé or “passive condition” which is “ready” to change. 
The condition‟s readiness will either be determined by having the capacity to affectively 
change quickly or easily, in this case representing a condition, or change slowly or not 
change at all representing a state. In either cases a pre-reception (or non-reception) of 
change, if they have a capacity either to change or resist, they exist potentially. This 
potentiality stands in relation to the “bringing about” of this change by a power, movement 
or cause, kinesis, a movement or process, it then becoming actuality, energeia.  
Since our capacities are potentially existing capabilities or movements or conditions 
or states that are hinged on an “external” qualifier that moves us, it would appear as if our 
understanding of human intention is quite at odds with what is going on here and is not 
taken in under consideration. In what way can we say that we are φ-ing, doing what we 
wish to do, when as it seems we are lugged out of our unqualified state by a force or 
movement, kinesis, external from this state and otherwise would not φ? The answer from 
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Aristotle is cryptic but seems to say that when something is wished for (boulesthai) or 
given thought then it is the thought or rational desires that does the φ-ing: “And the 
definition of that which as the result of thought comes to be in fulfilment from having been 
potentially is that when it has been wished it comes to pass if nothing external hinders it, 
while the condition on the other side – viz. in that which is healed – is that nothing hinders 
the result” (Met. IX, 7. 1049a5-8). Here thought and wish are linked marking wish as the 
kinesis or qualifier of an act. Moreover, when a wish is potential it is by definition possible 
and wishing in this circumstance is a rational desire to bring about that which is in fact 
possible. Being a boxer or runner are actualities that have been brought about by the wish 
and corresponding circumstances and processes, internal and external, qualified by the 
desires to run and to box. Being healthy in contrast, does not necessitate wish as the 
qualifier is the power that brings it into being.  
We may at this point ask where capacities as here described fit in to the greater 
scheme of character development. It is easy to see how capacities as defined in the first (1) 
sense (defined at the beginning of 2.2.2) presuppose our emotional capabilities and 
restraints and fittingly coincides with how we are affected, what affections do to us, how 
greatly or easily we are affected, i.e. our “readiness” to be affected as subjects. We may 
aptly add what the term „capacities‟ adds to the definitions of affection discussed in 2.2.1. 
In addition to “readiness” capacity invokes that our emotions are engaged in specific 
actualisations or activities, and the dynamics of our emotions will in turn increase or 
decrease our intensity and desire to continue and develop that activity. 
Pleasures and pains are the movers of our functions that we are first familiar with in 
that they partake in defining desires. The pleasures that are derivative of the more basic 
natural capacities of the part of the soul that has to do with natural growth and consumption 
will later often be in conflict with the pleasures deriving from the development of a good 
intellect. We do not have the capacity to judge and regulate our disposition to feel about 
different pleasures and pains in an encouraging way or in a way producing shame to begin 
with, but we have the capacity to learn it. This capacity will be wasted if one does not 
choose to follow the cause of the best pleasures. Though pleasure can derive from bodily 
activity and sensations, enjoying pleasure is a capacity of the soul, as „what is pleasant is 
pleasant by nature‟ (1099a13). Because function in nature is necessarily done excellently as 
functions in nature are fulfilling whatever they are for, and will correspondingly always be 
doing it well, the function of pleasure in man is different in that it can exceed our 
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substantial needs, and because the soul‟s different potentials define different needs and 
conflicting pleasures that can hinder it in fulfilling what a soul does well. 
2.2.3 Dispositions 
I have already given some indication as to how we can understand Aristotle‟s ideas on 
dispositions in that they are regarded as more lasting states as opposed to conditions, that we 
can be either rapidly or slowly disposed when affected, that when we are disposed for or over 
some actions and goods then the intermediate disposition between deficiency and excess is 
said to be a good state, and that dispositions are actualizations of capacities as illustrated in 
the above flowchart, table 2.2. Most importantly, however, is the mention that dispositions, as 
opposed to affections and capacities, are attributed to bear the label “proposition” in that they 
are phenomena that we are capable of thinking about, but also states that we can we can do 
something about. They are both typified by, and subject to, cognition, description, reflection 
and choice. These choices will, then, be about whatever makes our soul “worse or better” 
(1104b20). We are not censured by our affections or capacities, Aristotle states (1105b32-a8), 
but we can be called bad or praised in view of our dispositions.  
The first distinctive property that Aristotle tags on dispositions is that he wishes to 
induce an emotional fundament to the subjects will and deliberative faculties that is open to 
reason, i.e. that emotion and cognition can be each other‟s efficient causes (see section 2.1). 
At the same time dispositions describe a category of settled states that stand central to 
ethical living: Character excellences. Emotional growth and character excellence can 
rightly be described as the one depending on the other by way of reflection over what our 
emotional apparatus is like now and how it should be in a normative sense. While we can 
develop our capacity to imagine and reflect over choices concerning what is good (while 
our intellect develops), the goal of emotional development seems to be that emotions do 
more and more of the job regarding doing the right actions in relation to what is good, and 
by no means on auto-pilot, i.e. “at the right time, to the right degree, for the right things” 
the good man does (1109a27).  
One of the synonyms of “dispositions and habits” that are in common use today is 
„character‟, a word that invokes the meaning „rooted behaviour‟, „backbone‟, a mode of 
individual expression that typifies the way we act and who we are in a good way or a bad 
way: “in surmounting her hardships she displayed excellent character”, “he can‟t be trusted 
with the money due to his lack of character” etc. The subject of analysis in the following 
section will be what we can say happens causally to support and change character. And 
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certainly much of such rooted behaviour is subject to rational decision-making and 
reflection, which we will look at in chapter 3. Still, when we call up the connotations 
“backbone”, “character” or “rooted behaviour” there is something precognitive going on as 
we have seen, referring a person‟s typified emotional apparatus and his or her ability or 
freedom to act either with or against this “emotional grain”. Indeed none of these terms can 
exist without the subject being experienced in some way or another, meaning that, in order 
for a person to be endowed with, say, “backbone”, this person must first gain experience in 
how she reacts emotionally in relation to different situations and also in relation and 
(probably) comparison to others. This “backbone” will then partially consist of a memory 
or map of earlier experience of which affections where followed by which events. A 
category of dispositions that we will be interested in is Hannah‟s possible disposition 
towards excellence. 
The beginning of NE II.6 provides us with a preliminary two part definition of 
dispositions when they are in what Aristotle calls "a good state": "we must also say what 
sort of disposition it is. Well, one should say that every excellence, whatever it is the 
excellence of, both gives that thing the finish of a good condition and makes it perform its 
function well" (1106a14-17). Somewhat surprisingly we see here that the terms 
"disposition" and "excellence" are used interchangeably. Indeed within the context of Book 
II.6, since disposition is a state, and since states can either be changed too easily, 
intermediately or too slowly in relation relevant affections, then the dispositions that are in 
the intermediate state are truly dispositions over the affections, while neither of the 
extremes are so-called "good states". In this sense a disposition is an excellence in that it is 
as it should be.  
Dispositions then, from the definition above, are states that (i) fulfil the criterion for 
being the "finished" state of good condition, and (ii) perform the function of the disposition 
well. The premise (i) calls upon the teleological idea that dispositions qua being human 
states have an end or goal that "fulfils" or "completes" the owner of the state, i.e. that until 
the subject does what is needed to be disposed to a working state (recall kinesis from the 
diagram 2.2), the state that the subject is in cannot rightly be called a working disposition. 
Not until we are able to see the disposition work consecutively as it should, i.e. function in 
all the future circumstances that require it, or would be prudent for it, to function and be in 
good working condition. 'Completion' as mentioned in the teleological understanding of the 
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term, is the end of the activity taking place, that not only can desires (orexis) be actualised, 
but also states by the building of its components
10
.  
The translator Rowe here chooses the term "finish" and it appears that he 
understands this state as the disposition towards excellence revealing the "markings" of 
being in a good state. Quite often, when describing what a good person typically is like, 
Aristotle describes this person as someone who has all his working 'good' dispositions 
intact, that the good person 'shines through' in all circumstances and this could be what 
Rowe is thinking of. Others (i.e. Barnes) translates instead that the excellence 'brings' us 
into a good condition. I regard Rowe‟s connotation of a 'resemblance' of a good state when 
fulfilling the teleology of coming to be in a good state to be logically closer to the mark.  
Premise (ii) on functioning well as a criterion for excellence, is derived from the 
idea that if you do something that requires such and such skills you will necessarily do it 
well. Aristotle gives us the example of the lute-player, who cannot rightly be said to be able 
to play the lute if he or she doesn't play well (1097b25). We see that premise (i) and (ii) 
both presuppose the criterion of completion, completion of a particular hexis or disposition. 
Premise (i) and (ii) also preclude each other: In order for a disposition to have the quality of 
“finish” then it must be active in relation to the function of the disposition, say playing the 
lute. If we include the premise of completion then the disposition to play the lute is 
completely active or actual when one is able to play the lute well, being the result of a 
disposition to play being in good condition
11
, premise (ii). But whether this disposition is 
functioning well or not in turn is determined by the function of disposition, i.e. masterfully 
interpreting and playing the music, emanating the tell tale signs of being in a completed 
state, premise (i). 
Importantly, there are three kinds of dispositional sates which oppose each other 
(1108b11-16), an intermediate and two extremes, for instance the intermediate 
„moderation‟ as opposed to either excess or deficiency. Aristotle‟s theory of opposing 
dispositional states leads to an important argument: Opposing states introduces the 
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 Aristotle argues also that what is most complete is most desirable (1097a28), that what is desirable, not 
because of something else, but on its own merit is more complete (1097a33-4), the totality of goods is more 
desirable than its components and the larger the summation or organization of the goods the greater the value 
(1097b20), as the building is of far greater worth than its columns because the building is what the columns are  
for. 
11
 We see a similar argument for the well functioning of sense-perception in 1174b15-18: “But since every sense 
is active in relation to the sense object, and completely active when the sense is in good condition and its object 
is the finest in the domain of that sense (for something like this, more than anything else, is what complete 
activity of a sense seems to be;” 
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necessity of choice. One can only be in one state, and if that states is undesirable then one 
faces the dilemma whether continue the disposition or steer towards the other extreme. The 
contrary disposition will hinder the opposing state and vice versa. 
Aristotle had a very clear idea as to which classes of emotional variation different 
dispositions are represented by. Indeed he lists a (non-exhaustive) numbered set of 
dispositions and their respective hexis, states, like the affection “fear” to the character state 
“courage” as the mean between “cowardice” and “rashness”. In book II.7 he lists them, 
from healthy states derived from our bodily nature (courage and moderation), to two social 
states derived from the activities of giving and receiving in relation to external goods 
(open-handedness and munificence) , to three dealing with the relation between honour and 
self-worth (Greatness of soul, a nameless excellence dealing with small honours and 
truthfulness concerning self-presentation), to three social character assets (friendliness, 
truthfulness and wittiness), to mildness, having to do with temper. Over all of these 
“emotional variations” is the class “justice”, what Aristotle calls a controlling capacity 
involving all the emotional relations stated above, which is also a division (to be presented 
in chapter 4.5) and an intermediate in both cases. Aristotle states that reason is also such a 
„controlling capacity‟, itself an intermediate.  
As we have earlier defined cognition as a necessary efficient cause or product of 
what we call emotion, and since emotion will necessarily involve cognitive content 
(chapter 2.1), it is less difficult to see how we can be quite capable of being disposed 
“over” emotions and affections in the present context via reflection and choice. In looking 
at table 2.3 we see more clearly that in many cases our dispositions will be met with 
normatively sensitive situations, where tactfulness here or disposition over our anger there 
has a distinct “mark” it should achieve (1138b22-23), the goal being not too much or too 
little, not excessive or deficient in the case sensitive continuum, but an intermediate 
disposition. This „mark‟ will obviously not be hit if either our intellect or our emotions fail 
to engage in that which is case-sensitive in the particular situation. This is what we call 
Aristotle‟s „rule of the mean‟. Over-steering each continua, i.e. the implicit goal for all the 
continuum, as mentioned is the “steering” disposition of justice (more on justice in chapter 
4). We understand then more clearly what type of job our emotional dispositions are 
supposed to, or should, take over time. Notice also right off the bat that the normative 
characteristic of the rule of the mean is not only a requirement of “do no harm”, but also 
requires moral positives, to “do and create goods in others”. We are not left without a 
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prescription to use the above stated table either, for when we notice ourselves missing the 
mark or the mean due to emotion or desire the prescription is simply to „lean over‟, to do 
consecutively the disposition that is opposite to where we stand, thereby compensating for 
our emotional „pull‟ to do the opposite. 
2.3 Pleasures and Pains  
We have now gone through some of the essential concepts and distinctions involved in 
understanding Aristotle‟s theory of emotion-/cognition-based action. Next I suggest we take a 
closer look at the heading of affections that are at the core of our orexis and movement: 
pleasures and pains.  
In his treatment of what we today would call motivation, Aristotle gives much 
consideration to the role of emotional positives and negatives, pleasures and pains, as these 
seem to be key antecedents of a subjects‟ action and movement in relation to any object - 
towards or from something. They are also affections due to which we do morally good or 
bad actions or make good or bad decisions. Capacities for pleasures and pains in Aristotle‟s 
view are universally distributed both in the animal kingdom and in human action: 
Aristotle‟s statements that “All do pursue pleasure” (1153b29-31) and that “for more than 
anything nature seems to avoid the painful, and seek the pleasant” (1157b17) gives us a 
clear indication that pleasure and pain are primary and distinct elements of all animal 
movement, including our own. We are in no way capable of imagining a type of living that 
does not incorporate movement by pleasure and pain: “Pleasure is something we have all 
grown up with since infancy; the result is that it is hard to rub us clean of this impulse, 
dyed as it is in our lives” (1105a2-6). For Hannah, at every stage of her life she has had 
immediate and continuous experience with pleasures and pains, to the point that we can 
imagine it to be difficult to start thinking about them too early on in life. But pleasures and 
pains are there and they will always be there. At the same time, however, without guidance 
and some sort of reflected habituation from the adult world we can also easily see that 
some pleasures and pains can easily be followed blindly or misinterpreted and lead to 
actions that are not desired by Hannah if not only for the particular pleasures and freedom 
of pains. And since pleasures and pains will permanently occur, it is not hard to fathom 
how consecutive pleasures and pains can lead to more permanent dispositions that will be 
difficult to do something about once “engrained”. If not for some sort of reflective 
guidance it is impossible for us to imagine how Hannah comes to enjoy, for instance, long 
distance running.  
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Previously (table 1.1) I attempted a sketch-up of Aristotle‟s biological psychology, 
amongst which were the appetitive parts of the soul, epithumia or enthymia. He is as stated 
quite prepared to use his biological psychology to explain the tension of moral weakness as 
a conflict of opposed orexis  (De Anima 433b5, NE 1147a31-4). Under these headings the 
feelings of pleasure and pain are inseparably associated with our physiological processes 
and biological needs. And because these needs are important for life and existence at a very 
basic and practical level they are in a sense irascible in that they can be both pleasurable or 
painful and on this level intensely so. But while they are natural capacities they cannot be 
over-indulged in before we gain cognitive capacities, for as Aristotle states, we cannot 
over-indulge in pleasures or go to lengths to avoid pains before we get a grasp of universals 
(NE VII.3, 1147b4-6). In chapter 3, I will explain in more depth what it means to “grasp 
universals”. For now it will suffice to say that, in Aristotle‟s view, the reason we do not see 
over-indulgence in infants and animals is that while they have the capacity to recognize and 
have a memory of particulars, they cannot from this recognition draw the cognitive 
assumption that all cases will lead to this pleasure or pain and therefore conclude or make 
judgements that the affections are an aim or avoidance in themselves. And of course we 
recognise a dialectic development between grasping and desiring particulars and grasping 
and learning universals while gaining cognitive capacities to choose courses of action. Such 
a process will be innately complex and difficult to navigate. At her infant stage, Hannah is 
visibly moved by her appetitive capacities to feel pleasure or pain to the degree that they 
are noticeable and discernable so that her surroundings are moved to fulfil her needs 
(hopefully not exclusively due to pains). She does not at this point, however, have any need 
of change in regards to her natural dispositions because they work well according to her 
needs. Indeed her epithumia seems wired to her vocal cords. However, when she is big 
enough to regard her surroundings in terms of objects of desire, or even better, things she 
evaluates as good, the correlation between body and pleasures and pains will change due to 
bodily and intellectual development and growth, and it is also quite fathomable that we will 
see emotional development on all levels, also the most basic, difficult though it may be.  
Among the candidates for serious consideration over what would constitute a bona 
fide pursuit of happiness in one‟s life is the life of pleasure for pleasures sake:  
On the good and happiness: to judge from their lives, most people, i.e. the most vulgar, 
seem – not unreasonably – to suppose it to be the life of pleasure. (1095b14-15) 
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But further, it is actually a necessary requirement that we inquire into pleasure and pain, in 
so far as we laid down that excellence and badness of character had to do with pains and 
pleasures, and most people say that happiness involves pleasure – which is why the 
„blessed‟ [makarioi] are so called, after „bliss‟ [chairein]. (1152b4-8) 
Aristotle in turn will rectify these suggestions, though he does seem to concede that 
they are “not unreasonable”. A life of pleasure seems like a type of living that could be a 
likely candidate for Hannah, one that we quite possibly, with good will intact, could wish 
upon her. And certainly, we could hardly consider Hannah‟s evolvement to be very good or 
fine or worthwhile if it didn‟t involve any form of pleasure. But as mentioned above 
pleasure will in a sense “always be there” and when someone accesses a desired result 
purely for the sake of pleasure then you access the end for the sake of the affection, not for 
the end. Still, that happiness will in many ways involve pleasure seems clear and a „life of 
pleasure‟, a joi de vivre if you will, seems like not such a bad thing. In this way it seems 
that pleasures and pains, and how we are built from nature, habitat and development, that 
we have a varying capacity for pleasures and pains and a disposition to react in our own 
ways to different types, might at a glance fulfil the necessary and sufficient criteria of being 
a function for Hannah. This is not, however, the conclusion we will land on, because before 
we can know how good a life of pleasure or a pain-free way of living is we must first 
examine what pleasure and pain is.  
There are two main accounts of pleasure and pain in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1. NE 
VII and 2. VIII – IX and X 2-5 and7-8. The last I will only give a brief account of in the 
following paragraph, but the first I will elaborate on as the main basis for Aristotle‟s 
positive account of pleasures and pains as phenomena. 
Book X 7-8 attempts to examine the question of whether pleasure is a good or 
perhaps the good by discussing the question in relation to theories that say that pleasure is a 
good in itself and the only good. The background for this discussion is the pivotal and 
central role pleasure plays in our nature and character, but Aristotle now sets this aspect 
somewhat aside in order to discuss pleasure as a phenomenon, not the object of pleasure 
but pleasure itself. He revokes the conclusion that since pleasure is a non-teleological item 
(that it is not „for‟ something else), that it then is a good in itself. Nor is pleasure 
tautologically a good because of its standing opposite to pain, nor can it be something bad 
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since goods can be accompanied by it. Nor is pleasure a „conjunctive‟ good (that for any 
object of desire A, if one ads pleasure, then any object A, plus pleasure, is better than any 
object A) or a quality, that by being „tagged‟ onto a good then that good becomes 
intrinsically better. In fact Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a good at all since it doesn‟t 
„come to be‟ or becomes more complete over time (does not fulfil the criterion of 
completeness) but is instead completed in every instance. It is a class different from goods 
but plays an important role in making the goods complete. Pleasure varies also in kind in 
relation to the kind of activity that arouses the emotion. Aristotle proposes that pleasure is 
most complete when caused by the most worthwhile objects and contributes to progress in 
skill-levels and faculties. However, since pleasures are of different kinds corresponding to 
different activities, then they can conflict and impede each other. Different kinds of 
pleasure will be relative to three variables of activity: i) Kind of object of desire, ii) kind of 
sensing of the object, along with the type/function of the individual person and the 
condition of his/her sensory faculties and iii) kind of activity (good/bad) that pursues the 
object of desire.  
2.3.1 Pleasures as Functions  
Let us next examine Aristotle‟s positive account of pleasures and pains. In book 
VII.11-12, emphasis is placed on arguments that contradict the different unqualified views 
on what pleasure is thought to be, especially the ones that argue for pleasure‟s either being 
a good, the good or an object of desire, or its opposites, that pleasure is in all cases an evil 
which should be avoided or that one should be satisfied with forgoing pleasure as long as 
one is free from pain. These views are erroneous in that they neglect to observe the variety 
of action and circumstance that pleasure emerges from. The case-sensitive counter-
examples he brings to the table are insightful and deserve examination. 
First, we may erroneously identify pleasure with being good and an object of desire. 
But pleasure does not meet the criterion for being a good, that it must be either a good 
“without qualification” (recall that this means that a good need not rely on anything else in 
order to be a good, like the good of health, that it will be a good for anyone) or a good “for 
someone” (a good “because of” something else; it is a good locked to a specific relation 
and without that relation it would no longer be a good, be it between the subject and the 
object of desire the way an apple stands to a subjects appetite, or a good that is good on the 
basis that it can fulfil yet another good, like money or carpentry skills to the completion of 
houses. Take away appetite, commodities/services or houses and there would no longer be 
  
 
41 
need for the apple, money or the carpentry skills). If pleasure was a good “for someone” 
then it would stand somewhere in the relation between potentiality and actuality. 
Many of our pleasures and pains seem to be a relation between the object of desire 
and disposition and potential capacity to be affected by the object.  
The pleasure and pain that supervene on what people do should be treated as a sign of their 
dispositions; for someone who holds back from bodily pleasures and does so cheerfully is a 
moderate person, while someone who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent [......]. For 
excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we 
do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from doing fine things. (1104b4-10) 
But if we examine pleasure, it does not appear to fit well into this scheme. As 
Aristotle states in 1153a9-11 that “...not all pleasures are comings to be, or accompanied by 
coming to be, but rather they are activities, and an end”, that pleasures demark quite some 
variety. First he emphasises “not all pleasures”, evidently implying „some pleasures are 
comings to be, but not all‟. We can take this sentence as a disjunction, that either a pleasure 
is a coming to be or it is an activity and an end. The either/or statement is rather strait 
forward, pending examination on “coming to be”, but next comes the confusing 
conjunction that (some) pleasures are activities, and an end. But how is this possible? This 
must imply that while not all pleasures have an end they still consist of, or are integral to, 
activities, while all activities on their part, given they consist of actions, have ends. But 
pleasures per se do not appear to have a beginning or an end in the same way as a building 
of a house or a replenishing of a state of hunger  even though they accompany activities 
that are „comings to be‟ – they are not themselves a “coming to be”. And if they are to be 
located in the schema between potentiality and actuality, they are energia – activity – 
which as we see in table 2.2 goes under the heading of actuality but does not transverse 
between potentiality and actuality, thereby making the implication of “coming to be” an 
absurdity both in the case of activity and of pleasure. But how then can Aristotle imply that 
some pleasures are “coming to be”? Well, it would be initially helpful to try and see more 
clearly how pleasure cannot be a „coming to be‟: First, pleasure is observed to go along 
with energeia, which implicitly will involve the kinesis or activation of a capacity 
(1153a12). The conjunction that pleasure, when not a „coming to be‟, is an activity and an 
end could then mean that pleasure P1 arises at point in time B, simultaneously with 
energeia E1, and that both end at time B. If the point in time where different, say a 
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previous time A, or the activity where different, say the activity E2, then we would not get 
P1 but P2 or not P at all. Therefore a conjunction explicates the pleasures context-
sensitivity given two premises, (i) that activity is an end only if it is completed in the 
instance of its happening and (ii) that if part of the conjunction, that pleasure can be 
identified with activity, is true, then pleasure will also be completed in every instance. 
From instance to instance, then, pleasure will change and cease to be P1 and go on to be P2 
or not P at all. Pleasure is „completed‟ under the same ontological conception as how 
activity is „completed‟ in every instance, while the affection of pleasure is in one sense the 
„crown‟ of the activity: “and every activity is completed by pleasure” (1175a20). The 
notion that pleasure, along with happiness, is an activity fits well with Aristotle‟s 
distinction between activity and process
12
. Hannah derives no direct pleasure from her 
subtle transitions from infant to toddler to schoolgirl to track-champ, i.e. the process itself. 
The rule of thumb, it seems then, for Aristotle‟s notion of pleasure in the above sense then 
is that if we can‟t use a verb to describe the pleasure-giving source (Hannah‟s eating, 
playing, talking, learning, making fun, running, daring and deciding) then we‟ve missed the 
mark on what the source is.  
While pleasure in the above sense cannot be a „coming to be‟, we might speculate 
as to how Aristotle could conceive a pleasure as an end. While it seems unjustified to 
identify pleasure with a good on the level of the particular, “this candy is sweet, therefore 
this candy is good”, it does seem plausible to indentify pleasure as good under the second 
premise in a universal about that which is fine and good in a syllogism; “all that is fine and 
good will seem pleasurable to one who is good. This end is fine and good. This end will 
seem pleasurable to me, as I am good”.  Here we see that there are two particulars to be 
recognized. The first is the fine and the good, that which has great value. The second is to 
recognise that “I am good” or that I am in good condition meaning that I will desire the 
good as something well suited given I am in a good state.  Indeed, continuing on from his 
assertion that pleasures are "activities, and an end" (1153a12) he adds that pleasures occur 
"because capacities are being put to use" (1153a13). The capacities that we possess and 
bring with us from one state (of character) to the other will involve that the capacities that 
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 Activity is a principle in all things in nature: things that “have within itself a principle of motion and of 
stationariness” (Physics II 192b13-14); “it is the primary underlying matter of things which have in themselves a 
principle of motion and change” (Physics II 193a28-29). Whereas a process fits more into the category of 
„coming to be‟ as mentioned above. 
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survive are functioning as they should, while a good indication of whether or not they are 
functioning well is whether or not their 'being put to use' when acting (virtuously) is 
bringing us pleasure. 
What is interesting with Aristotle‟s view on pleasure being context-sensitive is that, 
as it appears, he is of the impression that our capacity to sense pleasure is sensitive to 
where in the process between potential states (of character) and actual states we are at 
present located. If this is true, if pleasures and pains are indeed capable of pointing out the 
nuances of where in the process of transition from potential to actual a particular “coming 
into being” we find ourselves, then they are signals of exceeding value to us in indicating 
information about a movement. It seems they are in a sense capable then of signalling 
nuances from that of a start, a scope of what can be done, what it is like to be in the 
process, what is left in a process to what it is like to round off completion, that our ability 
to take on pleasure can respond to all these differences. It comes as no surprise then that in 
many ways, pleasure can go wrong, i.e. give us the wrong signal. A soul that is in “good 
condition” will then be partially marked off by whether or not it either gets the different 
“modes” of pleasure right or at least interprets them correctly as wrong if they do not signal 
a correct picture. There is obviously a strong cognitive slant to pleasures when we 
experience them. Interestingly, Aristotle thusly invites us to think about where in a process 
of coming to be we are placed at the moment, so as to be able to compare or get an 
overview from to which we can interpret the pleasure or understand its relevance. The main 
point, however, is that the pleasure started the process of cognising the pleasure, while in 
doing so our cognising the pleasure will merit the experience as pleasurable. Thus, pleasure 
is a source of cognition of change, while cognising the change notices the correlation 
between pleasure and change. Today we call such experiences meta-cognitive thinking, a 
type of double prepositional attitude, where the object of reflection is the thought that arises 
together with the situation or object in question (note, however, that this is an extrapolation 
of Aristotle‟s theory of cognition in pleasure-experience, not a practically utilised 
technique utilised by someone like Hannah).  
Are we in a state of hunger, or need of intimacy or in a state of anger? Capacities 
for pleasure or pain will enable affections when the situation arises which will inform us of 
change. Being capable of looking at the bigger picture, we can recognize that the pleasures 
in particulars when fulfilling needs can lead us not only to desires to repeat the experience 
but to connect the experience to a production of goods, like keeping in good health, 
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keeping friends or reacting to injustice, and in so doing take pleasure in acting out 
productions for these reasons.  
We are also informed of our condition by our ability to cognise over pleasures and 
pains: To know that while I feel angry, my views of others will be coloured by this 
condition, or while I am lonely my pleasures during discourse will be strengthened that 
way. Recognising these nuances seem essential in both being aware in the activity and for 
self-awareness about keeping track of what the activity is doing to us so as to base our next 
step on a more balanced outward view. To then identify pleasure as something that is 
simply an end as in a particular (All things that are sweet give me pleasure. This candy is 
sweet. This candy will give me pleasure) will then be to forgo all possible nuances that our 
senses of pleasure are capable of informing us and in Aristotle‟s view we will then totally 
miss out on critical information about what and how situations affect us. We change 
ourselves.   
It is a point worth mentioning that the complexity of learning to be in a right 
emotional condition, or learning to compensate if we are not, does not at all seem lost on 
Aristotle. Indeed we see evidence of him regarding the developmental mastery of the 
relation between the logical and alogical halves of the soul to be a lengthy dialectic 
process. We already understand that an emotional development is faced with the goal of 
functioning well in exceedingly vast and unequal situations, which of course requires time. 
Aristotle is quite clear on this part, renowned for citing Aesop‟s metaphor in NE book I that 
“a single swallow does not make a spring, nor does a single day; in the same way, neither 
does a single day, or a short time make a man blessed and happy” (1098a20). This sentence 
functions as a preamble to both the notion that the good life will consist of habituation and 
consecutiveness of acting in relation to what is good and fine over a span of many human 
years, making habituation a requirement for happiness, and the notion that happiness 
resembles completeness. And while pleasure and pain is the prime subject of interest for 
the political expert and lawgiver
13
, living by emotion is the prime mode of living for many, 
especially the young: “This is why the young are not an appropriate audience for the 
political expert; for they are inexperienced in the actions that constitute life... What is more, 
because they have a tendency to be led by emotions it will be without point for them to 
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good”; I.9, 1099b31-33  
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listen” (1095a2-5). The point I take it is not to exclude the young from engaging in political 
reflection or reflection over what is the best sort of living. That would strike us as starkly 
counter-intuitive. Instead, it seems clear that the young, when being led as they are by 
emotion, will have this as a both a part of their functioning well, in addition to a potential 
vice. Note that the sentence does not state that the young live by affection alone, or by 
pleasure alone. We can speculate as to which teleological positives might come out of 
emotional „leadership‟ at this stage, like guaranteeing the movement necessary both for 
discovery over as vast a plethora of phenomena as possible and for growing well 
physically, or inciting a great variety of changing interests, or inciting a passion for, or 
dedication to, lasting interests, especially liking this and not that. Again, precisely what is 
needed to gain what is lacking – experience in life, great objects of desire in the hearts of 
young people and emotional control. In all stages of Hannah‟s development we see positive 
examples of “living by emotion”. In the beginning it seems as though this is all that Hannah 
does, an existentially necessary function, though at this point we could hardly call 
Hannah‟s inner functioning emotion as the cognitive aspect of emotion is hardly developed. 
When Hannah starts school she is quickly incited and disposed to change her interests from 
the rudimentary to the cognitive to the social and perhaps back again throughout the day. 
And perhaps because of these rapid changes in activity, she gets good at running, 
discoursing, letting her needs be informed by her activities, while some activities she sticks 
to, forgoing other needs. Her decision at the track meet lets her discover emotions she 
would not have discovered without her having an astute awareness of her dilemma, and 
choosing what she deems good, she resolves a complicated situation with what she 
recognises as a soundly produced decision. Her well informed decision then leads to new 
and satisfying emotions on a level new to her and this again makes her aware of where and 
from what, the relief is coming. 
This touches upon an aspect of pleasure and pain that seems dominating in both the 
modern and Socratic understanding of the functions of pleasure and pain
14
. In the modern 
sense one of the dominating notions of the functions of pleasure and pain, I will venture, is 
the notion of positive and negative reinforcement correlated to particulars so as to point out 
what is good and what is bad in relation to universals. Positive and negative reinforcement, 
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just to give a loose example, is either when a pleasure or pain becomes associated with an 
object or activity, like Pavlov‟s dog, or when activities that give rise to pleasures and pains 
are in some way cognitively affirmed to rightly give rise to pleasures and pains, enabling us 
to produce thoughts like “there is nothing wrong with this pleasure. I don‟t have to doubt it. 
I can freely enjoy it” or “this pain shouldn‟t really be here. I can‟t stand it, there is 
definitely something wrong! This is indeed something I don‟t want to repeat”. Positive and 
negative reinforcement would either be a function of pleasures or pains themselves on the 
basis of the individuals own movement, or come from an outside source with the intention 
of inciting pleasure and pain with the intention of affirmation, or as Aristotle confirms, we 
steer our youth with pleasures and pains, „like a rudder‟.  
Though positive and negative reinforcement on the primary level of an outside 
source affirming negatives and positives seems essential so as to avoid engraining what 
will lead to painful our counter-ethical dispositions, the focus of reinforcement on 
Aristotle‟s part seems more to be on the affirmation one gets from the activities themselves 
once the activity is good. The locus of ethical dispositions seems to be the pleasure one 
takes in good activity, for that which is good human activity. Aristotle describes how we 
aim at becoming the “lover of” (1099a10) “capacities [which] are being put to use” 
(1153a12). When we are the 'lover of' some activity we do not simply like to do it. The 
activity gives lead to passions and a strong emotional affiliation to the activities. This has 
an evident reinforcement on our desires associated with these actions. This we see in that 
'the lover of [φx] gets better at his own task' [my brackets and insertion] 1175a35, i.e. the 
joy we get from some tasks will be a strong motivational component not only in the activity 
in the instance of activity, but also in the process of development. The pleasure one takes in 
an activity of a specific focus becomes more a disposition and expectation than affection in 
a strict sense: “For the activity‟s own pleasure contributes to increasing the activity” 
(1175a30), where we must assume that "increasing the activity" means simply we do it 
more, and want to do it more. “Increasing the activity” seems also to entail that not only get 
to enjoy the activity but also enjoy the association to what the activity is for: the 
production. This again entails yet another enjoyment of a production of our own growing 
affiliation and emotional attachment to good: We enjoy more enjoying it more. These types 
of pleasure have a different effect on us than simply being the “crown” of an activity in the 
instance. Immediately following the last quotation we are given an example of what 
Aristotle has in mind. While someone is actively partaking and interested in, say a 
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conversation then it is easy to enjoy and follow the curves of the conversation partner‟s 
reasoning. But say you are the lover of pipe-playing and you hear someone playing the pipe 
as it really should be played. You cannot help, as the Liebhaber of pipe playing that you 
are, to hark and listen (1175b4). No matter how hard you try, you are lost in the pipe-
playing due to the pleasure of both the pipe and your enjoyment of enjoying the pipe. It is 
hard, if not impossible to be simultaneously involved in these two engrossing activities at 
once (here Aristotle almost banteringly suggests it to be impossible to involve ourselves in 
another engrossing thought while for instance having sexual intercourse; though jocose, I 
do not believe this to be an idle example, but an example which metaphorically emphasises 
the strength of affiliation the “lover of” something has to that object of desire and its 
productive activity), and the example explicates how pleasure not only affects us in the 
moment but can affect us in a way that directs our dedication and focus towards a good in a 
way that is relevant to choice and decision. The Liebhaber might have to conclude that this 
fight is lost and the flute-player wins her audience or he instead sacrifices this pleasure by 
moving the conversation to another place. Such devotion can of course be both a vice and a 
virtue as you involuntarily love the flute-playing. Replace the flute-playing with say car-
stealing and we immediately see the flip side to 'loving' an activity and the necessity of 
developing dispositions such as steadily desiring reciprocity.  
Loving is in this sense a habitual/dispositional 'guaranty' that will seem to stick 
throughout various changes in environment and development. A temperate person, for 
instance, has gone through what in ancient Greek is called paideia – a type of habituation 
through positive or negative reinforcement of desiring or sacrificing the right pleasures at 
the right time for the right objects, to “delight and be distressed in the things we should” 
(1104b13). Such a habituation will help the temperate person to acquire loves and hates 
that are subject to reasoned reflection, persuasion and argument. Loves and hates are in 
turn a more permanent disposition, where when we learn to hate say inequality in relation 
to worth early in life it will most probably “stick” throughout life, that when you learn this 
as a child you will most likely bear this love or hate with you also into maturity.  
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2.3.2 Emotions as Cognition of Value 
Loving or liking, hating or disliking, have by recent commentators been interpreted 
as a relation between emotion and the cognition of value of particulars
15
. They have noticed 
that Aristotle‟s presentation of what the senses do, discern nuances and differences, seems 
to be similar descriptions of what pleasures and pains „do‟, that pleasures and pains 
resemble a sense. We may recall that an orexis (desire), when perceived by the subject as 
just that, consists of us assessing the object as good, taking pleasure in it and sensing it all 
in the same instance. Taking pleasure in the object of desire is then an integral part of 
sensing the good object as good. Again, the perceptual faculties of pleasure and pain are 
determined by the subject‟s condition. This is further emphasised in the following: 
But since every sense is active in relation to the sense-object, and completely active when 
the sense is in good condition and its object is the finest in the domain of that sense (for 
something like this, more than anything else, is what complete activity of a sense seems to 
be; .... in case of each of the senses the activity that is best is the one whose subject is in the 
best condition in relation to the object that is most worth... (1174b15-19) 
Let then the „domain‟ of pleasures and pains be considered that which is good or bad, while 
their jobs then are signalling which goods are the finest. A pleasure will not signal whether or 
not an orexis is fine, however, if the subject does not have this sense in good working order, 
working as it should, which in turn is determined by the subjects hexis or dispositions to likes 
and dislikes of that which is good and the „becoming‟ of these. Pleasures and pains are often 
criticized as being too „off again/on again‟ to be considered stable faculties of motivation in 
agency
16
; however, as we have seen Aristotle not only concedes to this fact but also integrates 
pleasures being completed in every instance into a theory of disposition-based agency.  
As we see, our test subject Hannah likes to run. There are many factors that play in 
on her enjoyment of track and field, many of them concerning a discovery and testing of 
her own physical capacities and capabilities, others being social (which we will get back 
to). More interestingly here is how she here starts to like sports. The first faculty we 
encounter is how she is acting out a talent. We figure that talents can refer to Aristotle‟s 
technical description of capacities, emotional/physiological quantities of capacity to do one 
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thing well and to a certain degree. When we say someone is talented we often say they 
make something look easy, or that it comes easily to that person. That running comes more 
easily to Hannah is evidence of her capacities. We see she also has a disposition: Because 
of her capacities, she has a desire/emotion based drive to fill them. The next oddity we 
encounter is that her desire is not driven by pleasure alone. Earlier we mentioned the 
capacititive emotions deriving from thumos (the spirited part of the soul). Here, „spirited‟ 
refers to an aggressive urge, a strong will or desire to overcome difficulties and produce the 
tasks ahead, due to a feeling or desire for a greater good deserved by the desirer. If I may 
interpret freely, this means that for Hannah, the pains incurred by running affects her on a 
level of a signal that she is heading in the right direction, for producing her talent, which is 
the final cause, an archē, the latter producing pleasure in Hannah. Here we must distinguish 
what Hannah experiences as in the experience and what the experience is for. We know 
today that pleasure in running is not uncommon due to physiological effects of certain 
signal chemicals released when the body is under strain. This is not wholly incompatible 
with thumiotic desires we see in Hannah, only Aristotle ads to this affective mechanism the 
cognition of these signals as heading in the right direction of an archē.   
So an archē, being a final cause, plays a defining role in which production leads up 
to it. As we saw, we can like both the action in itself and what the action is for either 
separately or, ideally as in the case of Hannah, in combination. We have also previously 
seen that emotions are fundamentally cognitive in nature, informing us that we are being 
affected by specific instances, relations and objects in our surroundings, informing us of 
whether relations are desirable or undesirable.  
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3 Intellectual Development 
Up until now I have interpreted Aristotle‟s two-part theory of the soul and how he perceives 
the logismos-having part of the soul as influencing our non-rational side and vice versa. 
Cognitive-emotional causation can be explained by Aristotle‟s theory of efficient cause, while 
emotions themselves have what I have called a strong cognitive slant. Emotions can more 
correctly be seen as fulfilling several functions necessary for human living, from functioning 
as senses influenced by changes in our environment to the cognition of value. This leads to 
the conclusion that we desire our emotional apparatus to function well in both scenarios. I 
have, however, focused mainly on one side of the story. Presently I will interpret Aristotle‟s 
views on the composition, function and development of the logismos. We will look at how the 
intellectual part of the soul is made up, what intellectual activity is thought to be, what some 
of the components of the activity are (and the use of these) and flesh out how logos is thought 
to produce prescriptions for its non-rational counterpart along with some of the reasons for 
why intellectual development is desirable for one who wishes a „good‟ life in happiness. It 
should become evident that the intellectual part of the soul plays a paramount role in man‟s 
fulfilling desires by way of understanding what a desire is for us (...whom consist of emotions 
and intellect and social needs and capacities), via reasoning, deliberation, intellect, 
intelligence, architectonic abilities and not least, wisdom. 
We have thus far discussed desires in terms of emotional appraisal. However, 
inherent to the logismos-having part of our souls are also genuinely intellectual desires. We 
like to know things and the world seems more harmonious to us when we understand it. We 
are incessantly curious throughout our development, and either delight in being puzzled, or 
feel frustration when there is something that we cannot comprehend. These intellectual 
desires are responsible for us wanting to read the NE to begin with. Intellectual desires are 
not only lofty acquisitions and late in coming in our development as humans, however. 
They begin with „taking pleasure in our senses‟ (Meta. I.1, 980a1-2). Hannah is learning 
rudimentary recognition of her closest others, of her surroundings and of her own make-up. 
When Hannah is 5-8 months old, why does she put everything in her mouth? Why does she 
need to feel what these objects are like, through this most tactile interaction? Why does she 
do it in the first place? Evidently she takes pleasure in the relief these sensations provide, or 
simply can‟t help herself. She just does. What is she doing it for? Though she has no sense 
of production, these experiences, through repeated interaction, are enriching to her; through 
repetition, these experiences allow her a faculty memory and recognition, what can only be 
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described as knowledge of what „feelings‟ the red wooden block and the blue plastic block 
will give her if she puts them in her mouth. But what will happen with this pencil...? What 
can we imagine Hannah doing if we at this point take away the pencil? Her desire to have 
the pencil in order to feel it would be interrupted, uncompleted, and this strikes Hannah as 
undesirable. And she‟d probably let us know. We seem born with both a vast capacity, and 
a great disposition, to be curious about our surroundings.  
It is fair then to say that the central „desire‟ of the logismos is our desire to 
understand. Man is by nature a systematic understander of the world.  
Though I will go into some detail as to the composition of the logismos, the aim of 
this chapter is to root out and elaborate on how Aristotle emphasises wisdom to be a 
function of well-being and his overall view that the subject of this field is intellectual 
excellence, described by an intellect who „grasps‟ principles and universal truth (theoretical 
wisdom), and practical excellence described by a well functioning decision-making 
faculties. When speaking of a functioning part of the soul we are in fact speaking of a part 
that belongs to someone to whom character- and intellectual excellence already belongs. In 
the area of the NE, the crowning excellence of the logismos is phronēsis or practical 
wisdom, and the standard for whether practical wisdom is in place is whether or not the 
decisions we make can be considered wise. How would we describe Hannah‟s decisions, 
for instance?   
Assisting this chapter is the theory that our intellect has two main functions – 
scientific and ethical reasoning. In so doing I make an assumption that the methodology 
described in both disciplines by Aristotle is also explanatory of how we desire, and arrive 
at, functioning capacities in both disciplines. Since here-and-now-functioning intellectual 
capacities are the standard Aristotle sets, we must also see how the logismos is thought to 
work in action.  
3.1 The Logismos is Divided by Two Main Functions of Reason 
A disposition that functions, as it should, when it should, the way it should, why it should and 
for the right things (and here Aristotle often adds „the way the good person does‟) is for 
Aristotle simply another way of saying that the disposition is what it should be. Dispositions 
that function in this way (adding „well‟ to the word „functioning‟ in this sense would be 
superfluous) is what is called an „excellence‟. It is presumably for this reason Aristotle so 
often starts with the result of a functioning property and then argues “backwards” from the 
property to what the property isn‟t, what the property might consist of, on what it depends, 
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what its ultimate product should be etc..  In book 6 he does the same with his analysis of our 
intellectual capacities: The litmus test of any intellect in „here and now‟ practical situations is 
whether or not it produces outcomes recommended by the function wisdom (phronēsis). It is 
for this reason the examination of the intellectual part of the soul coincides well with 
Aristotle‟s examination of intellectual excellence in book 6.  
Here he assumes that our soul‟s rational side is again divided in two:  
..., one by virtue of which we reflect upon the sorts of things who‟s principles cannot be 
otherwise, one by virtue of which we reflect upon things that can be otherwise; (VI.I 
1138a5-8) 
These two parts of the intellect are described as being generically different because 
they are each by nature „built‟ around fulfilling separate purposes and therefore function 
differently. They „resemble their objects‟ (1139a13) meaning that they are by nature 
structured to deal with generically separate subject matter and are therefore noted as 
generically distinct parts of the soul.  
The part which deals with principles that cannot be otherwise Aristotle calls i)  the 
scientific part, while the part that reflects on that which can be otherwise is called ii) the 
calculative part, which is also identified as the deliberative part.  
These two capacities are rendered moot outside their specific field, meaning the 
investigation into them is uninteresting without examining the area of either i) scientific 
investigation or ii) action/production. In this sense, thought consists of two separate 
capacities depending on which area of investigation is being developed. The function of 
both is truth to the highest degree (1139b12-14). Scientific thought (epistēmonicon) stands 
in relation to necessary and universal truths, relies on intelligence for the purpose of 
learning, reasoning and the demonstration of truths and its execution relies on intellectual 
excellence in its own right. Calculative thought (logistikon) deliberates on desire, agency 
and change, that which may be different, for practical reasons.  
3.2 Intellectual Activity I: Ethical Enquiry as Intellectual Development 
As Aristotle argues in book VII, our cognitive/analytic powers are divided by their 
functioning in relation to two generically different overlying principles, relating to scientific 
investigation on the one hand and ethical investigation on the other. This begs the question 
why scientific method is at all mentioned if we have no practical use for the scientific branch 
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of enquiry in ethical life. Its placement opens up for two different interpretations, that either 
the mention of intellectual excellence would simply be incomplete without the mention of 
scientific method or that scientific method bears some relevance to the methods of ethical 
enquiry and perhaps vice versa. My interpretation falls into the latter category for two 
reasons. First, it is evident that scientific method bears at least an indirect influence on ethics 
since Aristotle identifies happiness with the contemplative life of the intellectual, whom 
achieves happiness by engaging and achieving excellence in scientific method and activity in 
book X. Science is what the happy man does in book X. Second, once we look into particular 
aspects of Aristotle‟s scientific method, we see there are certain resemblances and general 
practical implications that must prove quite useful in practical enquiry, ethical enquiry 
included. In the present chapter I will therefore expound on both methodologies.  
Firstly, both methodologies attempt to go from appearance to genuine discovery 
and attempt to produce a theory of how discovery takes place. In Ways to First Principles: 
Aristotle’s method of Discovery (in Aristotle: Critical Assessments; Lloyd D. Gerson ed.), 
T.I. Irwin reflects upon the relation between appearance (phainomena) and discovery in 
Aristotle‟s two methodologies towards and from first principles. There are two types of 
phainomena which in turn lead to two different methods of discovery. Irwin reflects on 
different examples of scientific enquiry, enquiry into astronomy (signified T1) and into 
common beliefs (T2) as examples of sciences that are derived from (T2), or lead to (T1) 
first principles. T1 draws a path towards first principles, from appearance through 
experience (Apr 46a17-27), where the task and kind of experience is such that we become 
capable of determining the principles at work in the experience. This is done by i) grasping 
the appearance adequately, being informed correctly by phainomena or correcting 
misjudgements with reference to them and ii) finding possible demonstrations to the same 
principles. If, then, facts are grasped adequately (hyparchonta), the next task is to set out 
the demonstrations readily. If this enquiry (historia) leaves out none of the facts that truly 
hold for the phainomena then we will be capable of producing a demonstration. We will 
also be able to make evident that which does not readily admit to demonstration, yet in 
spite of this we know is still true, of the phainomena. 
Enquiry into common beliefs or endoxa (T2) by contrast starts from phainomena 
under different terms and has an aim of arriving from first principles to distinctive practical 
instances. A method concerning T2 should start out by i) „setting out the appearance‟ 
(tithenta ta phainomena) then ii) by going through the puzzles (aporia). The goal of this 
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methodology is to prove common beliefs (endoxa) to be justified. A proof in this regard is 
adequate if i) the difficulties presented by the puzzles (aporia) are resolved, and ii) the 
common belief is left unperturbed or remains unchanged.  
In addition to similarities in how to treat phainomena scientifically, both 
methodologies utilise their own methods of induction (epagōgē). Aristotle argues that T1 
induces demonstrations from first principles and experience on grounds that „the 
inarticulate whole is better known to perception‟ (Phys 184a16-26). „The whole is confused 
and we look for a clearer result‟ (Phys 184a 16-26). The method of discovery here leads 
from true principles with unclear observation of the particulars to clear observation of the 
particulars under true principles.   
Induction under T2, endoxa, takes form by way of what is often referred to as 
Aristotle‟s „dialectic‟. In his book Topica, the dialectic is a method from which we are able 
to syllogise endoxa about every topic proposed to us, while our syllogistic conclusion in no 
way conflicts with our own account of the same topic (Top 100a18-21). The same method 
of justification is involved here when we first „lay out the appearance‟, in this case the 
endoxa, then if, after resolving any conflicting beliefs the endoxa still stands, the belief  is 
then justified. The dialectic is therefore particularly concerned with equally sound, yet 
contrary reasoning which produces an aporia, and when we reason on both sides, and 
everything seems to follow by each, we are puzzled about which one we should act on.  
Both methodologies take pains in the beginning steps to „see aright‟, to clarify any 
misjudgements or misperceptions and to get a „grasp of‟ the phainomenon at hand. The 
phainomena arrive to us by perception first and next by „grasping‟ the phainomena. 
Though the concept of „grasping‟ is present in both methods, „grasping‟ is different in T1 
and T2. Where we induce in T1 from an „inarticulate whole‟ to „a clearer result‟, i.e. 
nomenological truths about the whole, grasping is thought more as letting phainomena 
present themselves as focussed and undistorted as possible. In addition, „grasping‟ carries 
the connotation of mentally grasping, understanding what we are seeing. Our cognitive 
reflection of the phainomenon must thusly also „see aright‟, demanding both faculties of 
experience and intelligence (nous). Obviously this also rings true of all sensory perception 
that we have described thus far. We can for instance rightly imagine that „grasping aright‟, 
from which we lay out phenomena, equally relies on sensations and affection from the 
alogical as well as the logical parts of the soul (see chapter 2.1.). As a consequence, we see 
that the first steps in each methodology rely as much on character-excellence as they do 
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intellectual accomplishment, justified by the goal of each enquiry, i.e. truth in T1 and 
truthfulness in T2.  
In summary we see evidence that T1 and T2 methods of inquiry under Aristotle‟s 
theory resemble each other by describing identical aims in the starting points of inquiry, i.e. 
to grasp aright the phainomena, that in so doing we „lay out the problems‟ as they appear, 
appearance in both cases are „dialectic‟ in nature, that each methodology is identified as an 
inductive method, that each method of enquiry will rely on the „receiver‟ of the 
phainomena being in a state capable of seeing aright and that the goal of truth or 
truthfulness provides premises along with sufficient reason for the informed soul to be 1) in 
a ready state and 2) a state capable of solving the puzzles hindering truthful „grasping‟. 
Simply put, each type of general inquiry not only has practical similarities, but is 
practically and theoretically linked by several identical prerequisites.  
3.2.1 Endoxa and the Dialectic 
Though scientific and ethical enquiry have practical links in their pre-determinates, they are 
still as Aristotle claims generically different in nature due to their different principle aims. 
While scientific enquiry has as its aim theoretic truths and demonstrations applied to 
universals, it is still quite vague to call the aim of ethical enquiry truthfulness that starts from 
first principles. To site Richard Kraut (Blackwell, 2006 pg. 77) the aim of the dialectic in 
ethical investigation is not to demonstrate the correctness of any given ethical proposition per 
se, but to become wiser: “It is part of one‟s own intellectual and moral development”.  
To recall the description of endoxa as a dialectic process in the previous chapter, it 
is a method of inquiry where we first give as qualified a description as possible of common 
belief, next describe plausible other beliefs derived from observations of the same 
phainomena , resolve conflicting propositions, and if the initial common belief still stands 
it is then justified. Common belief is perhaps a misguiding translation of endoxa, however, 
as an endoxon need not be widely held. An example in Hannah‟s case would be an endoxon 
that „running in itself is highly gratifying‟. We can imagine that this proposition is not 
widely held in Hannah‟s class room, yet the claim is none the less ready to be taken 
seriously as a contender to activities that can be highly gratifying. They are beliefs adopted 
by real people, held by specific individuals who have reasons to maintain them. „Laying 
out‟ an endoxon will then equally consist of understanding these reasons as testing their 
relevance to the enquiry. It is interesting that this type of enquiry exists on somewhat 
empirical grounds, at least to the degree that opinions are relied upon because they actually 
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come from someone‟s mouth or hand. That person has something at stake and a thumos-
derived incentive to hold this opinion as justified in addition to a desire for truthfulness
17
. It 
is not synonymous to the subjective opinion by or from anyone, however. Instead endoxa, 
if lain out correctly, should resemble the opinion of reputably wise individuals or be thus 
that reputably wise persons can agree on them. Disagreement from those known to be wise 
should also be heeded, along with why some are considered wise, i.e. we should have a 
notion of the quality of their work and why some are in agreement or disagreement. 
Endoxa is also qualified if a number of people hold the opinion. If a wide number of 
rational, mature people with some contact with the given phainomena hold a relevant 
preposition, we must assume they have a good reason to. Aristotle is optimistic that we 
have in us as a capacity to derive at truths and for the most part succeed (Rhret 
I.1.1355a15-18 as cited by R. Kraut, 2006 pp. 78). In other words, it is not Aristotle‟s 
suggestion that we should only listen to experts or blindly follow a given scientific 
paradigm or reputation alone. We should go with the experts, yes, but also go with 
whatever experience in „dialectic‟ which has already been lain down by those who do not 
have a stake, who need not defend him- or herself, casting as wide a net as possible 
knowing that this has been lain down by competent people capable of giving reason for 
their beliefs.  
The second stage of ethical investigation after trying sufficiently to „grasp‟ the 
phainomena at hand is to go though each endoxon and try to prove it. If the prepositions 
also resist falling into ambiguity, even when rearranging their structure while retaining 
their logical composition („being said in many ways‟), the endoxa are proven sound, but if 
the propositions they recommend conflict with other endoxa, then a contradiction is 
revealed, since both endoxa cannot be true at the same time, producing aporia or puzzles. 
When by „going through the puzzles‟ we are thusly perplexed, there is no longer any 
obvious next step to take in the investigation. In a perplexed state in face of contradictions 
there is little to recommend the one proposition over the other. We will, however, be in a 
better position at this stage to rightly divulge the supporting reasoning of each preposition. 
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We may then proceed to better compare the supported reasoning of each endoxon and asses 
which has the stronger argument.  
The transition from clarification of endoxa to testing its actual truth-value is a 
transition of vast importance, because we are transitioning between two qualitatively 
different starting points. Whereas when we attempt to „grasp‟ endoxa we enquire from 
„what is known‟ to us, when we start from imagining what is and what is not the truth of 
the matter we start with what Aristotle calls „that which is known without qualification, i.e. 
first principles, archē (I.4 1095a30-b4) . R. Kraut explains (Blackwell 2006, pg. 88) that 
the transition in enquiry from that which is „known to us‟ to what is known „without 
qualification‟ is a step in a hierarchical direction, meaning that the knowledge we gain in 
step two is knowledge „up‟ from incidental truth to general cases of universal truth. We can 
also see it as a linear development through inquiry, where we start from what is known up 
to a point where we deplete innate ambiguities in this knowledge and still face „endoxical‟ 
contradictions. At this point we are „half way‟ to first principles. We then attempt to draw 
out and imagine possible first principles that go with each qualified assumption, and by 
doing so we discover which justified belief has the strongest arguments and thus most 
resembles a first principle (being then true for the most part). The act of recognising 
resemblances between the endoxon and the universal or archē is also a process of 
„grasping‟ „upwards‟ from the systematic thoughts too the thoughts which control these 
truths. Here we are at a point where intelligence plays almost a sensory role in 
comprehension of universals. If we have sufficient intellectual capacity qua nous we will 
„see‟ the universal without further process. Nous will have grasped its object in the one 
direction: 
Intelligence (nous) has as its objects what is last in both directions [to and from universals]; 
for both the primary definitions and what is last in practical reasoning are to be grasped by 
intelligence, not with an account, the objects of the sort of intelligence that operates in 
demonstration that are universal consist of particulars. So one must have a sense of 
perception also of universals, and this is intelligence. (1143a36-1143b8) 
Further, systematic knowledge (sunesis) and intelligence (nous) most resemble 
objects high in a hierarchy of controlling principles in nature. Like first principles sunesis 
and nous are themselves high ranking principles in nature (1141b3-4), because they are 
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from nature (a capacity for sunesis and nous is something we are born with) and much of 
what is naturally good for man is dependent on these capacities. 
We have thus far gained precision in the prepositions, soundness and truth-value in 
a general sense. We have accomplished a sunesis of what we can say is true for the most 
part in our investigation, having examined the endoxa in relation with what is true without 
qualification. A universal in ethical enquiry is, however, not true in all cases since it is in 
the nature of cases involved that none are entirely identical (1094b15-23). An ethical archē, 
therefore will always be true for the most part, in most cases. This realisation also begs a 
reminder that a variation in endoxa, and true grasping of these, is a requirement in order to 
cover as vast a variation of general truths as possible (we are therefore reminded that one 
trip in this direction is not enough. We have gained the value of easier passage along with 
the pleasure derived thereof, encouraging us to make future enquiries). 
But since this is ethics, our inquiry into ethical conduct is meaningless if left to 
theoretic inquiry alone. We have yet to make our enquiry relevant to real ethical activity 
and conduct, and thus we return to the point of departure illuminating the beginning 
endoxa. Returning to the beginning seems also to have a motivational function: The 
enquiring subjects will notice the difference and the value of the enquiry when being able 
to compare the result to the humble beginnings, the point being that this should help 
students of ethics more easily to arrange or rearrange their beliefs in terms of which beliefs 
belong under which first principles and what stage of inquiry each belief is under. In 
addition, having gone through ethical enquiry in this manner should also motivate in terms 
of revealing the value of accumulating experience in further ethical activity and enquiry 
into the good for humans. Indeed the NE seen as a whole is an example of this type of 
enquiry, from humble beginnings in book one, laying out the conflicting ideas of what the 
good for man consists of, understanding the principle that the good for man is the excellent 
activity of the soul in accordance with reason, but then continuing in the remaining nine 
books to investigate what was not fully understood to begin with. If the result then 
harmonises with experience, including the experience of lives outside ethical enquiry, it 
should be accepted. It will be accepted by the person who through good upbringing and 
character development sees the direct relevance between the investigation which one has 
taken pains to bring in from outside his/her subjective view point, and one‟s own assurance 
that results, is how one wants to live. 
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Given the method of ethical enquiry as here described, and given the central role it 
plays in providing not just a means to ethical ends, but to a worthwhile mainundertaking in 
life in and of itself, is seems prudent to present it in diagram as suggested by Aristotle‟s 
metaphor that ethical enquiry is much like the U-shaped track in Athenian sports: 
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even super-human – but useless, because what they inquire into are not goods that are 
human” (1141b7-8). Aristotle pulls the leaf from his mouth at the thought of philosophy 
without the „round trip‟ back to practical wisdom: “But most people fail to do these things, 
and by taking refuge in talk they think they are philosophizing, and that they will become 
excellent this way” (1105b12-15). Ethical inquiry that loses its grasp on practical reasoning 
for the good and the fine, in action, in relation to us – humans – is of less worth than those 
who lack systematic knowledge of ethical universals but who are familiar with the 
particular and practical, who are effective in good activity.  
The trip back from first principles involves similar tasks the logismos must handle. 
The upshot in this trip back to practical wisdom is that we at this point have clearer access 
to archē controlling underlying principles for human action, which in turn gives us a sense 
of direction to our activities. Our intellect must in a different way synthesise the relevance 
of controlling principles concerning human action with their relevant actions. The job of 
the intellect is similar, however, in that it should make „free play of thought‟ and give „easy 
passage‟ (Lear, Cambridge 1988 pg. 4) to good inducing activity. 
3.2.2 Wisdom (phronēsis) 
What Aristotle calls wisdom or phronésis consists of an organised, though 
somewhat piecemeal description of characteristics: i) Wisdom will produce decisions that 
accomplish the good for each occasion, by issuing a prescription (orthos logos) ii) can be 
displayed by two different methods of inquiry, one for theoretical questions and one for 
practical questions, iii) a disposition marrying cleverness (true thought) with character 
excellence (true desires), iv) though Aristotle elaborates in length on the nature of technical 
expertise and intellectual accomplishment (a combination of knowledge , episteme, with 
intelligence, nous) he does so to illustrate that wisdom is separate from these, v) wisdom 
works on different levels: on a political level of production on a grater scale, on the level of 
comprehension, on the level of sympathy and on the level of intellectual mastery. 
Wisdom consists of deliberation on that which is good and advantageous (1140a25-
27), according to Aristotle‟s understanding of the endoxa (justified belief; see ch. 3.2.1) of 
the characteristics of one who is wise. Our modern endoxa might be different, as we may 
take good and advantageous to mean exclusively situational advancement. This is not the 
present case however, because the good and advantageous here would be for the betterment 
of life in general from the point of view of that person, taken as a whole, that which 
wisdom is for.  The practically wise (phronimos) does not have as his or her goal “some 
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benefit close at hand, but at a benefit of a whole life” (1160a22-23). It is striking that 
Aristotle also here, in explaining his notion of wisdom, relies on his central premise for 
human motivation: That we find out what sorts of things conduce to the good life in 
general. Wisdom is a kind of excellence in its own right, enabling us to judge the relevance 
of particulars - under their controlling principles. Practical wisdom must thus be concerned 
with universal premises (VI.7 1141b14-15), and it gains its knowledge of them „second 
hand‟ from the scientific of the logos having soul. Perception of particulars under the minor 
premise (or „practical perception‟) by contrast, is its own unique contribution (Reeve, 
Blackwell pg. 208). Though the practically wise must be informed by relevant facts and 
knowledge of the scientific world, his or her main concern is for „what can be otherwise‟ 
(1140b25-28) in the ethical world, the world of action. Wisdom must therefore include an 
„openness‟ and sensitivity to the ethical situation one stands in, in this sense informing the 
agent truthfully of what is going on, and in continuation recommend an apt response. This 
is the reason why practical wisdom is inseparable from a demand of character-excellence. 
Without character excellence, one alogical soul would be incapable of sensation of 
particulars in a manner that recommends apt action: “for a good person discriminates 
correctly in every set of circumstances, and in every set of circumstances what is true is 
apparent to him” (1113a29-31). But since circumstances are particular, and since practical 
wisdom must consider the controlling principles in each, they must hone their eye, and 
formed from experience, they see correctly. (1143b13). 
We all arrive at situations where forethought and weighty deliberation is desirable 
or even necessary, yet impossible, in order to bring about a result that is good, just, not evil 
etc. This is one reason for us to be concerned with our pre-disposition to be affected and 
react in the manner of one who is adept to feel, think and act wisely in situations where 
acquiring forethought is in conflict with the situations immediacy. The wise person acts 
precisely in this adept way, again underpinning the need for adaptation to character 
excellence in the phronimos (s/he who acts wisely, who has practical wisdom), seen as a 
goal for human functioning through ethical living. As mentioned in section 2.4 our 
emotional apparatus has the capability to judge value and make assessments in the here-
and-now based on feelings for and from recognised objects. If the relevant particular is 
recognised in the instance, then that is all the urge and impulse needed in order for the 
phronimos to act, because s/he  senses in the instant how to bring a good result „back to 
oneself‟, and being rightly affected here means reacting aptly, giving the same result as if 
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one had deliberated at length. The question is whether or not such action indeed qualifies to 
be called a wise deliberative action. One criterion is that the starting points of deliberative 
action is having the right archē, or major premise in an action; but when we act with the 
wrong major premise, say, wanting returns instead of wishing the other well when one 
helps others, then the deliberative action will start out off target. For this reason the 
phronimos has a soul disposed to enjoy, take pleasure from, or like the relevant archē, or 
retract from, or be displeased by inappropriate ones.  
It is therefore of some interest that, when we understand the way a phronimos 
deliberates or senses, we are a step closer to producing epistemē on ways in which we can 
go wrong. We can either i) deliberate well, i.e. successfully bridging major and minor 
premises in a resulting action, but for the wrong ends. This means effectively that we have 
either not aptly understood the archē, mistaken the desired outcome as a category under the 
archē, or mistaken one archē for another; ii) We may deliberate and act to the right result 
for the right archē, but through the wrong minor premise, because of not correctly 
interpreting the relevant particulars, mistaking one for another or not sensing them at all. 
The right result is then arrived at by luck alone and not be because of our being in a well 
functioning state. There are of course also the cases where the wrong archē and particulars 
are deliberated on and utilised due to an assessment by the deliberator that these are better, 
and these cases are examples of human badness.  
3.3 Intellectual Activity II: Ethical Deliberation and Development of 
„Good-Finding‟ Senses  
We have now lain down some of the foundations in Aristotle‟s theory concluding in ethical 
enquiry being valuable and desirable as an investment in and of itself. Through ethical 
enquiry we more easily understand living in the world as a coherent, facilitating, richer and 
more truthful existence. We have also seen that ethical enquiry is far more than simply a 
calculating method of enquiry, but a lifestyle in and of itself by exhibiting activity attuned to 
the universals concerning the good and the fine for us, both in the singular and as a species. 
This life style consists of gaining systematic knowledge of the controlling principles of that 
which is fine, and then exhibiting them in action. 
We have yet to look more closely at the return journey from gaining understanding 
of universals, to application in practical reasoning. We should therefore get a clearer idea 
of how practical reasoning in the NE is thought to work in practice. We have also taken 
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items such as „the good‟, „controlling principle‟ and „universal‟ at mere face value up until 
now. This neglects the very foundation of why Aristotle calls this ethical enquiry in the 
first place, making further disclosure of what „ends‟ consist of, the fine and the good, the 
true objects of desire in general,  far overdue.  
3.3.1 Universals, Particulars and the Senses‟ Dependency on Character Excellence  
I have presented above the interaction between a method of systematic thinking about puzzles 
lain out to us in the world, and our gaining of acumen in solving such puzzles. So far, the 
discussion has circled mostly on how methodology is relevant to our grasping and gaining 
knowledge of universals, realising what is true of what we commonly sense about the world. 
We have not yet discussed the production and utilisation of such knowledge in practice, or the 
situations that depend on the recognition of the viability of universals.  
One of Aristotle‟s rather famous logical deductions, the practical syllogism, utilises 
his notion of universal and particular. Thus far we have taken „universal‟ to carry a rather 
vague meaning, incorporating both a category of „common inference‟ (endoxa) and 
„controlling principle‟ (archē). At the same time we know that any given „universal‟ in 
ethical enquiry is intimately associated with action under the guidance of that which we 
judge as good for the most part. In moving away from universals towards practical effect, 
Aristotle relies on a specific logical function to make clear to us how we derive from 
something we have knowledge/experience of for the most part (all S are P), to recognising 
its relevance in the here and now (M is S). The practical syllogism is described below: 
Further, since there are two types of premiss, there is nothing to prevent someone from 
acting „contrary his knowledge‟ when he has both premises but is using only the universal 
one, not the particular one; for it is particulars that are acted on. The universal too has to be 
differentiated, in so far as there is one term for the agent and one for the object of the 
action, e.g. that all human beings are benefited by dry foods, and that oneself is a human 
being, or that such-and-such is dry; but whether this is such-and-such – this is what the 
agent either does not „have‟, or does not activate; and which of these ways we mean will 
make an enormous difference, with the result that his knowing seems, in one way, not all 
strange, and in the other way amazing.  (NE VII.3 1147a1-10) 
The practical syllogism is an argument showing how we go from deliberative action 
as described in a three-part argument. The argument consists of the universal stated as a 
major premise (“all human beings are benefited by dry foods”), a minor premise consisting 
of a particular recognition of the predicate in the universal (I am a human being, this food 
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is dry), to the conclusion resulting directly into action (“I am having this food now”). At 
face value the practical syllogism does not seem all too explanatory of how we choose to 
act, yet it can explain how we can gain systematic knowledge and experience of the 
universals in practical action. In scientific theory a syllogism would be an explanation of an 
acknowledged truth. In ethical theory on the other hand, a syllogism handles the purpose 
for which we act.  
When I have a grasp of a universal, something that is for the most part true, I will 
have no use for this sunesis without recognising its salience in „particulars‟, the 
circumference of situated events of significance to the universal or major premise: “for 
these are starting points of that for the sake of which, since things that are universal consist 
of particulars. So one must have perception of these, and this is intelligence” (1143a2-5). 
The universal consists of an organising context in which relational particulars represent the 
minor premise. Again as with the „grasping‟ of universals, nous has as its function to 
acquire an interpretation of particulars as well, in their situational whole, deciphering at the 
same time the relevant and significant futures of situational events.  
The capacity for nous is not alone in this task however. Grasping relevant 
particulars in continuous activity relies on all our senses and is exceptionally difficult. 
Whether we sense and recognise significant futures relies on the functioning of the entirety 
of our sensory devices, from „mere‟ sensory perception, to correct and effective affective 
reception, to apt emotional reception (of affection) and response, to intellectual „grasping‟, 
to sympathy and social understanding (see chapter 4.1 for the latter), to the cognition of 
value. The breadth and precision in such grasping of particulars seems daunting indeed, and 
is descriptive of the circumstances that necessitate character excellences. It seems all the 
more rational, then, that once we hone in on understanding  universals, we desire at the 
same time to concern ourselves with the parts of the soul that will be put to the test of 
utilising said universals. This is the very reason why practical wisdom (phronesis) is 
impossible to attain without character excellence in the owner; however, it would be a 
mistake to induce that arriving from the universal to the particular the way the wise person 
does is an impossible task not worth contemplating. Indeed, capacities for sensing our 
environment in a human way are tautologically in us as facilitated by nature, as humans. It 
is evident from the above passage that one segment of the minor premise consists of us 
identifying ourselves as human. While this necessitation of self-identification in the minor 
premise can have all sorts of syllogistic value, from identifying relative use and value 
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between the object of desire and us, to self-exploration through ones surroundings, the 
knowledge of who we are will, at all times, play a central role
18
 in sensing situations 
relevant to us. 
It is also evident that these sensing capacities mature incrementally and in stages, as 
we‟ve seen some examples of in our test subject Hannah.  Myles Burnyeat in his famous 
article „Aristotle on Learning to be Good‟ (California, 1992) draws a more detailed picture 
of Aristotle‟s theory of how rational development coincides with character-development, 
that the interdependency of the one on the other is a learned process. His main point is that 
we have today  too weak a definition of 'learning', since learning also implies development 
in both in the non-rational and rational parts of the soul. He also provides us with concrete 
suggestions for where different developmental stages are present in the text. He is 
interested in how we go from knowing “the that”, that something is so, to “knowing the 
why”, why something is so. Burnyeat‟s point of departure is a look at the notion of “The 
that” in book 1, “that that” being the relevant first principles (archē) in a given inquiry: 
“For the starting point is that it is so, and if this were sufficiently clear to us – well, in that 
case there will be no need to know in addition why” (1095b6-8).  From this and other 
passages he induces that Aristotle relies on there being consecutive steps in knowledge 
concerning both from and too first principles and that this is something we can accomplish 
by learning. The aim of upbringing is to enable the young to easily 'get' the starting points 
while the ones who do not easily get the starting points will be more dependent on their 
own motivation to understand what others are saying. They desire to know the why, even 
thought this type of knowledge is complex and difficult to grasp.  
As for Hannah, we can presume examples corresponding with syllogistic reasoning 
and its authority over her actions. When she learns productive capacities she 
simultaneously discovers she can be the cause of production. Under the rule of Aristotle‟s 
four causes (i. formal cause, ii. material cause, iii. efficient cause and iv. final cause; see 
sections 2.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3), Hannah is the efficient cause of her productions while, 
whether she is conscious of it or not, her production is steered by the final cause, that for 
which her actions are done. In production, Hannah‟s actions standing in relation to the final 
cause is determined by whether or not they are causal constituents to the final cause. The 
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final cause acts here as an archē (principle), say living and doing well, constituted by - 
“running contributes to health” -  and then „sorting out the puzzles‟ in the particulars, “is 
this a time to run? Should I run as fast as I can? Will the way I run lead to what I want?”, 
dependent on her senses, character and wisdom in the particular. 
Concerning the practical syllogism, the question remains: Do we syllogise from day 
to day in any practical sense, which aids us in our return from sunesis of a universal to 
exhibition of said universals in action? In short, can the practical syllogism be used in any 
prescriptive sense? And is it correct to presume that syllogistic reasoning is at work in our 
thought experiment? Certainly, it is not as if we think in our day-to-day lives “Oh, here is 
as a particular under this universal I have learned a lot about. I will do this then”. At the 
same time it seems imminent that moral prescriptions should be present in our actions, 
precisely in the way a universal, say, sharing goods with others, should present itself to us 
when the situation arises when we should act justly. Indeed a syllogism does seem to work 
prescriptively, in the sense that it can explain morally successful action, and failures to act. 
While on the other hand, it seems to press the matter too far to say that it is through 
syllogising we make decisions. Decisions, and what leads us to decide, are explained by 
Aristotle under the heading of deliberative activity, which is to follow.  
John Cooper (1986, pg. 23) summarises his view on the relation between the 
practical syllogism and how we arrive at ends and actions clearly by concluding ““A 
“practical syllogism” is not in any general part of the deliberation that leads to the 
performance of an action””, while other views19 maintain that we act instantly upon the 
conclusion of the syllogism and that syllogising is in some sense what it is to deliberate. As 
it seems, the main disagreement lies in whether or not the syllogistic conclusion includes 
the final resolution to act, or making a reasoned choice whatsoever.  As I understand it, 
under Cooper‟s reading one cannot divulge any more information from the syllogistic 
conclusion than a perception of a good, presiding on a general knowledge that it is good, 
and a conclusive good-getting if the agent has free play to do so. One can certainly not 
divulge if any reasoning has taken place from the syllogism alone. There is then no 
explanatory link between actions described under the syllogism and action as a result of 
deliberation.  
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Here‟s my take. First, we do know that a syllogism will involve beliefs and 
knowledge of universals in a major premise which are ideally evolved from the to-journey 
towards epistēme and archē. These include matters we do not deliberate about, like 
scientific knowledge, but also ends that are over and above other ends, like the good and 
the fine, activity in happiness if we first have this desire, knowledge we arrive at through 
ethical living itself, and epistēme itself. Indeed Cooper acknowledges, and devotes much 
discussion to, the development of human flourishing as both a universal and an end. 
Second, we can describe the instance of action in syllogistic form in a way that informs us 
of deliberation taking place. When Hannah deliberates upon her dilemma, she has the 
capacity to imagine, possibly through phantasia (a sense invoking imagination when 
conceptualising consequential acts), not only that a particular is relevant to the universal, 
but how action might produce the good under said universal if she chooses to act. Her 
sensations help her perceive and be affected by the possibility of personal victory versus 
the pain of letting it go
20. These emotions‟ „cognitive slant‟, as I call it, inform us of how 
we feel about each outcome we imagine. When we arrive at the conclusion, we have 
brought „the end back to us‟ (1113a5-6) in two senses. First, when we have managed to 
cognise what our perception is telling us about the universal, we still need to understand 
why the universal pertains to the situation, the reasons for which are object to deliberation. 
Second, we need to realise the ordinary practical steps we need to take in order to act 
according to the universal. I believe Cooper only takes into account the second, practical 
use of syllogistic reasoning and therefore denies its relevance to deliberation and choice.  
The practical syllogism now consists of a grasp of a universal through a dichotomy 
of ethical enquiry and ethical living. We 1) sense and grasp relevant ethical circumstances, 
grasped by both logical and alogical functions of the soul, 2) know how and why they fall 
under a relevant ethical universal, and in so doing arrive at an outcome prescribed by this 
meeting, and 3) realise the necessary action which leads to the good prescribed by said 
universal. The practical syllogism does not sufficiently explain how we deliberate, 
however. In general, we deliberate on things that can be otherwise and worthwhile of 
pursuit. While the product of deliberation, the reason we deliberate, is to make a decision 
(prohairesis). 
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3.3.2 Deliberation and Desire-Based Decision 
Under Aristotle‟s preliminary definition the cause of „decision‟ must enter into the 
definition of what „decisions‟ are thought to be. The cause of decisions is desire. Desires in 
turn are „informed‟ by deliberation (1139b4-5). The function of deliberation is to achieve a 
direct route to action by „bringing the end back to us‟ (1113a5-6). Decision (proheiresis) is 
a combination of thought (dianoia)/intelligence (nous), and desire (orexis). After a 
deliberation a decision will then ensue committing us to what good deliberation prescribes. 
Aristotle is of the idea that once we have deliberated there is nothing else left between us 
and the object of desire. Given that our orexis (emoting desire) is a mover, we will at this 
time commence the good-getting action since there is nothing else left holding it back. It is 
a transition where the thinking (noēsis) stops and the doing (poiēsis) commences (1032b15-
17). We arrive at decisions then, when we have in a sufficiently clear way seen what 
actions one must take in order to produce the desired outcome, thereby lifting the break off 
our orexis. Decision, under Aristotle‟s definition, is thus „the source of movement‟ 
(1139a31-35). 
Deliberation, we initially say, is reasoning over „what can be otherwise‟, not by 
nature, necessity or chance, but by our agency (1112a36-37). The objects of deliberation 
are thus the outcomes that depend on our actions, understood as a function of intelligence. 
We do not deliberate when the outcome is the same every time or already known, but when 
the outcome is unclear and when the correct way to act is not given (1112b8-9), when we 
are in two minds on how to act (11121b3). When there is a gap between our understanding 
of the universal and what our perception of the particular is telling us, resolving the 
disparity will require deliberation. Objects we deliberate on are the ones that depend on our 
productive agency and capacity, “the things doable by him” (112a35).  
I mentioned above that once deliberation is „completed‟ the effect is knowledge of 
how we bring the object of desire „back to where we are‟. To bring the good back to us can 
be taken too literally however. We do not imagine ourselves walking backwards from the 
desired good, over certain obstacles back to where we stand. Instead the logismos „sees‟ 
that the good is both desirable and attainable, by understanding why it is good and how to 
attain it. The reasoning part of the soul does not itself add to the desiring part of the soul 
qua orexis (the moving faculty), but in Jonathan Lear‟s words “forms” the desire21, our 
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emotional faculties being ever present. It is in this sense we can understand how the logical 
and alogical parts of the soul can each others „efficient cause‟ as described in section 2.1.  
3.3.3 On Ends (II) 
It seems clear that deliberation is attached to wishing and desire as a furtherance 
and completion of desire:  
Given that what is decided upon is an object of deliberation and desire among the things 
that depend on us, decision to will be deliberational desire for things that depend on us; for 
it is through having selected on the basis of having deliberated that we desire in accordance 
with deliberation. (1113a10-13) 
As we found in 1.2, ends or products in relation to us stand in a hierarchy, from 
simple to refined, derived from the fact that it is for the controlling ends, the „finished 
product‟ that we desire the products that lead up to it (1094a15-17). These are archē in a 
practical sense in terms of what we want. It seems logical for us to want the end that is 
highest in this hierarchy, yet these types of ends would require some specific knowledge of 
what it takes to do the things that are for the sake of it.  
However, (in this opening chapter) the end‟s specific conditionals are not known to 
us. Nor is the right path of discovery, and there is little to reveal whether we are doing the 
things required or not. Thus the wisdom to judge is not presently available to us, but it 
seems evident what its job is: To both uncover the right path of discovery, which actions 
lead to which goods, and attempt to gain the capabilities, needed in order to get there.  
A special brand of practical enquiry, „getting there‟ as a type of thinking, is what 
Aristotle calls „architectonic knowledge‟. Architectonic knowledge is aptly named due to 
the inductive nature of the inquiry, defining a goal, say a house, planning out the house 
(sorting out the puzzles) and then ultimately bringing the plan to fulfilment by defining the 
right steps and in so doing defining the right consecutive first steps (bringing the thing back 
to oneself).   
In architectonic assignment of desired ends, Aristotle attaches the concepts of action 
and production. Technical expertise or techné is a productive disposition accompanied by a 
true rational prescription, concerned with the capability of coming into being or not coming 
into being. Knowledge in this area is based on observable facts and change, of which one 
cannot claim knowledge once outside our direct observation. However, if a rational 
prescription is incorrect or gives directions on „know-how‟ for the wrong product, then that 
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is the cause of in-expert technique. Technical expertise is concerned with the „coming into 
being‟ (1140a11) or production: It is concerned...  
...with the practice and theory of how to bring into being some one of the things that are 
capable either of being or of not being, and the origin of whose coming into being lies in 
the producer and not in the thing being produced (1140a12-14). 
Aristotle‟s concept of production is underpinned by the following theory: In the 
Metaphysics V.2 and Physics II.3, he divides causes into four categories of explanation: 
The four causes are 1) Material cause, from what the production is made of, 2) Formal 
cause, also called the „form‟, from what knowledge, concept, designs and ideas the product 
is thought to be a priori, an explanation of what the product will be, 3) Efficient cause
22
, the 
cause or source of change outside the thing itself (the thing in production) and 4) Final 
cause, the end, the end product for the sake of which the production was done. So technical 
expertise in production will concern itself with each of the four causes of production, 
including the role and consecutive steps of the external changer 3), the one who acts as the 
products efficient cause, along with what he or does in order to consider 1) and 2) in order 
to bring about the realisation of 4).  
Technical expertise is knowledge in a very strict sense, since we can only claim to 
have proper knowledge of a thing once we have grasped its causes (Posterior analytics 
71b9-11; 94a20)
23
, which is precisely what technical expertise aims at, given the theory of 
four causes.  The fact that technical expertise is a type of knowledge, and only knowledge, 
is also confirmed by contrasting expert knowledge with wisdom (1140b25). Technical 
expertise is not a capacity which we humans have in the sense that it is as it should be when 
it is working in us. Recall that the only qualifier of technical expertise was that it works in 
accordance with rational prescription. Technical expertise can, however, be an excellence 
in the sense that the masters of certain crafts display excellence in their field, and by this 
we mean that they have excellent precision in technical knowledge and practice. Technē 
can coincide with excellent capacities and dispositions, but can also exist without them. 
And since it is knowledge, one can also go wrong both in action and production based on 
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technical expertise by, alone due to it, not following rational prescription. One can 
therefore have expertise, but still get both action and production wrong for lack of some 
other character state.  
So habituation is not an uninformative brute prerequisite necessitated by the 
predefined starting points of a principle. Habituation is often a prerequisite for those who 
do not 'get' „the that’ by being naturally predisposed; but more importantly, habituation is 
also a means to 'grasp'/'get'/ or 'see' the reasons for starting points. That being said 
habituation can be considered a starting point in its own right, which also starts with 'that 
which is familiar' ideally for each person. That habituation is a means in its own entails that 
'the that' in habituation may reveal what habituation is for along the way, meaning that by 
doing the habituated acts you may notice that habituation is taking place, and see the 
connection between the change in you and the purpose in habituation. It is also only by 
having acted out such change that we can get to know how that change affects us, affirming 
or correcting false presuppositions we might have had at the starting points. So habituation 
is highly based on the notion that we learn by doing but not in the sense of merely 
experiencing the change. As Burnyeat puts it: "The thesis is that we first learn (come to 
see) what is noble and just not by experience of or induction from a series of instances, nor 
by intuition (intellectual or perceptual), but by learning to do noble and just things, by 
being habituated to noble and just conduct" (Rorty ed. California 1992, pp. 73) . Again we 
can call upon the notion of 'efficient cause' for explanation of what Burnyeat means here: 
that the cause of the just and noble acts is in the agent. We therefore have to eliminate our 
modern understanding of practice as an observation over consecutive steps, but instead see 
it more as actualised action, praxis, for the goal of „dispositioning‟, hexis. More 
surprisingly still is Burnyeat‟s theory that practice has 'cognitive powers'. It is not quite 
clear what he means by this, but I think he is invoking what I mentioned above, that actions 
affect our belief-system and dispositions in a way that a priori notions cannot, by affirming 
true presuppositions or correcting false presuppositions. Practice is both dependant on, and 
the begetter of, reasonably correct ideas. 
Our starting points from nature, i.e. what we find naturally pleasurable, will 
obviously lay a major role in deciding what type of habituation is best. Here Burnyeat 
alludes to NE book X where Aristotle asks who is best suited for noticing these things 
before we are self aware on the level of pleasures and pains. The noble (kalon) and the 
good (for many, a true realisation of the pleasure that comes with the true enjoyment of 
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good and noble praxis will be out of reach, if not affixed to the pain of force). But one who 
decides that the noble and the good is indeed what it is, i.e. good, the stage is set for true 
"lovers of what is noble" (1099a13.15). Here the word "love" has no weaker connotation 
than it does today. This person truly sets the noble highest both in the hierarchy of goods, 
but also in terms of passion, being truly affected by these goods. And if such a person is not 
directly affected by such goods at present, they none the less are truly pleased by 
experiencing habituation that, if all goes as planned, puts them in the position to love in the 
way they desire. They desire a body and mind which are directly pleasurably affected by 
what is ultimately good, and this is a highly desirable end in itself, though not a final end.  
Burnyeat distinguishes between a "modern" weak understanding of what we mean 
by learning and a stronger Aristotelian understanding of what "learning" implies. While we 
may think that learning consists solely of acquiring some information or know-how, 
learning in the strong sense implies a learning which involves us being in a certain 
condition in order to take in what is being learnt, like us taking pleasure in what is learnt. In 
this way Aristotle connects knowledge with the way it is enjoyed. We might know 
something, like parties being excellent for interacting and connecting in fun and interesting 
ways with others, yet enjoy a party mostly for all the important people we meet. In this 
example we are not learning to enjoy ourselves at parties, even though we are enjoying 
ourselves, because we are not enjoying the party the right way, (i.e. for the right reasons, in 
this example). Under Aristotle‟s notion of learning we may not learn by simple habituation, 
internalisation, or by social dictate. It is only learned by experiencing a well functioning 
interplay between the emotional and intellectual sides of a worth-while action or 
production, and deriving pleasure from it – or learning to do so. What the virtuous person 
enjoys is the practice of virtues because s/he sees them as such, and that is the efficient 
cause of the enjoyment.  
The reasons for our capability to learn in the way mentioned above can be argued in 
four successive steps. i) We may either have internal or external grounds for pleasure and 
pain, and the more autonomously/self-sufficiently we do what is fine and good due to 
pleasures and pains triggering our own reflection and disposition, the surer we are of being 
in the right condition to attain such goods. ii) There are two ways of forming desires: one is 
for our non-rational side to be ready to form desires from reason, the second comes from 
“pursuing each successive object, as passion directs” (1.3 1095a 9-10). iii) Akratic action 
(deciding to do something, yet not acting out the decision) consists of the above desire “as 
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passion directs” in addition to the combination of desire and thought leading to a syllogism: 
“Sweets are nice; this is sweet; I‟ll have this”. iv) There are two kinds of syllogism 
separating the continent person from the akratic. The one is of the above kind. The other is 
of the kind which represents a latter and less established stage of development where one 
has passion for the fine and the good, i.e. right desire, yet jumps the mark before 
recognising the situation as conducive to the good. From these steps and distinctions, we 
are capable of judging whether actions are causing the right enjoyment and correct desires 
for the lover of the fine and the good.  
In order to be fully virtuous it is then required that the noble productions and actions 
bring us pleasure for what it is, that the noble be the chief part of the desired good, that the 
deliberation and choice of action/production be pleasant, plus that the resulting 
activity/production proceeds from a firm and unchangeable character. Our envisioning and 
sense of the good is now shaped by a free, reasoned conception of the good, where the 
noble is pleasant because we see it as good and our perception is correct.  
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4 Social Development 
Thus far we have examined development of faculties essential to emotive and deliberate 
action by Hannah the individual. This examination has until now, however, been quite out of 
context: Even from birth, indeed from conception, our protagonist has stood in a relation to 
others and her surroundings, determinate for her capacities and possibilities, potential and 
actualised wishes and desires: her parents, her society, her species and her growth in the 
natural world. The „development‟ of Hannah‟s wants and desires is a development both 
essential to, and enabled by, being born into a specifically human social context. From the 
beginning the Nicomachean Ethics, as an examination concerning human happiness, is strictly 
evolved as a line of enquiry directed at the conceived identity between the good for man and 
the good for individuals of this species. To our modern western eyes, with the endoxon that 
happiness for us must contain an individual „elan‟ based in thorough  self-exploration and 
expression, this may seem like a striking position that is contrary or non-sensitive to 
individually perceived self-originating „styles‟ of living. As such we can expect to gain some 
insight into questions concerning this distinction by going through some of the puzzles this 
presents us with, if we consider these endoxa both valid yet contradictory. 
Presently, the most illustrative example of such a distinction would be, in our 
thought-experiment, the conclusion our test subject makes when she decides to put all her 
effort into the collective honour based in winning as a team over the taste of personal 
victory in her own discipline. The question resounding in our modern ears would be, if I 
may venture, whether this decision is at all good for Hannah. How can we say that this 
outcome is what Hannah wanted? Does she not here sacrifice the affirmation that all her 
work up to this point has been worth her effort? Would this affirmation not be essentially 
good for her, something that we as bystanders would genuinely wish upon her? Is she at all 
confident of her own skills, or that running is good for her own sake, in making this 
decision? Does she gain her deserved recognition as someone capable of something extra 
ordinary? When asking these questions it dawns on us that answering them will indeed be a 
part of a complicated and delicate navigation of the not always positive forces of social 
influence on the one side, and necessary and often pleasurable „good-inducing‟ communal 
bonds and relations on the other. In order to bring about more clarity, it seems useful to 
reflect that Aristotle‟s position is the one more distant to our times. Fortunately for this 
discussion, Aristotle is very aware of the problem that arises when we intuitively question 
whether Hannah‟s decision is good for Hannah, and shows this by formulating the question 
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we wish to ask for us by making a striking distinction: “Is it then the good that people love, 
or what is good for themselves?” (1155b23-24). This query allows for a disjunction 
between the good (to agathon) and the individual good. This remark also opens up the 
possibility of a shared good qua our distinctions as human versus an individual good qua 
perception of goods as self gain. To our modern eyes this distinction seems at odds with a 
presupposition that all goods are relative to the one for whom it is good, whether they be 
incidentally conducive to others or not. The main point is that our modern endoxon and 
Aristotle‟s are at odds based on whether or not the individual good and the good as a 
species member is incidental, or indeed causal, Aristotle claiming the latter. We should 
then give that idea a treatment that may let us understand how he could justify Hannah‟s 
conclusion as being good for Hannah, considering her human context. This context is 
evolved in the NE continuously, and specifically in book V on justice and books VIII and 
XI on friendship. 
It is tempting to read these books as etching out definitive developmental stages. 
Traditionally, Aristotle has been thought to describe social development in three stages 
 
(Lerner, 2002) prior to the well-functioning adult. The first stage is „infancy‟ from 
conception to early childhood, where infants exhibit capacities that are otherwise common 
of animal species, where the social context mainly concerns nurturing, where epithumatic 
desires are dominant. The second stage, „boyhood‟, as we can imagine, contains 
exploration into short lived mutual pleasures, stronger passions and memetic desires (from 
mimesis - mirroring) in relation to others, incorporated in, but also separate from, identity-
building. Here we understand, and are concerned with, shame and praise in a social 
context, but not yet its aim – honour and the fine. The last stage, „manhood‟ continues from 
adolescence to the early twenties, from which development in a capacitative sense is 
completed. During this stage we are helped by others to understand our own dispositions, 
learn relevant principles for acting and understand our productive capacities in relation to 
others. Here we understand the objects of shame and honour, shunning the first in practice 
and desiring the last, understanding honour‟s relation to greater architectonic designs for a 
good society. We should at this point no longer have need for shame as an affective cause 
of action. Also, in this last stage, depending on our prior and continual character 
development in earlier and present stages, we are capable of what Aristotle describes as 
friendship between two good people, or character-friendship. From this last stage, Aristotle 
imagines we begin our prime of life, which continues till we are again dependant on 
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nurturing and relief of discomfort when we are old. These stages should not be taken too 
literally. It is not the intention of this paper, or of Aristotle I believe, to understand human 
development in clearly etched steps and looking for proof of these in the text. It is more 
interesting, and more fruitful, to understand which transitions occur by piecing together 
their mechanisms.  
In discussing social development we will be discussing predominantly the 
development of social desires, or more to the point, the desires we have for living together 
both seen as a good in itself and as a means for ethical living and happiness proper, i.e. as 
an object of desire and as a cooperative project concerning the greater good of happiness.  
4.1 Preconditions for Social Interaction 
Before we summarize Aristotle‟s theory of social development, through, by and for others, we 
need to get a better grasp of what Aristotle means that we are by nature an animal whose 
function it is to be a part of a structured human society. Again we will rely predominantly on 
the NE for answers, though the reader should be forewarned that this will not present a 
complete picture of Aristotle‟s thoughts on the subject.  
We already have some idea as to emotional and cognitive functions Hannah arrives 
with from birth to adolescence. Here we will have to go a step further back and try to see 
what relational contexts Hannah stands in before we can call her „Hannah‟, since who and 
what Hannah becomes has a defining significance for what she desires. We will be 
interested in what emotive powers bring her into existence, both as a member of mankind 
and through the desires of her parents. 
4.1.1 Predefining Bonds: Kinship, the Biological Continuum, Predecessors and 
Parental Love 
Aristotle uses term „friend‟ or (philia) as both a common and a philosophical term that can 
explain a direct relation, such as „the friends we surround ourselves with‟, and imminent and 
generic relations between humans
24
. The breadth of relational examples becomes apparent in 
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 To give a short introduction, Aristotle‟s concept of philia is defined by several moments: Friendship is 
fundamentally linked to happiness and pertains to loving and cherishing others throughout varying degrees of 
closeness and utility. Friendship is 1) love for the human species, and can imply that one loves the flourishing of 
the capacities of our species, 2) necessary. No one would choose life without it, 3) closeness and pleasure in 
seeing the true figure of another person that is his/her best functioning, 4) safekeeping of one‟s fortune and 
refuge in ones misfortune, 5) necessary for the (type of) thinking and acting that stimulates noble acts, 6) a 
natural bond between parents and their children, 7) a visible bond between people wherever we go, i.e. 
topologically universal 8) given higher priority in our lives than justice and is something fine and praiseworthy 
in itself, 9) consists of relative kinds, relative to different kinds of character, complete when it is between 
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book VIII.1, where it is proclaimed that friendship is not something only seen in the human 
species, but is also apparent in the bonds between parent and offspring in most animal species, 
such as birds (1155a16-19), an idea that seems foreign to our understanding of friendship. 
However, given Aristotle‟s concept of biological functioning (ergon), we can imagine that 
this odd observation is directed at a distinction between species that birth offspring dependant 
on nurturing in order to mature and species that are birthed physically adept to be left to cope 
on their own. The deep dependency between parent and child has, as we shall see, a broader 
explanatory function concerning essential bonds determined by our place in social contexts 
and in nature. At a second glance, species-friendship does appear coherent with our 
distinction „friendship‟ when taking into consideration that most of us will confess to, perhaps 
as we watch a nature documentary, easily projecting our own relationships on turtle doves, 
families of elephant or herds of bison. Aristotle‟s case, however, cannot be seen as a mistaken 
or sentimental projection of human characteristics on animal behaviour. Instead it is a 
metaphysical observation as much as it is a biological one.  
This means that prior to Hannah‟s conception there are a vast number of causes that 
lead up to Hannah being of the specific kind that she is or can be. When examining kinship 
in the NE, Aristotle gives us some important clues as to what his idea of kinship is in 
relation to generational procreation in our species: For instance, man is by nature „a 
coupler‟ (1161a17), meaning that we have in us, from nature, the capacity to continue what 
it is to be human in other – new – individuals, by coupling. He goes on to elaborate logical 
necessities behind coupling: Coupling between man and women is a relation that Aristotle 
calls, from the side of nature, a „completion‟ - i.e.it is a function in human biology that is 
only potential until „completed‟ by intercourse. The completion between a man and a 
woman
25
 happens when each make available what is „there to begin with‟ to „both in 
common‟ (1162a17). This indicates a mutual conscious choice to „make available‟ our 
physiological reproducing capacities, and marks a transition from a non-enabled natural 
function (dunamis) to an enabled active and „completed‟ natural function (energeia) in 
offspring. It seems that Aristotle‟s „coupling‟ entails more that a formal biological function. 
It is noteworthy that the completion is only enabled by „making available to both in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
excellent people who are lovable and desirable for each other, 10) necessitates trust and sharing and 11) brings 
something good with it for each friend.  
 
25
 Aristotle actually uses the signification „husband‟ and „wife‟ which will be explained in more detail later. 
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common‟ i.e. sharing, explicating an intimate biological enclosure that is common to each, 
yet not belonging to one individual, being exclusive and dissimilar. We should speculate, 
also, that coupling is not only descriptive of sexual intercourse. In this context, we see that 
„to make available‟ derives from choice. The reasons and emotions behind coupling are 
thereby relevant to the encounter, as any other choice. The motivation for this act is shared 
in nature: “The most natural act is the production of another like oneself….in order that, as 
far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine. That is the goal for the sake 
of which all things strive” (De Anima II.4 415a27-28)26. A motivation, as prescribed by our 
biological functions, is to partake in the fine and eternal, by coupling. That man is 
„naturally a coupler‟ can also take the meaning „coupling‟ in the sense of „in need of 
another person or group‟, whom we from nature seek to join in human activity with. We 
shall certainly see in upcoming discussions how human activity is dependent on the latter.  
In the NE the „completion‟ between two members of the opposite sex is not strictly 
biological, however. Though sex is mentioned several places in the NE (primarily during 
discussions on pleasure, affection and moderation), it is only in books VIII and IV that 
Aristotle describes coupling in light of love. A good spouse-relation is a relation based on 
excellence (1171a11-12), between two excellent characters, no different from excellence-
based friendship proper, and must fulfil proper criteria for such friendship (excellence-
based friendship). It is plausible that such a friendship can also incorporate a relation 
consisting of „extreme friendship‟, extreme to the degree that this type of friendship can 
only be directed to one person. Though Aristotle is not gender-specific when mentioning 
„extreme friendship‟, it is still clear that a spouse-relation should be of a lasting kind, to one 
person, which makes possible for such a friendship to exist between spouses. Furthermore, 
he argues that the relation between husband and wife should ideally be one based on 
excellence (1161a23-24), both in relation to each other, that their relationship be one of just 
distribution (living together justly; 1162a30), of benefiting the other for the others own 
sake, and in relation to each being of excellent character in their own right. This singular 
and strong bond is then the background for biological coupling, thought to be strengthened 
even further by their delight in each other and in the activities they are the cause of. Their 
„coupling‟ and nurturing, the „causes‟ of children, then „binds them together‟ (1162a28) in 
a way not possible without children.  
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 Reading Lear, Cambridge 1988 pg. 100. 
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The idea of kinship is not only meant to involve an intra-species categorisation, but 
is also descriptive of a possible bond between humans qua being human: Aristotle remarks 
that every human being is a „kindred thing‟ and „an object of friendship‟ (1155a23-25). A 
„kindred thing‟ bears a likeness to you, likeness here meaning sameness, shared biology, 
shared needs, shared rational – non-rational soul – being of the same kind. ‟Kindred‟ also 
carries the meaning of sharing a familiarity, a shared history, the history of the human 
species, but also more directly the history of direct predecessors and ancestors: „An 
ancestor is also a benefactor‟ he says (1161a18), meaning that good has been passed on 
from previous generations to the next ad infinitum (or from an unmoved mover) to the 
present, in both a biological and an abstract sense, and has passed on their material goods 
in a particular sense. With benefaction Aristotle seems also to imply the good that comes 
with life itself, that mere existence is a result of our predecessor‟s good-inducing activity. 
Hannah in this sense is a product of her parents sharing each other. Benefaction, however, 
carries a wider meaning, from material inheritance to an organised society, to an intricate 
ontology carried on from predecessor to predecessor. In a simplified version, given that the 
good for man is an activity, benefaction here implies we bear direct lineage to our 
predecessor‟s good-inducing activity, both in an indirect social context and in a direct 
biological causal sense. 
As mentioned, in the human case we are individuals of a species dependant on 
nurturing. This is also evident in our thought experiment. Already at birth, though Hannah 
is not yet aware of it herself, she is able to communicate how she feels to others. Certainly, 
Hannah‟s parents become fully aware of Hannah‟s needs by Hannah‟s crying out and being 
still as expressions of wanting, desiring succession of discomfort or pain, or satisfaction. 
Before long her affective states connect systematically to action in a way that signals her 
surroundings what she is affected by. This includes pleasure and comfort, having a 
reaffirming positive effect on parents as well. Nurturing however is not episodic as in the 
thought experiment, but a continuous existential commitment and a necessity for Hannah. 
Nurturing is then a determinate of which generic capacities, capabilities and dispositions 
she will be given at the start of her life. Even such a basic circumstance as receiving 
nourishment can have a great - or detrimental if not given - effect on affective, cognitive 
and even social capabilities later on in her life.  
With nurturing we also understand a parent-offspring bond of affection and love, 
completing a strong motivation to care and love for one whom is existentially dependant on 
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you and a focussed and consuming reciprocal affection from the one who is all-dependant 
on the other. One observation considers the time it takes for parents to feel affection for 
their children versus other friends, or more to the point - lack of time needed: „parents‟ 
affection to children is instant‟ [1161b25 (my italics)]. While a human bond between two 
people, or infant to parent, will in all instances take time, the idea here is that parents‟ 
affection for children arises the instant they become visually or physically affected by their 
child (key is the notion of „perception‟ as affection of the other, which will be treated later). 
Aristotle provides several explanations for these bonds. Two such aspects are the sense in 
which the parent is the „source‟ of the child, and the sense in which children stand in 
comparison to the parent as „another self‟: In 1155a5 it is mentioned that parents love 
children as being themselves. We will engage a general discussion of self-love later (4.1.4). 
The point here is that the parents‟ love for the children can be explained by a sense of self-
love in the way that the parent is the child‟s both material and efficient cause, and also final 
cause in the sense Aristotle understands the seed to incorporate the final “genealogical” 
product containing the telos for becoming a specific type of human. The parent already 
knows him- or herself in addition to knowing, in an ideal situation, their spouse, and in 
continuation knows many of the capacities of the child. The mother, generally speaking, 
brings a physical nurturing to the child, being literally the material cause of her offspring‟s 
foetal growth. In addition, Aristotle states that maternal love for offspring is „the greater‟ 
compared to fatherly love (1161b27), the reason being precisely that the child is more the 
stuff of the mother, the mother being more the material cause of the child. In continuation 
the child being more another self to the mother, they thusly love more
27
 (1168a26-29). 
Aristotle observes also (1159a28-30) a great pleasure or elation in a parent‟s relation to the 
child. Love is then stated to resemble this pleasure, to resemble „the delight mothers take‟ 
in their children: “She loves them and knows who they are” (1159a30). He states that love 
has pleasure in itself, a more complete pleasure than comes from „such as honour‟ 
(1159a25-26). A mother knows a child in the same sense as above – like another self.  To 
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 Here I am making a somewhat controversial interpretation that the mother is not solely a passive vessel for the 
activity of the male seed as much focus has been given to Aristotle‟s defense of male energeia in conception as a 
basis for gender inequality. The controversy is partially rooted in the conception that the seed of the father is the 
„active‟, „animating‟, life-giving, telos–producing cause of the offspring (Meta. VII.7, 1032a24), the mother 
contributing nothing to this, when we know it is almost the genetic opposite today. Yet I will contend that the 
passive-concubine-notion of woman in Aristotle‟s biology is not a decisive theory, but at best a puzzle which 
needs to be pieced together with, for instance, the claimed necessity of male-female justice and excellence, seen 
as an ideal precursor to conception.  
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„know‟ a child means also to know why one is this way and not that, because one is a 
source of, and for, the child, and has had a hand in it being thus. Here Aristotle likens 
birthing a child to any production of a good, by suggesting that the „source‟ has a closer 
relation to the produced good, while children feel to parents like something that the parent 
is the source of, i. e. the source or embodiment of relief, food, pleasure and love (1161b19): 
And parents know better what has sprung from them than their offspring know they sprang 
from them; also the source of a thing has a closer relation of belonging to what is sprung 
from it than the thing produced has to what produced it, for what comes from something 
belongs to something, as e.g. a tooth, a hair, or anything else belongs to its owner, whereas 
what it came from does not belong to it at all, or does so to a lesser degree. (1161b20-24)  
................. 
[F]or parents feel affection for children as something of themselves, children for parents as 
something that has come from them.  
The sense of belonging in the above passage introduces a semantic background 
from which we can understand friends metaphorically „belonging‟ to each other. Here, 
belonging pertains to a things coming into being via one‟s own existence, growth, 
processes etc.. For a child to have „come from them‟ implies that the child‟s existence is 
caused by the parents, a „coming into being‟ from parent-activity/coupling-activity. At the 
same time, a parent will not belong to a child in any causal way, and marks an 
individuation of the child qua object-of-self to the parent. This sense of belonging and not 
belonging is defining for the relation between parent and offspring. The offspring is 
continuously dependant on the parents continuing causation throughout the child‟s nurture-
dependency. This dependency, in continuation, is a responsibility for the parent to further 
cause the child: As a father is responsible for an existence, as a source to the child, the 
existence (i.e. child), along with its generic capacity, is a furtherance (for instance via 
educating) under the responsibility of said source, the father (1161a17-18)
28
.  
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 This relation is as it should be when parents render what should be rendered to children (1158b23-24), looks 
after his/her children‟s interests (1160b25-26) and not treat their children slavishly – as they are then tyrants 
(1160b27).
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There comes a point, however, when the existence of the child or progeny, becomes 
distinct and unique, perhaps even from birth. Indeed, a child from birth will become 
another self resulting from the physical separation from the mother (1161b28). When 
understanding Aristotle‟s concept of being a „source‟ we need to keep in mind that the 
transferred energeia is a transference of the same entity, in discreet objects (1161b33). 
The concept of love seems based on a model of the type of loving we ideally 
observe in the nurturing parent, based on „knowing‟ (the other) and a cherishing of direct 
bonds. Loving is an activity, whereas being loved cannot rightly be called activity 
(1168a20), thereby indicating that loving is closer to being happy since happiness is a type 
of activity (1098a6, 1098b31-99a7). The activity enables unequal parties to desire each 
other and in turn desire equality.   
4.1.2 Shared Living 
When laying out our common intuitions on friendship, Aristotle deduces that friendship is 
something both necessary and fine in itself (1155a30). We will come back to „fine‟ (kolos) in 
4.2.3. It seems, then, that this claim is based on friendship being essential to humans, both in 
the sense of individuals coming together and in the sense that civic friendship is necessary for 
human living. Necessity here indicates that social bonds are a primary need, and therefore 
tautologically useful. We have already seen how we are from nature dependant on nurturing 
and stand in a context of membership to a species. We are in addition „civic beings‟ living in a 
political community, which in turn contains the social over-structure for all communities 
(1160a9). If we look at Hannah‟s development, her activities at every stage are dependent on 
a social macrostructure or political over-structure. It is then right to agree that she is a „civic 
being‟ whose nature it is to live with others (1169a18-19).  
That living together is necessary does not here denominate existential necessity, at 
least not exclusively. Our shared living is also a shared activity, and with shared activity it 
becomes possible to have shared goals that are unachievable without participation of others 
in varying scales. Shared living has an intuitive direction to it: an initial endoxa Aristotle 
puts forward says that we “make our way together” because it is i) advantageous and ii) 
provides for necessities for life (1160a10-13). That is, being together as we make our way 
is here understood as a means to an end. The thing we are making, however, can be 
understood in two ways. It can be both arriving at the destination of a good (that the way or 
progress in production is what we make) or that the company on the road is what we are 
making (that our way together is what we are making). Thus, „together‟ can imply both 
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being a means and being an end. Living together, then, is a means to an end of gaining the 
object of shared living (1156b5-6). 
Indeed, a well functioning society is definitely an end in Aristotle‟s view. A mark of 
a well functioning society is whether or not it produces just members of a decent character 
and which enables excellence in ethical living (see 3.2.1 for explanation of this dialectic). 
For Aristotle this implies that the political community does not seek advantage of the 
moment but takes regard to the whole life (1160a23-24). Not seeking advantage in the 
moment, but for what is finest and more lasting, is the mark of a good person, and such a 
person will make the same decision as the wise person for the sake of others under the 
same laws for the sake of the other. Members under such an over-structure, if it is 
successful, will do good acts and work hard at them. Wishing each other well as members 
of a political society will mean committing oneself to joint decisions on what creates good 
in others for their sake, while being concerned by how one contributes to letting such good 
have actual advantage for other members. Since goods easily fall on barren ground, a 
political member should also be concerned with others‟ states of character, the polis seen as 
a whole. A good person would naturally want to live in such a society. Aristotle claims that 
we generally desire to live together with what we „understand‟ (1166a19). This implies that 
we desire to live with others who understand common reason and just grounds to live in a 
state which produces sameness in excellence, and whom have such capacities as owners of 
intelligence. In continuation, we also desire to live with the advantages of intelligence, in 
this case communal intelligence.  
4.1.2.1 Decent People Are Dependent on Just Societies 
Aristotle argues that though there might be a standard of justice or „political‟ justice (the 
hypothetical justice that would exist amongst good people who have what they need and do 
their part in a state of equality, the state that wouldn‟t need a law) it will have different causes 
and solutions from state to state. A natural legal justice is thought to be the justice that exists 
between people who are both morally self-sufficient and self sufficient in terms of external 
goods, who both do just actions and are just. The reward of good people in a „legal‟ state is 
honour, not because they act justly, and have capacities to do so even in difficult 
circumstances, but because it‟s difficult for them to do otherwise because they are just. 
Aristotle mentions in book I that political expertise is one of the highest forms of 
excellence because so many other types of expertise fall under it. Habituation is not only 
the object of the individual‟s judgements but also the judgements of the community; so for 
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us to become rightly habituated we must also go about both listening to and changing our 
community. This is because Aristotle sees justice as the excellence that is closest to being a 
Form, and a Form not only defines „what it is itself‟ but also what causes it. So being just 
and doing whatever makes just events just are one and the same. That means that if justice 
is rightly framed in laws etc. it will command and forbid the right actions at the right times 
for the right purposes and habituate people on the course to becoming self-sufficient in the 
matter, i.e. be just themselves. The aim of laws is to prescribe and educate us about the 
common good.  
Justice is of both a general kind pertaining to general principles that will always be 
the case, and also to a „complete‟ excellence, and a particular kind pertaining to particular 
cases and according excellences like the justice between specific roles in our society or 
between parent and child or master and slave. The ambiguities involved in both the terms 
„justice‟ and „injustice‟ are farther reaching than only this distinction, however, and create 
difficulties when the terms point to potentially similar events but at different classes of 
event. Aristotle wishes to clarify this seemingly difficult to ambiguity, by first looking at 
the types of people they point to in each case and redefining or expanding the terms along 
the way. The just are lawful, because they always follow, and are formed by, rightly framed 
laws. They are not „grasping‟, meaning they „spread the good around‟ as the good needs to 
be spread in order for the good to be good, and they are equal, meaning they distribute 
different goods along the lines of proper merits. This also implies where the unjust person 
goes wrong.  
Aristotle states that justice is another person‟s good, meaning that it is good for each 
of us in its true form under the condition that it is directed towards others. That the 
excellence is complete means that justice will not be in its true form unless the other 
character-excellences are in place. Producing just acts in relation to others without fail is 
the test of the other excellences so to speak. Conversely, injustice is not a part of a vice but 
the vice proper. This taken into account, our actions will be just if they are the mean 
between our acting unjustly towards others and others treating us justly. 
When we are being unjust proper we are acting out of a class of the state of being 
bad, like self-indulgence, cowardice or anger leading to unjust actions like harassment, 
dissertation or violence. However, when we are acting unjustly motivated by gain we are 
being injust, because the things we are acting for can be goods proper like honour, money 
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or safety. The first should be rectified, the second rearranged in terms of who gets which 
goods.  
4.1.2.2 Three Loveable Qualities – Pleasantness, Usefulness and Excellence 
Lasting harmony between friends depend on whether they have reciprocal interaction along 
the above three valuable qualities: that which is pleasant, the useful and that which is 
conducive to excellence [These qualities recall I.8 1099a24-9, II.3 1104b31]. A relationship is 
good if the parties that have vested interests in the other for the other person‟s sake, but not 
for selfish reasons alone. These three qualities comprise three different ranks of friendship 
(1159b10). 
Each desirable/lovable quality can be ones main reason to be together with others or 
that which binds people together.  Friendship based primarily on pleasure will last as long 
as there is pleasure to be had with the other. Friendship based on usefulness will last as 
long as the other is useful. One can have friendships based on both goods, being both 
pleasurable and useful at the same time. The common facet here, however, is that these 
friendships aren‟t based on wishing the other well, for their own sake. They are instead 
characteristic of wishing oneself well, for self-acquiring of goods and good-feeling. In this 
sense, then, pleasure- and utility-friendships are a means to an end, the other party being 
only incidentally involved in the production of objects of desire. In both cases we are 
friends, not to the one who is the source of use and pleasure, but to ourselves most of all 
(1167a15-17). Thus, we calculate in the sense that we wish to act in relation to whatever 
gets the other to produce the good we are after. We give in order to get.  
This need not carry an entirely negative connotation, however. In both cases 
Aristotle gives examples of these types of friendships that are unavoidable or necessary. 
For lovers, for instance, the very perception of the other is the cause of their pleasure 
(1167a5). Indeed he claims that this is the first step of any physical relationship, regardless 
of whether the other is the incidental cause or primary reason for the affection. Also, as 
mentioned, communal friendship, including alliances of all different types will be for utility 
alone, yet such utility is fully capable of being decent if it is just and proportionate.  
Character-friendship, Aristotle argues, is not of the type mentioned above. With this 
type of friendship, which should also be both pleasurable and useful, the other is not 
incidentally the cause of the object of desire. Instead the other is the object of desire. The 
main reason for the person being an object of desire is that s/he is desirable in a non-
reductive sense (Bonaunet, 2008 p. 188). Character-friendship concerns the other as a good 
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person, not essentially as a good for the perceiver but a good because the person is good. 
He argues that people of excellent character are drawn to each other as equals and because 
they have and perceive each other‟s good qualities. Also, since they are good, they will be 
disposed to being a continuous source of good for each other and will work hard at the 
activity of being good for the other, for the others sake. I will continue to examine 
character-friendship understood as an active relation in section 4.2.2.  
4.1.2.3 The Other As Lovable and As a Good 
The loveable qualities of the other mentioned above are the good, the useful and the pleasant. 
However, these qualities do not necessarily make the person they belong to lovable. How then 
does Aristotle argue that a person in ownership of all three qualities truly is lovable, while 
others in ownership of only one or two are not?  
The term „lovable‟ is not used lightly in Aristotle‟s terminology. He states that 
objects of love are rarely encountered and therefore precious (1158a27-34, 1156b25). In 
addition he states that we praise those who love, the act of loving being something fine and 
good in itself (1159a35). We have also seen (in 4.1.1) that motherly love is closer to the 
mark when describing our endoxa of love, since motherly love appears to be an activity. 
Loving seems to lend more meaning than being loved. Also, love in a proper sense is 
thought to resemble motherly love, which is greater than even fatherly love because the 
offspring is partially the same stuff as the mother, the child being more „another self‟ to the 
mother than the father (1159a30, 1161b27), enabling the mother better access to „know 
who they are‟. Love brings into equality (1159b2) the differences between people. We also 
love the other according to merit (1158b27) as a good in and of itself. Excellence between 
friends seems to be love (1159a31-b1). 
Instead of friends being merely external goods in an instrumental sense (in that they 
are necessary for exercising ones good capacities), Aristotle argues that friends are also 
intrinsically a part of human happiness, i.e. are intrinsically good. I believe it is not off the 
mark to suggest that Aristotle‟s definition of love helps us understand why friends are 
intrinsically valuable to us. 
Friends, we recall, are external goods in the sense that they are of benefit and a 
resource and necessity to a life worth living. They can also be goods in that they are 
pleasurable. They can thusly be represented as orexis, or an affective urge towards a good, 
in both the promise of pleasure and in their being instrumental in fulfilment of our 
boulesthai, or wished good. Friends understood as desired and lovable in themselves, 
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however, will entail i) that one knows „who they are‟ as good, ii) that they are both pleasant 
and useful, iii) that they are pleasant and useful for that which is good and fine, i.e. one‟s 
own good and fine activity and iv) being of this kind makes them rare and cherishable, dear 
to oneself and one‟s mode of life and v) that the great value of the good of the other, as 
desirable and lovable, is proportionate to the love you should give
29
.  
Indeed, Aristotle ranks friendship amongst the goods highest in the hierarchy of 
value. Friendship is not only a good in itself, but is also called the most necessary of goods 
(1154a4), enabling other goods of value, since without friendship, any other good would be 
of little worth. While the reasons for friendship that derive from pleasure and utility are 
accidental in nature, kata sumbebékos (Sherman, 1989 pg. 129), the friendships derived 
from virtuous activity enabled by good friends are of a lasting kind. This is because the 
virtuous activity is done with and for the friend as good, and not for the sake of pleasure 
and utility alone (1156a18-b24). A cherished friend will compel us to know who they are 
intimately in a way that one cannot know many people.  
The true lovable kind, then, will be a rare breed, in part due to the demand of 
perceiving the other at length alone, and to them being people of accomplished good 
inducing activities in that they are persons whose desires such friends bring to life. The 
friends whom are appreciated for what they bring incidentally, on the other hand, are not 
lovable in the rare sense stated above, mainly due to the friendship not necessitating 
character excellence because one gets what one desires independent of the composition of 
the friend. Thus, friends in the latter sense do not depend on each other in order to act well, 
while a good character will depend on and be naturally conducive to, virtuous activity. Yet 
for most, since such a soul can only exist if the person has a „complete excellence‟, this 
said soul is correspondingly precious and rare and merits proportionate love. 
4.1.3 Perception I: Coming Into Being By Way of Others Coming Into View   
What defines an existence as an „animal being‟ and „alive‟, in Aristotle‟s view, is determined 
by whether or not it has the capacity to perceive, and in the human case, the capacity to think 
(11170a17-20).  Since the capacity of perception is thusly attached to primary human being, it 
follows that the first stages of enabling this capacity is an essential stage of development. My 
intuition is that, in the NE, there is also a central social context to perception-enabled 
capacities.  
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While perception is defining of animal life, it is difficult for us to see how it can be 
so defining for Hannah in her first stage of life. She is being taken care of and has little 
need of perceptive capacities in order to function by way of taking in nourishment and 
growing. While she does have working perceptive capacities that affect her and allow her 
surroundings to understand how she is affected, she has not yet developed the cognitive 
link between perception and thought. Yet there is still something happening with Hannah‟s 
senses that classifies as perceiving. Instead, perception in infancy seems more pertinent to 
her social context than to her natural surroundings. One example is Hannah‟s growing 
attachment to her parents.  
It is not difficult to understand how perception can be crucial in early social 
development. For instance, it is said that infants are nearsighted until they are several 
weeks old, and though they see little they are capable of seeing the distance to someone‟s 
face when being held. In addition, empirical studies have also shown that infants quickly 
learn to recognise specific details of the face of the mother. In which sense could 
something like this be classified as perception under Aristotle‟s theory? The perceiving 
faculty that stands above all other senses, in Aristotle‟s view, is the faculty of sight 
(1171b70). However, at an infant stage we would only be capable of taking in a close 
object‟s “accidental form” and not its “intelligible form” (DA II4416b20-23) by way of 
sight, since we do not as of yet have the cognitive capabilities to attach an understanding of 
the objects form to the perceived object. So an infant‟s taking in someone‟s “accidental 
form”, would be seeing someone‟s facial features but not understanding that they make up 
a semantic object or person, and can be likened to „discerning‟ (chrinein, though chrinein is 
also often understood as „judging‟, but not in the present case). The child does not yet make 
a cognitive connection between what she sees and what she sees as an object. Yet, while an 
infant will only recognise the features of a parent incidentally, it still gains familiarity with 
the parent in the sense of preferring the closeness of a recognised parent over an unfamiliar 
person. We also say that the child develops attachment by way of recognition through 
several senses. Though we cannot say that the infant has an intelligible recognition of the 
person, and cannot describe a clear cut transition showing when and how a child is capable 
of taking in a parents „intelligible form‟, we can say that the infant is developing a faculty 
of recognition. Most important, in the present case, is that perception facilitated by the 
closeness necessary for early nurturing is giving the infant an extremely focussed, close 
and detailed experience of the parent or anyone whom is caring for it, necessitated by the 
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nurturing of the child. „Discerning‟ then, in this case, has as its function an attachment, and 
has literally closeness between parent and offspring as its enabling variable, because of the 
child‟s needs for nurturing.  
Compared to the parent, whose bond to the child is “instant” (1161b25) and on 
sight, a parent‟s coming into view is for the child gradual. And while the mother (from 
whom the child has come) „knows the child‟ (1159a28-30), the child does not, or cannot, 
know the mother in the same sense. Yet the parent becomes intelligible to the child 
gradually and defines the child‟s becoming a perceiver in her own right, a perceiver who 
can with time induce another‟s intelligible form, and know who someone is, even to the 
degree of a parent to a child. Aristotle marks a clear transition in the infant stage, however, 
where the child becomes capable of sensing her surroundings affectively and through 
emotion: The child can feel affection for parent after a time when s/he has gained 
comprehension and/or the capacity to perceive (1161b26). This passage raises some doubts 
about when and at which stage an infant becomes capable of sensing the other with her full 
arsenal of sensing faculties, including her capacity to comprehend. It appears, though, that 
Aristotle has in mind a stage when perception and comprehension conflux. At this time 
there emerges an emotional bond of affection, perhaps love, in the child towards the parent.  
From Aristotle‟s passages concerning sight and perception in the NE, it seems 
plausible that he relies on theory developed in other works. Let me then present a theory 
from De Anima that is at first glance quite out of context, as it concerns animal perception 
in general, and sensory organs in particular, but can explain a great deal about perception of 
the other from the comments above. Perception is viewed by Aristotle as a type of „meeting 
of forms‟, i.e. the sum of the material, formal and final causes of the object meeting the 
form of the subject, via sensation as the mean. In De Anima he then writes, 
“As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived 
object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the 
two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the 
other as identical in quality with it (DAII.5 418a4-6). 
This somewhat cryptic passage explains a process describing the perceiver (or more correctly 
her perceiving organs) before „meeting‟ and taking in an object or form, as having a capacity 
to be potentially similar  to what the object is qualitatively. So what does it mean to be 
similar? Though this concept obviously deserves to be discussed in depth, we can say in brief 
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that likeness here is defined metaphysically as being capable of falling under the same 
category of quality
30
, quality in turn pertaining to what the object is in actuality in relation to 
opposing pairs of actuality, like whether something is hot or cold, light or heavy, soft or hard, 
shaped this way or the other, pertaining to the distinctions the senses can let us make out. So 
our sensory organs can pick up change by being able to juxtapose an opposing quality, 
rendering the quality in the object. We can also understand „likeness‟ in a commonsensical 
way as one object becoming likened to the other object in virtue of shared „incidental forms‟ 
under its „intelligible form‟. The potent and somewhat surprising notion Aristotle here puts 
forward is: that through perception, the perceiver has in her the capability to mirror, by way of 
opposed affective capacities, the activity of the object, the activity of the object being what 
the object does by way of initiating qualitative change, and by extension, sensing the objects 
form as a cause of change (what it truly is), thus accessing the objects form indirectly. 
This way of looking at sense perception, not as a mirror of activity but as an 
apparatus undergoing simultaneous change caused by the observed activities, explains at 
the same time why it is that a perceiver will be dependent on continuous observation of the 
objects‟ activities, and a memory of said activity, to gain enough examples to discern or 
judge the objects form. When we then take another human being to be this type of 
perceived object, it becomes clearer why  it takes such a long time and activity to „get‟ the 
other‟s form. It then becomes even more surprising and unique that, under Aristotle‟s 
understanding, we can truly have access to someone else‟s form (especially said mothers 
instant access in 1161b25, 1159a28-30) as what this person truly is, by way of what the 
person can do capacitatively, does dispositionally and is intelligibly.   
What is perhaps most significant, however, under this interpretation of the above 
passage, is a claim that by perceiving, the subject and object become more similar to each 
other. Dissimilar forms take  each other in by a sort of „assimilation‟, while in the next step 
of the process of perceiving they become similar in the first instance qualitatively, by the 
activity of the perceived other, affecting the subject in real time qua their initial qualitative 
differences, and secondly, by way of the subject sensing the juxtapositions of change from 
dissimilarity to likeness. It is also because of initial qualitative dissimilarity that the other is 
initially noticeable to the subject, the argument being that if the senses were in the same 
state as the sense-object then there would be no differentiation to be sensed.   
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I have stated that a clear motivation to perceive one‟s friend is pleasure. Pleasure is 
clearly the source of affection between lovers as stated in 1171b30. More interestingly in 
the present case, however, is that pleasure is also derived from similarity (1156b18). When 
we observe each other, and affectively derive each other‟s „form‟, we are in fact in the 
process of becoming more similar, and thereby deriving pleasure from the encounter.  
Perception of the other thusly becomes both a means and an activity in its own 
right, necessitating both closeness and activity in order to „know‟ the other, but when in 
active mode leads to likeness between subject and object along with pleasure in the 
process. 
4.1.4 Perception II: Self-Perception, Active Perception and the Desire to Be a True 
Self-Lover. 
As we shall see, a friend is partly defined as someone who can notice and perceive oneself in 
a light that is otherwise unattainable by the subject alone. From section 4.1.3 we can already 
see how perception stands as an incorporated category of living for the human animal. This, 
of course, could not be so if perception was considered solely as affection on the subject by an 
object. Under Aristotle‟s understanding, perception is also the activity of perceiving. 
Moreover, he claims a strong connection between perceiving the other and gaining 
understanding about oneself. I will presently venture a description of transition from passive 
perceiver of the other to perception in an active sense. 
The thing in nature that perceives in the human case, is the thing that can judge 
good in others, i.e. an intelligence. Being animals of intelligence, we naturally seek out 
others through intelligence, seeking also to be perceived by a member with like perceptive 
capacities. An intelligence „chooses what is best for itself‟, obeying that which the good 
prescribes, choosing „for the sake of the fine‟ (1169a17-18). Intelligence is also what we 
are most of all (1169 b39-a2)
31
. When we then are active in relation to each other we desire 
to understand and judge one another as intelligence, i.e. I) one who desires what is best for 
him/herself in relation to the good and fine, II) one who has the capacity to perceive you as 
an intricate whole and III) one who‟s rational makeup desires the good the same way as the 
perceiver. As intelligence we also want to judge „all different kinds of nuances and merit‟ 
(1164b27), being capable of deriving them without losing a lot on the way, and desiring 
what is best amongst these. And as the intellect desires what is best for itself, it also desires 
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a good „other‟ and a good „self‟, a self that can maintain harmony between its logical and 
alogical halves, which can both perceive good, desire the good and act in accordance with 
it. As this self-interest as intellect is at the heart of logos for thinking social animals,  what 
we perceive when we perceive others is one with the same desires, if they too are of the 
same character. When we then perceive by intelligence we know what the other is doing. 
He or she is distinguishing us as potentially good and a mutual good-seeker in return, and 
in extension we can surmise an understanding of ourselves as potentially good for the 
perceiver. 
A criterion for truly „knowing the other‟ is that we become capable of sensing, 
experiencing and thus „knowing‟ the other‟s alogical states as well as their intellect, 
something that cannot be derived from logos alone. Aristotle understands the term 
„sympathy‟ to be this type of sense. Sympathy is inhabited by “one who spends time with 
the other and makes the same choices…, or who feels grief and pleasure with his friend” 
(1166a7-9). We are sympathetic when we know and can  connect with the other‟s alogical 
side. In addition, once we truly know the other, we should be able to express our sympathy 
in a truly ingenious fashion, to help the others alogical side feel acknowledged (1171b4). 
Good friends are ingenious at following each other and can join immediately in, and 
partake in, the joy and grief of the other. We can thus claim that friendships are concerned 
with each other‟s affective states and character (1155b10) not just as a common interest, 
but as a genuine compassion for the other‟s well being in the moment.  
Getting to know someone, spending time together in shared activity and getting a 
thorough acquaintance and knowledge of one another‟s intellect and character is 
emphasised as being “very difficult” (1158a15-16) to achieve. Aristotle wouldn‟t 
emphasise its difficulty if it such mutual acquaintance could happen through mere  passage 
of time in another‟s company, say as class mates or as colleagues. Spending time together 
is a prerequisite for friendship, but it is not sufficient. Without engaging in query, and 
taking time to listen, without engaging each other‟s different attributes, i.e. without shared 
activity, one does not get to know someone well (sic.).  
As we have seen, we as perceivers are changed through our sense-perception of the 
other. In addition it seems there is a close connection between getting acquainted with 
someone, gradually sharing a likeness to someone, and discovering one‟s own character 
and dispositions. 
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In an interesting passage, he describes a capacity of self observation that is 
intimately connected with activity as a perceiver: 
...and if the one who perceives that he sees, the one who hears perceives that he hears, the 
one who walks perceives that he walks, and similarly in the other cases there is something 
that perceives that we are in activity, so that if we perceive, it perceives that we perceive, 
and if we think, it perceives that we think; and if perceiving that we perceive or think is 
perceiving that we exist (for as we said, existing is perceiving or thinking); and if 
perceiving that one is alive is pleasant in itself (for being alive is something naturally good, 
and perceiving what is good as being there in oneself is pleasant);  1170a29-b4  
This is a description of a perceiver who perceives him-/herself, both in energeia and as a 
perceiver (an argument similar to the cogito). Aristotle adds that the aim of such perception is 
pleasure in perceiving one‟s own energeia as action. If we liken the passage to Hannah‟s 
running, we see that Hannah derives precisely this type of pleasure, the pleasure in perceiving 
her own orexis (pull/reaching out) to run. The pleasure in the present case, however, is a 
pleasure of life itself. One‟s own exercising of one‟s own life and person as good is a true 
pleasure worth anyone‟s pursuit. Aristotle has here set the mark for desires concerning our 
own energeia. This goal is supported when stated elsewhere that the phronimos or person of 
practical wisdom and excellence, candidate for happiness, appears to be more the self-lover 
(1168b30).  
As we have seen, and shall see in 4.2, perception of the other‟s form is 
exceptionally difficult (1158a15-16). But difficult as it may be, Aristotle argues that the 
more difficult object to „grasp‟ is oneself: “We are better at observing others than 
ourselves” (1169b35). The process of active perception of one‟s own activity is 
exceedingly difficult outside of simple self-sensation of affective states. If we were to go at 
it ourselves we would have little to go on outside of being informed by our own pleasures 
and pains, lead by emotion, not from sensation by the intellect. Watching others‟ reactions 
to oneself puts self-perception in a different light. Understanding that the other is an 
intellect, we can see how intellect reacts by comparison to our own affective states. Thus, 
in order to be informed by nous (intellect) we depend on activity with the other.  
Being alive then, as intelligence sensing one‟s own activity affectively in addition to 
through the eyes of others, is something naturally good. Aristotle also argues that it is 
something naturally pleasant: 
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...and if being alive is desirable, and especially so for the good, because for them existing is 
good, and pleasant (for concurrent perception of what is in itself good, in themselves, gives 
them pleasure) and if, as the good person is good to himself, so he is to his friend (since the 
friend is another self): then just as for each his own existence is desirable, so his friend‟s is 
to, or to a similar degree. But as we saw the good mans existence is desirable because of his 
perceiving himself, that self being good 1170b4-10 
One‟s own being, then, is a good in itself, for each and every person; however, for 
those who are good, i.e. of good character, their existence is desirable to all. They are 
themselves life that is good. Such life is not good in relation to the good person only, 
though he/she finds living pleasant. Sherman, (Clarendon Press, 1989, pg. 125-26), 
discusses friendship in light of two senses of representing external goods: The other being 
good in themselves and being good for other goods that are to advantage for those who are 
friends with the good person. The existence exemplified above will be good in both senses. 
How this person is good in relation to others is plain to see. The way his/her existence is 
good, objectively, is not so straight forward. As stated in the citation, the good person‟s 
existence is desirable because the good person perceives himself. From what we have 
deduced from the prior discussion on perception, let me venture an interpretation (it has to 
do with becoming what you do, and the relation between action and character): since the 
good man perceives his own energeia with pleasure, and since the perceptive vessels 
change in relation to said energeia, and since this change is attached to the affection 
pleasure, a sign that the vessel and the activity are becoming similar in “quality” and 
“intelligible” form, we can deduce that the man is enjoying an existence in activity because 
he is enjoying becoming similar to his own form (I interpret this argument as an argument 
supporting the determinability of character traits once established). And since said self is 
good, he perceives becoming what is good in action
32
. The good person is an external good 
in and of itself because his/her form is in activity as the thing it should be – the good and 
fine activity of the soul in accordance with reason.  
Self-love,  then, will incorporate observing oneself as active perception of a good, 
well-functioning being. As mentioned, Aristotle here lays out the goal of our own energeia. 
The upshot of this notion is that the need for the other, for friendship, is a constant 
facilitating necessity, whether one is in a stage of emerging character capacities or of full 
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character excellence. Even friends of complete character-excellence, self-sufficient in most 
areas, will depend on others in order to act virtuously. 
Aristotle argues that the starting points of all friendship-relations start with oneself (1168a5-
8). This will also be true of the relation self-love. The true „lover of self or self-lover‟ is 
developed in IX.8 and can be rendered in the following argument: i) that people should love 
the one who is most a friend. ii) The one who is most a friend is the one who wishes the most 
good things for the person to whom the good things are wished, for the others sake. iii) The 
one who does this the most is our self in relation to our self. So a self-lover is one whose soul 
is not conflicted in relation to desires, reasons and actions in relation to the fine, because s/he 
has good-feeling towards him-/herself. In contrast, one whose logical-alogical faculties are in 
conflict will not be lovable, or indeed be a lover of himself, because such a person is in 
faction with himself – and does not appear to be disposed towards friendship, even towards 
himself (1166b19-26). As Aristotle states, each relation, i.e. each type of social bond, derives 
from or „belongs to‟ the decent person in relation to himself – a self that desires things in 
relation to his/her whole soul for the sake of the thinking part (1166a13-14), and from this 
relation „extends to others‟ externally the relations the good person has to himself internally 
(1168b5-8). The relation  character excellence most depends on, as we have examined in 
chapter 2 and 3, is the alogical soul‟s capability to listen to and act in accordance with reason, 
the fine and the good. Thus, the internal relation the good person extends to others is the 
capability to act in view of what those of similar souls think is fine and good. We can then 
take the term „being of one soul‟ as meaning „sharing the same set of values‟, „sharing a 
desire for what the soul senses as fine‟ and „mutually acting in relation to the values we 
share‟. We could not enable these bonds to „extend to others‟ if friends were not similar-
souled.  
4.2 Social Interaction as Action and Development.  
Through the descriptions above of the preconditions for social bonds, and an understanding of 
the ontology under which Aristotle‟s concept of friendship resides, we should now have some 
idea of our intrinsic social existence and which capacities friendship-states are dependent on. 
It is very clear, however, that friendship under Aristotle‟s definition is based in activity, 
shared activity, living together (suzēn), exchange of pleasure and benefit and, as I will argue, 
exchange of goods and excellence. I will here present the main concepts of active friendship, 
understood as transference of goods, giving and taking, in relation to each other as well as in 
relation to the final good. I will then continue to draw a more concrete description of stages of 
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friendship that Hannah goes through, and examine critical entries determining whether 
Hannah‟s decisions are indeed good for Hannah. 
Since our social development in Aristotle‟s ontology is teleological, we should first 
see if we find traces of development along such a path. Initially in the opening chapter of 
book VIII he promisingly shows that friendship is of different kinds for children, people in 
their prime and the elderly (1155a15). But we quickly see that these three types are not 
teleological, with elderly friendship as the goal. On the contrary, as elderly our physical 
dependency on others and constrictions on mutual activity leads this type of friendship to 
become more utilitarian, not necessarily for the sake of the other. So friendship in the prime 
of life is what Aristotle has in mind as the possible candidate for true virtue-friendship. We 
should not write off the possibility of finding clues on developmental stages, however. As 
we have already seen in 2.1.3 that Hannah is born into nurture-dependency which we can 
clearly describe as a primary stage – a stage of coming into existence no less. By 
perceiving and recognising her (to her) incidental world, Hannah recognises the features of 
her progenitor. She becomes a perceiver in a process which eventually requires intelligence 
in order to perceive (1161b26), not only incidental features, but also intelligible features of 
a parent laying out further boundaries for her intelligible world. Simultaneously she is an 
individuated and separate being, undergoing her own development. Once she has the 
capacity to perceive and comprehend her parents, her capacity to feel affection will 
simultaneously come into being.  
Hannah is at this time engaged in her own character development with others, 
extended to peers rather to parents.  
The next clue we have of a stage is a childhood/youth stage comprised of three 
notions: i) that friendships of this stage are mainly pleasure friendships (1156a35-37, 
1156a33), ii) that this stage is typified by character development, the other being someone 
who can who can help in avoiding mistakes (1155a13) and iii) and is a stage where we can 
gain benefits from growing up together (1161b35, 1156b26, 1161a4, 1161a25). There are 
some teleological notions in each of these. As for i) the pleasure-friendship, this type we 
see as predominant in childhood.   
Aristotle marks another transition:  
Friendship between young seems to be because of pleasure, since the young live by 
emotion, and more than anything pursue what is pleasant for them and what is there in front 
of them; but as their age changes, the things they find pleasant also become different. This 
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is why they are quick to become friends and to stop being friends; for the friendship 
changes along with what is pleasant for them, and shift in that sort of pleasure is quick. The 
younger are also erotically inclined, for erotic friendship is for the most part a matter of 
emotion, and because of pleasure; hence they love and quickly stop loving, often changing 
in the course of the same day. But the young do wish to spend their days together, and to 
live together, since that is how they gain the object that accords to their own friendship. 
1156a32-b6 
Here we see a change in maturity from activity we can identify as playground fun 
and games of early childhood to a more advanced exchange of pleasure in the form of 
erotic love in adolescence, as lead by the predominance of the emotional side of the soul at 
that point in life. It is evident that this description of “change” can span over several years. 
And it seems that what is cultivated and developed is the emotional side of the soul‟s 
increasing capacity for pleasure in another human being. We see precisely this transition in 
our thought experiment: once Hannah‟s other-oriented capacities develop in her school 
setting, her pleasure for „what is in front of her‟ (i.e. her lunch) decreases, while what is 
around her (fun and games) increases rapidly. And though what Aristotle observes in 
adolescent bonds seems fickle in nature, he still argues that adolescent‟s have true lasting 
bonds, due to their objective to be pleasant with each other. The notion of love and pleasure 
still play an explanatory role, however. It is interesting to see, then, that in his further 
discussion on character-friendship, Aristotle likens character- with pleasure-friendship due 
to character-friendship being a great source of pleasure (1158a18-20). Hence, between 
utility- and pleasure-friendships, the one grounded in pleasure is the closest to character-
friendship (1158a18-20). It seems then that these youths are not too far off the mark in their 
development toward friendship for the sake of the other, between good characters, by way 
of pleasurable engagement. 
Elsewhere Aristotle explains that the starting point of such friendship is like sensing 
beauty – and can be likened to good will (1167a3-4). The notion of good will is developed 
as the affection or emotion that occurs when observing decency or excellence. The other 
then appears to be a fine character, or courageous, or generous, or in some other ownership 
of a character excellence. Aristotle likens this approach to how we act when we root for 
contestants in sports (1169a19-22), like cheering, wishing a good outcome for the other 
person, or wishing goods bestowed upon them. Sensing an appearance of a good character-
state causes an affection of pleasure at the sight, again a sign that the appearance of a well 
functioning other arouses desires for us to liken them, or mimic them, in what we believe to 
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be unequivocally good activity. To press the argument a step further, such well-wishing can 
manifest itself in a cognate wish to be like the good character, also to approach them with 
the knowledge that if one‟s own character is good, shared activity and reciprocal 
acknowledgement will liken us to them. Aristotle also states, that characters of similar 
merit will have a „sense‟ for each other, making the distance for the one to approach the 
other shorter, in Aristotle‟s assumption that each of us gains pleasure in „noticing 
similarity‟ (1156b18; Braodie/Rowe pg. 212).  
The acquaintances between decent characters cause them to wish each other well in 
a different manner than that stated above. They do not passively gaze upon each other with 
admiration. Instead they a) wish good things upon each other, for the others sake (like 
everyone else) but b) in addition, are disposed to do something about it (1157a33). 
Aristotle is clear in his argument that wishing the other well is not simply an affection, like 
enjoying the triumph of a sports champion, but a disposition, manifest in action, to do a 
similar feat oneself, or act in the knowledge of one‟s own specialties and excellences, 
because of one‟s own affinity to be of like kind.  I must emphasise, though, that a) and b) 
are not exclusive but inclusive. The person of character-excellence will not instinctively 
attempt to up-show the champ at the site of his/her accomplishment, but will authentically 
wish and cherish the other‟s triumph for the other‟s sake.  
The next observation we need to make at the present stage of social development is 
that we need peers and superiors to help us in avoiding mistakes (1155a13; recall also from 
4.1.4 that we are dependent on others in order to be perceived by intelligence). It is critical 
to our character development that  we have friends around who know who we are and 
recognise our actions. This can‟t be done through casual play alone. Since we at this stage 
are „led by emotion‟ (1095a4), yet when live together (suzen) or choose to live together 
(from the passage above), each youth will depend on the other to observe and inform the 
other when they engage in bad reasoning or bad acts, playing collectively in the role of 
reason. And it would seem that friends at this stage are capable of listening to „collective 
reasoning‟ partly due to the knowledge of continued pleasure if they listen to one another. 
A relation that contributes to our understanding of young people is the relation 
„brotherhood‟. The relation „brotherhood‟ is often likened to friendship in that it entails 
knowledge of the other and a mutual sympathy toward each other. Both brothers and youth 
who grow up together „come from the same source‟ [(1161b31) and perhaps also have the 
same education and/or playground in the case of young friends]. Brothers, however,  in 
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contrast to young friends, do not go their separate ways due to the one not getting what 
they want from the other. The relation is extremely robust under Aristotle‟s definition in 
that brothers “belong to each other” (1162a12-13). They have been there to feel affection 
for the other since the birth of the younger. Their source is also a biological and generic 
source, not the incidental source that is education. Friends are likened brothers, in that they 
in general are in tone with one another (1161a27-28), while the camaraderie of adolescence 
is likened to brotherhood in that they are frank with one another, and prone to share due to 
both necessity and desire. Indeed, because a friendship of this kind survives both positive 
and negative experiences, because of the lack of gravity in youthful pleasure-relations, one 
can learn both through play, necessity and desire advanced social capabilities, sharing and 
self-truth.  
In order for friends to help each other better their characters and avoid mistakes, 
they must truly know each other‟s character. Yet recalling the position that knowing 
someone‟s character is exceptionally difficult (1158a15-16), how can someone so young be 
capable of help in this area? Aristotle states elsewhere that being of the same age 
contributes greatly to friendship (1161b35), meaning a) that they are around the same point 
of social, intellectual and emotional development, and b) that they share a common 
proximity in action. Another explanation is given to us in that being of the same source, i.e. 
upbringing, contributes to likeness of character, or at least evidence of how the same source 
affects the capacities that reside in each friend. Growing up together, going to the same 
school, having the same teacher, coming from the same neighbourhood, greatly informs us 
of our peers as „other selves‟. In the passage above we saw that the pleasure-friendships of 
children are of a fickle kind. However, this generalisation cannot be counted as Aristotle‟s 
final view on the matter. In youth, there are also those whom establish lasting friendships. 
Growing up together enables them to get to know the other‟s character and time to 
experience the others „lovability‟ (1156a26) through the longest and most secure scrutiny 
(1162a15). Youth also have a keen sense of what it is to be a „true friend‟. Aristotle allows 
for this to happen, especially when he likens those growing up from the same source with 
brothers coming from the same source (1161b31, 1162a12-13), and with brothers‟ tendency 
to be comrades (1165a28). Their relations are typified by frankness and sharing (1165a28).  
So youth who value each other, are capable of wishing each other well, sharing the goods 
they like the most, engage each other in activity for the sake of pleasure (but with activity 
for activities sake as pleasures function), and are honest with each other, prizing also 
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honesty in regard to oneself. And as stated, these friends whom „live by emotion‟ help each 
other avoid mistakes (1155a12-13). For the „true friend‟ will not let the other „go wrong‟ 
(1159b7-8) and knows that helping your friend with his or her character is what the most 
important (1165b25). 
Living with those whom are „lovable‟ to you, and their returned recognition of 
one‟s own „lovability‟ establishes a suzen (shared living) that encourages character-
training. Aristotle calls it „living with the good‟ (1170a11-12).  
4.2.1 Development Through Giving and Receiving: From Interaction to the Creation 
of Value.  
We have yet to look at how a developing character-friendship is encouraged through utility. In 
Book II.7 and IV.3-8, Aristotle emphasises character-excellence in relation to giving and 
receiving as social interaction. Our virtues and how good we can become is for Aristotle 
dependent upon virtuous activity with others. Indeed, just as important to our „becoming our 
form‟ as our disposition over inner affections and our ability to be disposed over the entirety 
of our soul are our intimacies, pleasures, dependencies, well- or ill-wishing, justice and our 
usefulness and pleasure given to others. Giving and receiving in different areas constitute 
different excellences (1158b18), like open-handedness, munificence, greatness of soul, or 
being able to give eagerly yet take in a leisurely manner. As stated in 4.1.2.2, amongst the 
goods we desire, friends rank amongst the greatest, both as a means to other goods in life and 
as a good in and of themselves. We desire nurturing and affection, to be perceived as „another 
self‟, to be like-minded with others and to activate what is potentially good in us in energeia – 
in action. Action and activity, best encapsulated by the actions of giving and receiving will 
therefore demand further notice.  
In treating Aristotle‟s models for friendship, we observed that parenting a child can 
be seen as a model for friendship – the relation between the progenitor and the progeny. 
This model is also helpful in illustrating social utility in transference of goods. The parent 
is the „maker of‟ the good in the child that is life. I take this to mean that a function of a 
friend to another is to be a progenitor for the goods in the other. But while the parent and 
child are in a sense a „giver‟ and a „getter‟ of the good that is life, a friend will be  both the 
progenitor and progeny of goods given and taken. Also, in the creation of goods in others 
(not only in desiring them),  we can assume that goods take two forms: goods in themselves 
for the sake of the receiver and goods for the sake of or enhancement of other goods (for 
instance, wanting something in return). But how can we conceptualise a transfer of goods 
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from one to another by simply engaging each other? What happens physically? What 
happens metaphysically? 
First off, it may be superfluous, or perhaps simply wrong, to ask of Aristotle to 
explain what happens physically in the productions of goods. We must keep in mind that 
the object of character-friendships, the utility the good represents, is one‟s firm disposition 
to act in accordance with human virtue. So the good produced is a „firm disposition‟. From 
our discussion of dispositions in 2.2.3, a disposition is whatever makes „our soul worse or 
better‟. And a soul‟s good condition depends on whether our alogical-logical faculties are 
working well in relation to the human good. This entails that the product of character-
friendship is continued virtuous activity. 
Yet contributing to the other‟s becoming good is still a poesis (production) like any 
other good inducing activity and is likened to the craftsman loving his/her work. The simile 
is apt because, like the craftsman, the contributor to good in others should function well at 
his/her craft by being inventive and ingenious in his/her work, not only loving what is 
produced but loving the work itself. The maker also „loves what he has wrought‟ (1167b31-
68a5). In Broadie‟s commentary of this passage (Oxford 2002, pg. 421) she emphasises 
that what the maker is loving in this case is the maker‟s ergon or function, being the 
function of the change in the subject by the maker, i.e. loving i) that the good has been 
enhanced by the function, and ii) that the cause of the good is his/her activity. It is thus the 
increment of good that the maker produces what s/he loves qua his/her activity. One is a 
lover as a source, and because one is a source. “Loving what one does is loving ones 
existence” (1168a5-8), existence in „another self‟. Yet, if my interpretation in 4.1.3 is 
sound, we also know that this love derives from allowing access to „knowing who someone 
is‟ as separate and individuated from oneself, which enables Aristotle to add „for the sake 
of the other‟ as a suffix to the notion „creating goods in others‟. One does not only love 
because one is a source. One also loves the activity of bestowing the good, feeling it 
enriching to create a good that is separate from oneself, which now belongs to the other. 
Bestowing goods in others by working on a relationship is rewarded by us „knowing‟ the 
other as another self because our contribution is a necessity for virtuous activity. According 
to Aristotle it is the existence of his/her work in the benefactor we love (1168a10). 
Bestowing goods as a „maker‟ of goods affects us with delight in the one in whom the 
making occurs (1168a10-11, Broadie 2002, pg. 421-22, Meta IX.8 1050a30, Phys, III.3).  
What one is making, since we are contributing to activity under the archē to kolon („the 
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fine‟ as final cause), is the enablement of one‟s own fine activity by the other. The process 
of change is an actuality in the subject, however. Friend‟s poesis of good dispositions is 
thus the good of the other, while the contribution to to kolon is the reward of the 
contributor. In this sense it is therefore the contributor that „gains‟ the finest good. This also 
explains how it is that character friends „compete‟ in doing good to each other (1162b7-9).  
The fine, kolos, are ends that friends will commonly agree on. They share not only a 
propositional judgement about what is advantageous (1167a27-28), but also what is good to 
both. Friends will thusly share a common view or agreement of what to kolon consists of. 
Thus, when „going forth together‟ they know they are going the same way. By affirming 
that the other‟s activity is in alignment with their shared perception, they affirm each 
other‟s disposition to fine action. Though their goals are the same, it does not mean that 
they have the same dispositions in accordance to the good. They may be characters of 
„complete excellence (1145a1-2), 1098a17-18), but will most likely excel in different areas, 
for instance the one excelling in being open handed, the other in wittiness, thus causing 
pleasure and utility in the other which again causes the other to desire to become better in 
that area. They thus enforce each other‟s good activity, making sure that „the fine survives 
the passage of time‟ (1168a16).  
4.2.2 Hannah‟s Decision 
Hannah does not strike us as someone whom is in conflict between her desires and activities,  
in general or under the circumstances of her decision. She knows her class-mates and team 
mates, and they know her different sides and strengths by learning and playing with her. In 
their training they‟ve seen each other getting better, each one‟s disadvantages being 
compensated for, and becoming individual techniques. Being brought up together and being 
the same age has contributed greatly to their camaraderie, as those who „live‟ together are 
natural comrades (1161b25). The observations made by teachers and friends have let her see 
her own talents while affirming that the pleasure she gets from running is good for her to feel. 
Hannah has had the benefit of being praised for what she displays in  track and 
field. However, it was her own discovery that the sport itself could be a worthwhile pursuit 
in itself. Indeed, though running around in the school yard was a great joy, also for others, 
in that she was quite good at such games, the aim of getting better at training systematically 
gave her an entirely new drive, her team-mates, coach and parents affirming this aim as 
good and worth-while. Hannah does seem like someone whom has had quite a lot of 
affirmation that she is good in her discipline. Our initial worry that she might not get the 
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needed affirmation for further growth might be misplaced in her case. Through observation 
of others she has become quite apt at „knowing herself‟. Indeed she knows herself so well 
that she immediately realises her dilemma, knowing precisely the lengths of her stamina 
and the time it takes to bring it up again. She sees clearly that she must sacrifice her 
stamina for the team relay or pace herself  for a chance to win her individual contest.  
Before her competition she is quite confident. Indeed she appears to know quite 
well what she is capable of and deeply desires the honour that can come from exercising 
her capacities in a contest. It appears that this craving is a part of her dilemma.  
The other part appears to be a realisation she is making while considering the 
dilemma, something she has only recently started to mull over. She notices her own 
confidence in running, which in itself is a joy for her. At the same time she knows who her 
team-mates are, the fun they‟ve had in practice, what they can do when they push, help and 
support each other. Fun as it is to run, it‟s more fun to run together. They‟ve often been told 
the values of pulling together, though previously this seemed a little odd to Hannah, as she 
did best in solo-competition. She realises that the honour she has felt from previous 
personal victories, which she now desires, will come about from this one individual 
victory. However, presently this benefit seems small in comparison to the communal good 
she desires in a shared victory. This realisation alarms her somewhat, though she is not 
unsure and decides to let up the gates in the relay. This action is extremely easy for her, 
second nature. She has no doubt in her orexis to run and displays this thoroughly. Once  
decided, it was easy to forgo her honour, which seemed small, in order to benefit the others 
(1169a33-4), and herself. Indeed she feels as if she is getting the better deal out of it.  
We noticed she is extraordinarily attuned to her situation. Indeed we are impressed 
that she is attuned to her circumstance in a way that is, for her, represented truthfully. Her 
self-perception is correct: both her emotions and her intellect are informing her of her own 
self as a person deserving of honour and praise for what she does well, based on her hard 
work and her dedication. Her cognition and sensing of values of each hypothetical outcome 
is spot on: In this new circumstance she sees clearly the value of individually claimed 
honour in comparison to honour claimed collectively. The latter she has been told, but has 
not been previously felt. She perceives the collective effort more clearly than she‟s done 
before in her track career: she knows the others so well that she knows what effect she can 
have on them. And she is right: her strength, stamina and determination inspire her 
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teammates to such a degree that they too went to their very limits, and won the race. Thus 
Hannah‟s decision was good for her.  
The question still remains, is Hannah‟s decision the decision of „the good person‟? 
Her choice incorporates what Burnyeat, as described in 3.3.3, describes as a sense of 
„strong‟ learning. Hannah has gone from knowing that a team effort is fine, to having 
sensed and anticipated it a priori by way of phantasia in a practical decision by 
understanding which value such an outcome would bring. She understood also through an 
entirely new feeling a posteriori, a feeling representing a new type of value that we can 
only imagine strengthens her abilities in ethical living. The question still remains, what end 
were Hannah, and especially her team-mates influenced by. Certainly it was winning, 
especially, for her team-mates. But it seems this honour became downplayed by the team as 
a whole. I wouldn‟t call the end Hannah acted in relation to truly Kolos, because honour 
was a steering desire, which is fair considering honour cannot outplay its role in her 
development until much later. However, Hannah‟s decision is a part of what inspired the 
others in the first place. It is a good she knew she could give them, and given they are of 
like types, which it appears they are, Hannah has here set an example of „good inducing‟ 
that the others probably will wish to liken. Though too early to call action in accordance to 
the good and the fine, Hannah is definitely on the right track. 
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5 Summary 
In this thesis I have shown how Aristotle‟s psychology of desire can only be fully appreciated 
in light of his astonishing breadth and depth of theoretical mechanisms on which his 
psychological theory is based. The NE is a source of a genuinely deeper understanding of the 
frame in which we, as I have argued, must discuss human desire. It is indeed quite pointless to 
discuss motivation or indeed philosophy of action without expanding our view outside the 
analysis of particular actions, to instead explore what it is that the human animal desires - 
through the modality of the animal in motion. The psychological mechanisms available for 
extrapolation in the NE rely heavily, to a surprising extent, on his metaphysics, his „first 
philosophy‟ for explanation, as they do biology, logic, scientific theory and ethics.  
It is not enough to look at these mechanisms in an isolated sense. This has been 
done often and is the flavour of the day in classical investigation on Aristotle‟s theory of 
desires. The problem we face when extrapolating Aristotle‟s arguments on the make-up and 
functions of the soul, is that it is not necessarily difficult to describe emotional, cognitive 
and social faculties that Aristotle lists readily in his texts – it is that it is unclear how they 
attach themselves to the functions he describes. The problem is figuring out how they work 
together in the manner he conceived them functioning – how they are tied together and 
causally influence each other – in action. In this paper I have developed many of the listed 
faculties of the soul that needed developing, and in addition provided solutions to their 
bunched-togetherness.  
In order to complete this line of inquiry, we must now synthesise the three faculties 
of development that I constructed for the sake of structure in the paper.  
The first two main chapters (2 and 3) explain the interaction between thinking 
(logos) and sensation (aisthêsis) in active relation to their objects – the perceived good. 
Perception (aisthêsis) is not a faculty divided in labour between the logical/alogical halves 
of the soul. Both the intellect and our emotions must be actively involved in order for us to 
sufficiently perceive complex human goods. Our main discovery in chapter 2 was that 
emotions and thoughts are causally linked. The logical/alogical parts of the soul influence 
each other causally under Aristotle‟s theory of the four causes. Thoughts can invoke 
influence on emotions causally under Aristotle‟s description of efficient cause. We made 
the potent discovery that emotions are exclusively sensations attached to thought, that 
thought qualifies emotion. Our emotional development incorporates us becoming 
„systematic understanders‟ of which emotions have which causes, thus gaining a capacity 
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to reflect on which objects affect us positively and negatively. Emotional development can 
thus lead to an ability to effectively perceive value in situations that are otherwise difficult 
to discern.  
Our intellectual development „feeds‟ our discerning ability. By desiring to „know‟ 
what „is‟ we develop nous (intellect) and phantasia (imagination) in our systematic 
understanding of the world. The intellect evolves along two distinct paths of development, 
as intellect by nature is divided in two distinct functions, one for inquiring into systematic 
knowledge of universal, the other an empirical knowledge of which particulars represent 
which goods. We have a genuine capacity unique in nature to be puzzled by our 
surroundings. This capacity is „what we are the most‟. One good for man is then engaging 
in solving the puzzles as they are represented to him/her in perceiving the good. Our main 
discovery in chapter 3 was that our intellect plays a crucial role in discerning both 
„solutions‟ to puzzles of a theoretic nature, but also in discerning the relevance of 
particulars in practical situations, and is a perceptive organ in its own right. The two 
distinct developmental paths do not exclude each other. We learn both toward and from 
universal truths, but without an attempt at ethical living and using our knowledge to 
develop practical wisdom, theoretic excellence is of little worth.  
Perception, âisthesis, of goods is a developing faculty in its own right, but is 
intimately attached to the metaphysics of the gradual individuation of the perceiver. We 
become a perceiver in gradual steps from birth. The main discovery of chapter 4 is that we 
are dependent on others in order to become self-perceivers, and indeed self-lovers. To tie 
this realisation back to the first two chapters, our senses are causes of pleasures in a most 
significant way, in that we can learn that a sensation of a good is a cause of pleasure. We 
can thus only learn to systematically take pleasure in activities for goods we desire together 
with others, making such activity a desired good in its own right. To become a perceiver 
we must understand an objects intelligible form. We desire to understand other‟s 
intelligible form, and through activity with them, our own.  
Our thought-experiment, Hannah, has gone through a development that has enabled 
her to discern the ethically good in her last transition, represented by her decision to engage 
in her teams good at a personal cost. This decision was made upon the desire of a good that 
Hannah perceived was of greater value. When answering „is it then the good that Hannah 
loves, or what is good for Hannah?‟ we can answer that Hannah has, with her decision, 
brought these two in alignment.  
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